

ISSN: 2992-8680

CHINA GLOBAL REVIEW

Volumen 3 • Número 6 • Julio - diciembre de 2025

6



UNIVERSIDAD DE COLIMA

Universidad de Colima

Dr. Christian Jorge Torres Ortiz Zermeño
RECTOR

Mtro. Joel Nino Jr.
SECRETARIO GENERAL

Dra. Xóchitl Angélica R. Trujillo Trujillo
COORDINADORA GENERAL DE INVESTIGACIÓN CIENTÍFICA

Mtro. Jorge Martínez Durán
COORDINADOR GENERAL DE COMUNICACIÓN SOCIAL

Mtro. Adolfo Álvarez González
DIRECTOR GENERAL DE PUBLICACIONES

Mtra. Irma Leticia Bermúdez Aceves
DIRECTORA EDITORIAL

Dr. Juan González García
DIRECTOR (Editor responsable)

Dr. Edgar Samid Limón Villegas
EDITOR TÉCNICO

Lic. Jorge Arturo Jiménez Landín
PROGRAMA EDITORIAL PERIÓDICO

Consejo Ejecutivo

Daniel Ricardo Lemus Delgado, *ITESM-Campus Guadalajara, México.*
Ana Bertha Cuevas Tello, *Departamento Estudios del Pacífico- U de G, México.*
Roberto Celaya Figueroa, *Instituto Tecnológico de Sonora, ITSON, México.*
Germán Osorio Novela, *FE-UABC, México.*
José Manuel Orozco Plascencia, *FE-Universidad de Colima, México.*
Tania Anahí Díaz González, *DRT-FE-Universidad de Colima, México.*
Dra. Marcela Maldonado Bodart, *Universidad de Arizona, EUA.*
Dra. Diana Elena Serrano Camarena, *Universidad de Guadalajara, México.*

Comité Editorial Nacional

Carlos Gómez Chiñas, *UAM, México.*
Arturo Oropeza García, *UNAM, México.*
Alejandro Carlos Uscanga Prieto, *UNAM, México.*
Roberto Hernández Hernández, *Universidad de Guadalajara, México.*
Melba Falck Reyes, *Universidad de Guadalajara, México.*
José Luis León Manríquez, *UAM, México.*
Xue Dong Liu Sun, *FES-Aragón-UNAM, México.*
Alfonso Mercado García, *El Colegio de México, México.*
María Cristina Rosas, *UNAM, México.*
Humberto Ríos Bolívar, *IPN, México.*
Alenka Guzmán Chávez, *UAM, México.*
Francisco López Herrera, *UNAM, México.*
Ignacio Perrotini Hernández, *UNAM, México.*
Graciela Teruel Belis Melis, *Universidad Iberoamericana, México.*
Cauahutémoc Calderón Villarreal, *El Colegio de la Frontera Norte, México.*

Consejo Editorial Internacional

Yang Zhimin, *Instituto para América Latina y el Caribe (CASS-ILAS), China.*
Xu Shicheng, *Instituto para América Latina y el Caribe (CASS-ILAS), China.*
Antonio C. Hsiang, *Centro de Estudio de Economía y Comercio de América Latina. Chihllee University of Technology, Taiwan.*
Maria Mont Strabucchi, *Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Chile.*
Andrés Bórquez, *Instituto de Estudios Internacionales de la Universidad de Chile, Chile.*
Jiang Shixue, *Centro de Estudios de América Latina. Universidad Shanghai, China.*
Han Qi, *Nankai University, Tianjin, China.*

CHINA GLOBAL REVIEW, Volumen 3, número 6, julio - diciembre 2025, es una publicación semestral, editada por la Universidad de Colima, Av. Universidad 333, Col. Las Víboras, Colima, Colima, México, C.P. 28040, a través del Centro Universitario de Estudios e Investigaciones sobre la Cuenca del Pacífico (CUEICP) y Centro de Estudios de APEC (CEAPEC), Av. Gonzalo de Sandoval 444, Col. Las Víboras, C.P. 28040, Colima, Colima, México. Tel. (312) 316-1131, <https://revistasacademicas.ucol.mx/index.php/China>, chinaglobalmx@gmail.com. Editor Responsable: Juan González García. Reserva de derechos al uso exclusivo del título No. 04-2023-112214343200-102, ISSN: 2992-8680, ambos otorgados por el Instituto Nacional del Derecho de Autor. Responsable de la última actualización de este número, Centro Universitario de Estudios e Investigaciones sobre la Cuenca del Pacífico, Juan González García, Av. Gonzalo de Sandoval 444, Col. Las Víboras, Colima, Colima, México, C.P. 28040, fecha de última modificación 6 de noviembre de 2025.

5E.1.2/317010/202/2025 Edición de publicaciones periódicas

Contenido

4	Presentación <i>Alberto Francisco Torres García</i>
8	The Role of Chinese Culture (Confucianism) in East and Southeast Asia <i>Héctor Arturo Oropeza García</i>
47	La Ley de Promoción de la Economía Privada de la RPC en contexto: Un análisis histórico-político <i>Franco Maximiliano Lagarrigue</i>
67	Institutions Role in the Economic Development of Underdeveloped Countries. Lessons From China for Mexico <i>Andrea Salazar Aguilar</i>
110	The Global Community of Shared Future and Its Influence Mechanisms on China–Latin America Ecommerce Cooperation <i>Liu Shiyang</i>
127	Desarrollo regional México-China: Un análisis comparativo y de consistencia <i>José Manuel Orozco Plascencia</i>

Presentación

China: historia, instituciones y cooperación

El papel de la República Popular China en la esfera internacional ha adquirido una relevancia significativa en las últimas décadas, convirtiéndose en un referente para las investigaciones sobre desarrollo y crecimiento económico. En el ámbito de las ciencias sociales, los aspectos políticos, culturales y económicos de China ofrecen un campo fértil para los estudios de caso y la aplicación del método comparativo, con el fin de establecer líneas de acción y directrices para la toma de decisiones.

En esta edición, se aborda la transformación económica interna de China, las lecciones derivadas de su desarrollo institucional, su influencia cultural milenaria en Asia y su creciente activismo en la cooperación global, con especial atención a América Latina. Los artículos se articulan en una secuencia lógica que examina: 1) los fundamentos culturales e institucionales del poder chino; 2) el análisis comparativo del modelo estatal de desarrollo; 3) la validación metodológica de dicha comparación; y 4) la aplicación de este poder y modelo en la cooperación internacional.

Desde un enfoque histórico y cultural, la razón de ser del Estado en China se sustenta en la premisa de que constituye una entidad moralmente superior (Lemus, 2023). En esta línea, el primer trabajo, *The Role of Chinese History and Culture in East and Southeast Asia*, analiza la influencia histórica y cultural que ha configurado la cosmovisión china en el desarrollo político, social y cultural de Asia oriental y sudoriental. Se sostiene que la continuidad milenaria de la civilización china, cimentada en el confucianismo, ha ejercido una influencia decisiva en la conformación de los países vecinos. El estudio resalta cómo los principios morales confucianos moldearon las estructuras de gobierno en China, Japón y Corea, mientras que el sistema tributario consolidó el rol central de China en la región. Comprender esta continuidad civilizatoria resulta indispensable para interpretar tanto la cohesión regional como el ascenso global contemporáneo de China. Aunque

Cómo citar: Torres García, A.F. (2025). Presentación. China Global Review, 3(6), 1-7.

su influencia alcanzó su máximo en Asia oriental, en el sudeste asiático se manifestó principalmente en los ámbitos político y económico, sin dejar de legar una impronta cultural que perdura hasta hoy.

El segundo artículo titulado *La Ley de Promoción de la Economía Privada en contexto: Un análisis histórico-político*, ofrece un análisis cualitativo de la Ley de Promoción de la Economía Privada (LPEP), promulgada en China en 2025. El estudio examina el alcance y las limitaciones de esta norma dentro del marco más amplio de las reformas económicas y jurídicas recientes. Dado que las instituciones coordinan y regulan el funcionamiento de una economía —y su eficiencia incide directamente en el bienestar de empresas e individuos al proporcionar un entorno propicio para sus actividades (Juárez y Torres, 2006)—, la LPEP busca establecer un marco legal unificado para el sector privado, garantizando un trato equitativo frente al sector público, al que supera en generación de riqueza e innovación. No obstante, la ley reafirma la subordinación del sector privado a la autoridad política, en coherencia con la concepción china de que el Estado de derecho es inseparable de la conducción política del Partido Comunista de China (PCCh). En conclusión, la LPEP constituye un avance significativo al reconocer explícitamente el papel del sector privado en la economía nacional, aunque mantiene su dependencia jurídica y política respecto al sector público y al PCCh.

China se ha consolidado como la segunda economía del mundo y se encuentra próxima a ocupar la primera posición, atendiendo al valor de su producto interno bruto y al dinamismo de su motor económico (González et al., 2023). El tercer artículo, titulado *Institutions' Role in the Economic Development of Underdeveloped Countries. Lessons From China for Mexico*, aborda el tema desde una perspectiva neo-institucional. Se argumenta que el éxito de China se debe a las reformas institucionales graduales —basadas en el incrementalismo— impulsadas por el Estado desde 1978, las cuales propiciaron un crecimiento sostenido y mejoras en el bienestar social. Desde el inicio del programa de apertura y reforma, las políticas públicas chinas han permitido que alrededor de 850 millones de personas superen la pobreza extrema (Ambrós, 2021). En contraste, México adoptó un modelo neoliberal en los años ochenta, caracterizado por la reducción de la intervención estatal, lo que derivó en un crecimiento más lento y desigual. El estudio, que compara mandatos constitucionales entre 2001 y 2024, concluye que el enfoque chino —basado en una evolución institucional pragmática y en el Estado como agente innovador— ofrece lecciones valiosas para los países en desarrollo que buscan alcanzar los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible (ODS).

En el contexto económico global actual, el comercio electrónico se ha convertido en un motor emergente de cooperación internacional (Li et al., 2022). En este marco, el cuarto trabajo, *The Global Community of Shared Future and Its Influence Mechanisms on China–Latin America E-commerce Cooperation*, formula un modelo teórico sobre los mecanismos de influencia del concepto chino de la “Comunidad Global de Destino Compartido” (CSFM) en la colaboración de comercio electrónico entre China y América Latina. La investigación se apoya en la teoría institucional y en la teoría del capital social: la primera aporta un marco analítico sobre las actividades transfronterizas de las empresas de comercio electrónico (Cumming et al., 2023), mientras que la segunda permite comprender las dinámicas relacionales y culturales. El modelo identifica cinco mecanismos principales de influencia: coordinación de políticas, empoderamiento tecnológico, integración económica, confianza cultural mutua y resiliencia al riesgo. A través del estudio de caso del Proyecto Aldea Digital de México, se demuestra que el concepto CSFM ofrece mecanismos efectivos para el éxito de la cooperación bilateral. No obstante, se subraya la necesidad de ampliar la apertura institucional, fortalecer la inversión conjunta y promover la formación intercultural para superar los desafíos derivados de las diferencias culturales e institucionales.

Por último, el quinto artículo, *Desarrollo regional México-China: Un análisis comparativo y de consistencia*, aplica una prueba metodológica al enfoque comparativo diacrónico utilizado en una investigación doctoral sobre los patrones de desarrollo regional de México y China durante el periodo 1980–2012. El estudio demuestra la viabilidad de comparar economías de distinto tamaño y con datos publicados en años diferentes (México 2009 y China 2011), mediante la estandarización de las metodologías censales con la Clasificación Industrial Uniforme de Naciones Unidas (CIIU-3). Asimismo, emplea el software TAREA (Técnica de Análisis Regional: Entrenamiento y Aplicación) de CEPAL/ILPES. El hallazgo principal confirma que, tras la apertura externa, tanto en México como en China persiste una alta concentración de actividades económicas en la Región Centro y en la Costa, respectivamente.

En conjunto, los cinco artículos conforman un cuerpo analítico coherente y progresivo que examina la naturaleza del poder y el desarrollo de China en el siglo XXI, desde sus raíces culturales e institucionales hasta su proyección económica y política en el ámbito regional y global. Esta edición enfatiza, particularmente, los vínculos comparativos y de cooperación entre China, México y América Latina, aportando elementos valiosos para comprender las transformaciones contemporáneas del orden económico internacional.

Referencias

- Ambrós, I. (2021). *China derrota la pobreza extrema, pero los pobres no se han ido*. *Política Exterior*. <https://www.politicaexterior.com/china-derrota-la-pobreza-extrema-pero-los-pobres-no-se-han-ido/>
- Cumming, D., Johan, S., Khan, Z. y Meyer, M. (2023). E-commerce policy and international business. *Management International Review*, 63(1), 3–25. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11575-022-00489-8>
- González García, J. y Zamora Torres, A. I. (2023). Avances y retrocesos en el combate a la pobreza en México y China (pp. 15–76). En A. F. Torres García (Ed.), *Divergencias en el desarrollo económico de México y China* (p. 246). Universidad Autónoma de Baja California Sur; Universidad Veracruzana.
- Juárez Mancilla, J. y Torres García, A. F. (2006). La importancia de las instituciones para la mejora de la competitividad en materia de comercio exterior. *Expresión Económica. Revista de Análisis*, 79–90. Universidad de Guadalajara, Centro Universitario de Ciencias Económico Administrativas.
- Lemus Delgado, D. (2023). China, legitimidad política y el combate a la pobreza (pp. 39–56). En A. F. Torres García, D. Lemus Delgado, y J. González García (Eds.), *Los contornos recientes de las políticas económicas y sociales en China y México* (p. 159). Altres Costa-Amic; Universidad Autónoma de Baja California Sur.
- Li, X., Wu, Y., Wang, Y., Wang, Y. y Wen, T. (2022). E-commerce connecting China and Latin America via Digital Silk-Road. *Cuban Journal of Public and Business Administration*, 6(1). <https://apye.esceg.cu/index.php/apye/article/download/200/183?inline=1>

Alberto Francisco Torres García

<https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4338-9928>

atorresg@uabcs.mx

Departamento Académico de Economía

Universidad Autónoma de Baja California Sur

La Paz, Baja California Sur

The Role of Chinese Culture (Confucianism) in East and Southeast Asia

El papel de la cultura china (confucianismo) en el este y el sudeste asiático

Héctor Arturo Oropeza García
<https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4970-7157>
a.oropeza@unam.mx

Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, México

Recibido: 09 de septiembre de 2025
Aceptado: 16 de octubre de 2025



“As Jean Levi admitted, until he went in depth into the study of Confucianism, under the influence of the greatest attraction that Taoism and Buddhism usually have for Western thinkers, he remained on the borders of Chinese tradition, interested only in his images, “always wandering around the periphery without venturing to its center.”
Jesús Sole-Farras

Abstract: This paper examines the influence that Chinese culture has had on the configuration of East and Southeast Asia, from a millenary vision that remains relevant. It argues that this Chinese continuity—expressed through a civilizational interpretation of the world and of life, based mainly on Confucianism—has maintained a significant influence on the development of the political, economic, and social ethnicity of East and Southeast Asia.

It puts forward the idea that, under a millenary cultural tributary system of Confucian nature, China has always consolidated its central role in the region. Importantly, it points out that the persistence of the Chinese worldview today, with the revitalizations recorded throughout this long period, continues to be a key interpretative point for understanding the new geopolitical participation of this important region.

Cómo citar: Oropeza, H.A. (2025). The Role of Chinese Culture (Confucianism) in East and Southeast Asia. *China Global Review*, 3(6), 8-46. <https://doi.org/10.53897/REvChinaGR.2025.06.01>

Keywords: Confucianism, civilization, China, Vietnam, Japan, Korea

Resumen: Este trabajo examina la influencia que la cultura China ha tenido en la configuración de Asia Oriental y Sudoriental, a partir de una visión milenaria que guarda vigencia. Se sostiene que esta continuidad China expresada a través de una interpretación civilizatoria del mundo y de la vida, basada principalmente en el confucianismo, ha mantenido una influencia relevante en el desarrollo de la etnicidad política, económica y social del Este y del Sudeste Asiático.

Propone la idea de que bajo una política tributaria cultural milenaria de naturaleza confuciana, China consolidó desde siempre su papel central en la región. Y de manera importante, señala que la persistencia de la cosmovisión China en la actualidad, con las revitalizaciones registradas a lo largo de este amplio periodo, sigue siendo un punto de interpretación fundamental para entender la nueva participación geopolítica de esta importante región.

Palabras clave: Confucianismo, civilización, China, Vietnam, Japón, Corea

Introduction

This study examines the historical and cultural influence of China on East and Southeast Asia, under the premise that Chinese civilization is an essential factor for understanding the politics and societies of the region. Unlike the West, whose development has been marked by ruptures and discontinuities, China has been characterized by the continuity of its philosophical, social, and political structures. Confucianism, in particular, established a moral model of the state which, beyond its historical adaptations, shaped the organization of power not only in China but also in Japan and Korea.

The persistence of Chinese civilization, together with its tributary system and the transmission of language, technology, and values, created a regional order that positioned China as the cultural and political center of Asia for centuries. At the same time, the inability of Western analytical frameworks to fully grasp China's civilizational continuity has led to recurrent misunderstandings of its regional and global role.

This paper is structured in six main sections. First, it examines China and its influence in East Asia. Second, it discusses Confucianism and its importance in regional cohesion. Third, it analyzes China's influence in Southeast Asia. Fourth, it considers Southeast Asia and the present Confucian lines. Fifth, it addresses the main challenges faced by Southeast Asia. Ultimately,

the study argues that understanding the continuity of Chinese civilization is indispensable to interpreting both regional cohesion and China's contemporary global rise. The study ends with the conclusions.

China and its Influence in East Asia

East Asia. A Coherent Region

The West has always had an inadequate understanding of East Asia (China, Japan, and Korea)¹, throughout its different stages of coexistence with this region. For millennia, the separation between these regions was the product of distance, which isolated them from greater contact with the Indo-European civilization that, at its extreme western end, was maturing with pretensions to universality.

The intuitions of the other were always present, but the force of the geographical and technological obstacles determined that only the exception would travel between the two worlds, cultures that developed with an idea

1 For the purposes of this essay, the term East Asia will only include China, Japan, and Korea for illustrative purposes. However, it should be noted that according to the United Nations (UN), the concept includes the following countries: China, Hong Kong, Macao, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Japan, Mongolia, the Republic of Korea. As for Southeast Asia, the UN includes Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, East Timor, Vietnam. The South Pacific is made up of the following sub-regions: Australia and New Zealand, the Christmas Islands, the Cocos Islands, the Heard and McDonald Islands, the Norfolk Islands, Melanesia, Fiji, New Caledonia, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu Micronesia: Guam, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Northern the Mariana Islands, Palau, the U.S. Overseas Islands, Polynesia, American Samoa, the Cook Islands, French Polynesia, Niue, Pitcairn, Samoa, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, Wallis, and the Futuna Islands. As for South Asia or South Asia, it includes the nations of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Iran, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Finally, Asia Pacific, which includes several sub-regions and encompasses countries on the continents of Asia, Oceania and, in some cases, the American continent. This category is not used by the UN for statistical purposes but has gained importance due to the creation of the Asia-Pacific Cooperation Forum in 1989. Since it is not a specifically defined category, the countries that comprise it vary according to the source. The countries that comprise it are usually the sum of the subregions it covers: East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the South Pacific. In some cases, Russia is also considered. In the Asia-Pacific Cooperation Forum. The following countries of the American continent are added: Canada, United States, Mexico, Peru, and Chile.

of exclusivity until the Nineteenth Century. At that time, western visitors in the form of military and diplomatic advances broke the decadency of the Chinese imperial period (1839), Japanese isolationism (Sakoku), and the binational pressure (a shrimp among whales) that Korea has always suffered as the hinge country of the area.

China, Japan, and Korea, due to their geographical proximity, have lived for two millennia in an obligatory neighborhood full of vicissitudes that accompanied them with intensity from the birth of their pre-modern states until the 19th century. In time, the precocity of the modern Chinese state, formalized before our era, set the standard for the exchange of a collective regional culture that greatly determined its social and political ethnicity.

The cultural and geopolitical logic which, to a greater or lesser extent, prevailed in the region for nearly two millennia was broken with the arrival of the Western powers resulting in a first clash of civilizations that generated a rearrangement of the axioms and actors in the area. These have gradually been rebuilt but with this process still being incomplete to date.

This region, led by China, held great economic, cultural, and geopolitical importance for two millennia. Now, since the beginning of the 21st century, it is once again gaining greater relevance every day to the point of ushering in a transfer from the Era of the Atlantic, managed by the West, to a new Era of the Pacific, led by the countries of East and Southeast Asia, which, little by little, are taking relevant positions in the economic, social, and political fields of the world. This has led to a leadership clash in different ways and languages between China and the United States when they appear at the same discussion table, debating with increasing intensity, day by day, the attributes of a complex global hegemony during the third half of the 21st century. The Asian century, has arrived, Mahbubani says, even if the area must stumble one or two more times before it rises to the top.

An interpretive lag on central themes regarding East Asia, such as the validity of its millenary culture, the existence of a Confucian Moral State, the organizational filial piety of its institutions, the validity of its utopias, the nature of its ethnicities, and of the Confucian moral lines of their societies, among others, are issues that remain open. This limits a better appreciation and understanding of the construction of the political power of their societies, the nature of the implementation of their economic models, and the ethical-moral behavior of their social organizations.

The Cultural Affinity of the Area

Holcombe, when describing East Asia defines it as “The region of the world that used the Chinese writing system extensively, and that absorbed through these written words, many of the ideas and values of what we call Confucianism, much of the associated legal and political governance structure, and certain specific forms of East Asian Buddhism,” to which he adds, that “East Asia is truly a culturally and historically coherent region, which deserves serious attention as a whole, and not just like a random group of individual countries, or some arbitrary lines on a map” (Holcombe, 2016, pp. 12-13).

The Origins of Affinity. East Asia is the right arm of the largest continent in the world, which, with its geographical characteristics, protected the birth of the three central actors of the region. China is its central axis, and the lucidity of Chinese thought stands out at the level of the best cultures in the world. Just as Greco-Latin thought is a fundamental part of the Western ethos, so the strength of the Chinese proposal became the central scaffolding for the construction of the East Asian States, in particular, and a relevant influence for the nations of Southeast Asia.

The Chinese tree was born early and strong. When Holcombe asks how old China is, he replies that Chinese civilization is often assumed to be the oldest in the world, having arisen in the late Stone Age (Neolithic), having flourished in the rise of the Bronze Age civilization, which emerged 2000 BC, and have survived thereafter without interruption to this day. The invitation is to understand the Chinese and Asian phenomenon beyond a short-term vision and looking beyond the individuality of each of its members. However, Holcombe, himself, warns that no civilization constitutes a permanent concrete reality; civilizations are abstractions of historical continuities and connections that become meaningful, and they also have permeable frontiers where ideas are exchanged (Holcombe, 2016, p. 13).

For this reason, starting with China to talk about Japan, Korea, and East Asia is not only convenient, but it is also mandatory. Their coherent kingdoms of Xia, Shang, and Zhou, from XXI to III BC, with their high level of civilization, make them a starting point, not only for the interpretation of China, but for an entire cultural region of rice, silk, and the language of remote times.

Contrasting with the Chinese development of that time, Japan had the Jōmon and Yayoi cultures arising about 1000 BC, identified by their

pottery and a multiplicity of clans. In the case of Korea, there was a greater number of social organizations from the XXIII century to the first century BC, such as the Old Joseon, Tan-gun, Kija periods, etc., but like Japan, their advance with respect to China was asymmetrical.

Since the times of the Bronze and Iron Ages, the first links within the region can already be seen with an inevitable influence of Chinese development on the others within the region. In the case of Japan, for example, in its intermediate period (300 BC), when the first early state formations occurred, the sending of prisoners of war to Chinese monarchs as gifts or tribute was a frequent practice in order to obtain recognition. Based on the Chinese historiography of the time (Han), which was the only one that existed in this period, it had already been recorded that in the 1st century BC, there were a large number of small kingdoms in the Japanese islands; that King Na of Wa (the name that was given to Japan in the Chinese chronicles of that time) had sent a diplomatic mission to an emperor of the Later Han Dynasty; in 107, another Han emperor had received gifts from a King of Wa, including 160 slaves (Tanaka, 2013, pp. 39-40). Regarding this, Mori commented "The information about the first kingdoms of the Japanese islands has been transmitted by Chinese history books. The oldest records are concentrated in the book of the Han according to which the Emperor of China conferred a gold seal on a Japanese King in 57 AD. The meaning of this was that the records still exist and it was discovered in North Kyūshū in the 18th century." (Mori, 2019, p.14) Similarly, archaeological evidence reveals the extensive use of pottery and wares such as bronze mirrors, swords, and other implements in Japanese tombs and burials from 1000 BC on, which possibly came through Korea during the Yayoi period (Vogel, 2019, p.4).

Korea also experienced Chinese influence starting in its early Bronze and Iron Ages. Around 1200 B.C., it developed a culture of black pottery similar to that of Longshan China, now the North Shandong province: bronze mirrors, knives, and other ceremonial utensils such as bronze bells from the 5th century BC, as Nahm indicates, suggest the cultural influence of China. The same sources in the Han Dynasty record books indicated that the kingdom of Kija (1120-18 BC) was formed from a split of the Chinese kingdom of Shang (Yin), which was defeated by Chou King around 1122 BC. This account described that Kija emigrated to Korea with 5,000 followers that revealed themselves to the Chou government. This Sino-Korean Dynasty would later lose part of its dominions and fortresses in the 4th century B.C. at the hands

of the Chinese Yen or Yan State. However, its records show the strong historical ties in the origin of these countries (Nahm, 1996, pp. 24,26).

This porosity of borders of developing States would also lead to a wave of Chinese refugees entering the Korean peninsula at the end of the 3rd century BC due to the establishment of the Qin Dynasty, which ended the creation of the first Modern Chinese State in 221 BC. Chinese general Wiman, one of those affected by this integration of peoples, founded the Korean kingdom Wiman-Choson, which was defeated by the Han Chinese in 109 BC; the same Chinese Dynasty then installed the first bases of administrative control on the ground through which goods collected by the Chinese government (salt, iron, agricultural products, etc.) flowed, as well as cultural knowledge (Seligson, 2019, pp. 35-36).

China was born ancient with an early integration that shared its values with neighboring groups and the different societies of the time. Its difficult stages of Spring and Autumn (722-481 BC), and of warring States (403-221 BC), although they were convulsive and belligerent between their different kingdoms, at the same time represented, as already said, one of the most lucid times in the generation of political and philosophical thought. The integration of China's last seven pre-modern states carried out by the Qin Dynasty pushed it to stages of development superior to those of its neighbors in the region. "Unification under one empire," as Hoffman points out, ended a long period of war and gave people the precious gift of security. Preserving unity then became an essential part of the very idea of the state, even as China was ravaged by rebellions and internal wars. This helped keep the empire intact, as did efforts to reduce ethnic differences through education, migration, and the imposition of a dominant culture. These efforts, he adds, left an indelible mark on ethnic and linguistic differences in China (Hoffman, 2016, p. 145).

The Chinese project developed along the entire cultural horizon. In relation to the creation of written language since, around 1200 BC, there are records of archaic linguistics whose evolution can be traced to the present day. Along with this is documented history from the Zhou Dynasty (1122 BC-256 BC) that narrates the relevant facts of the area, and its daily life. The first evidence of Chinese pottery dates to 7500 BC, at the same time the region represented one of the first world centers for the domestication of plants and animals, it was one of the great exporters of bronze and had the first cast iron production in the world around 500 BC. In the middle of the 2nd century BC, China was technologically more advanced and innovative

than Europe. Among its many advances from the time included (Diamond, Midham, Holcombe, etc.) cast iron gutter gates, deep bores, harness for transport animals, gunpowder, kites, compasses, paper, printing with movable (non-metal) typefaces including porcelain, stern rudders, the trolley, etc. (Kaplan, 2013, p. 246) This overflow of development caused China to be the first nation with the organized production of food, technology, etc., and in a relevant way, the construction of an important social and political organization that contributed decisively to the formation of neighboring states.

Japan and Korea adopted rice cultivation from China in the second millennium BC. In the first millennium, they obtained important teachings on the subjects of bronze metallurgy, pottery, wheat, and barley crops, among many others. However, one of the contributions that most influenced the development of East Asian countries, both individually and collectively, was language. In this regard, Diamond believes "... the prestige that Chinese culture still enjoys in Japan and Korea is so great that Japan does not at all intend to abandon its Chinese-derived writing system despite its inconveniences to represent Japanese words, although Korea is finally regularizing now its cumbersome Chinese type writing by the excellent Hangul alphabet" (Diamond, 2018, pp. 380-389).

Mandarin is presented as the oldest living language on earth, as well as the second most widely spoken language in the world (22%), with speakers in about 30 countries. Until the 18th century, more than half of the books published in the world were printed in Mandarin (Asia-Pacific Centre of Education for International Understanding, 2015, p. 188). Of course, this language was born within a wide range of phonemes. Today more than 300 living languages are still registered in China. However, the fact that language and books appeared centuries before our era, and within them, a philosophical, political, and social proposal of the State was lucidly reflected, is a transcendent fact that became the main engine of influence on the Chinese civilization of the time. This was especially true for Japan and Korea, which did not have a written language at the time and lagged in their political organization and cultural formation.

Until the 6th and 7th centuries, Japan was an illiterate state. Then Chinese characters began to circulate from those dates, along with a first centralized administrative organization influenced by China. Its first historical compilations, the Kojiki (712) and the Nihonshoki (720), referring to antecedents and chronicles of a historical nature, were written in Chinese

characters. The chapters of the second of these, the *Nihonshoki*, for example, record the arrival in Japan via Korean scholars of the books of the Analects of Confucius and the Thousand Chinese Characters (Asia-Pacific Centre of Education for International Understanding, 2015, p. 238).

Similarly, Korea used the Chinese language as a first form of communication, which remained unchanged until the 15th century. Then one of its most representative monarchs of the Joseon Dynasty, King Sejong (1418-1450), invented an alphabet of 28 characters called Hangul, which was published in 1443. Notwithstanding the above, the strong cultural influence of China at the time caused that this proposal was contemptuously received as vulgar, "that did not have the literary merit of Chinese writing;" it was even outlawed in 1504 by Prince Yeonsan, which is why Mandarin remained the privileged means of communication until the 19th century (Romero, 2019, p. 74).

The first Korean historiographies appeared in the 12th century, four centuries after the Japanese, with the publication of the book *Sanguk Sagi*, written by Kim Pusik at the suggestion of King Injong with Chinese characters and Confucian style around 1145. This dealt with the history and customs of the Three kingdoms of Koguryo, Paekche and Shilla. A hundred years later, a second book entitled *Sanguk Yusa* appeared, written with the same characteristics as its previous simile, although more focused on the legends, tales, and stories of the three Korean kingdoms, especially the kingdom of Shilla, which ultimately would be the one that would achieve the first unification of Korea in 668. These first Korean works had as their immediate reference the Han Chinese records, such as the *Weizhi*, and the *Sanguo Zhi*, etc. This is why Kim Bu-sik commented in the preface to the *Sanguk Sagi*, "Among the scholars and high-ranking officials of today, there are those who are well-versed and can discuss in detail the Five Classics and the other philosophical treatises... as well as the stories of Qin. and Han, but as for the events of our country, they are completely ignorant from beginning to end. This is truly unfortunate" (Kim, 1145, as cited in Lee, 1992).

East Asia and its Cultural Tributary Policy

Chinese civilization in East Asia was like a magnet that brought together three social organizations that mixed culturally even beyond their political desires. From this Chinese influence, but also from Japanese and Korean admiration of China, with their trying to learn from the Chinese referent, there

emerged a tax era of a civilizing nature, where the payment of tariffs was least important and where true dependence or taxation was born out of the desire to educate themselves in the knowledge of the Chinese Middle Kingdom in a wide range of modalities, from political organization, bureaucratic administrative technique, social organization, technological knowledge, etc. This led China to become a beacon of illustration from its foundation, up to its regional decline in the 19th century, which is when Chinese taxation really ended. There are authors who mark the tributary era of East Asia only from the formal acceptance of the delivery of stipends to the Chinese nation (Vogel, Nahm, etc.). However, linking the tax period only in the light of a formal gesture of surrender or guardianship would severely limit the appreciation that can be had of the civilizational exchange of the region based on the cultural influence that China always radiated to its neighbors, and to the evident use that they made of this influence in an official or veiled way.

The official tributary policy, as already mentioned, was based on the Asian states in formation that voluntarily went to the emperor in turn to request the ratification of his mandates in exchange for gifts or tribute. It also occurred, although to a lesser extent, in the face of Chinese harassment or military intervention that intimidated its neighbors, forcing them to recognize it as the center of the geopolitical system in the area.

The Chinese Middle Kingdom was the undisputed leader of its region for most of modern time. Its civilizing and tributary influence not only affected Korea and Japan, but also how it will later be abundantly spread to remote regions such as the Kingdom of Champa, Annam; Tibet, Java, Central Asia, the Ryūkyū Islands, regions of India, Malaysia, Borneo, Sumatra, Iran, and other regions of Asia (Botton, 2010, p. 313). Reaching its greatest territorial height during the Tang and Qing Dynasties, the Chinese empire comprised a surface of more than 5.4 and 13 million km,² respectively (Qixiang, 1982).

As is well-known (Kissinger, Fairbank, Vogel, Botton, etc.), Chinese tributary policy departed from the tradition of Western peoples, of conquest and plunder, but was derived from a moralistic construction of power, internal and external, in which China was divined as the center of a confused world order from which the explanation and disposition of things emerged. Under this tributary worldview, the East Asia region was hierarchically organized as a family with reciprocal duties and obligations, where China was presented as the geopolitical center of the region and the world.

Under this idea of cosmic superiority, but also of shared responsibility, China managed the visits of its neighbors with great attention and gifts in exchange for the greatest respect for the emperor (Kowtow), in his capacity as Son of Heaven, but also under a Confucian idea of filial piety, to esteem China as the father of an integrated regional state.

In the case of Korea, for example, Romero comments that this extended family figure advocated by Confucian ideology, governed society not only internally, but also included political relations with neighboring nations which were considered to be an extension of interpersonal relationships. This implied that the Chinese emperor should be recognized as the elder brother of the Korean State. This relationship appeared to be contained in the expression *sadae kyorin*, whose first term meant to serve the greatest (China), while the second referred to the maintenance of friendly relations between neighbors (Japan). This sentence came from ancient Chinese political philosophy and was linked to the mutual responsibilities that must exist between the son and the father, which by analogy constituted what some authors have called “the Chinese world order” (Fairbank 1996).

In the East Asian region, one could speak of three types of Chinese taxation. The most extensive and which remains to this day, is the one that refers to the civilizing issue which occurs between the three countries beyond their own wills. The second, geopolitical in nature, is the one that corresponds to the Chinese hegemony that was deployed in the area over two millennia according to the circumstances of each moment that finished at the end of the 19th century, before the geopolitical rise of Japan; and the latter or traditional, which is measured only through empirical evidence of voluntary or forced tax acceptance, both from Japan and Korea throughout more than two millennia of their life together (Vogel, 2019, p. 31)².

Confucianism and its Importance in Regional Cohesion

East Asia was born under the influence of Confucian thought that already inhabited its region before the formal appearance of each of its three states.

2 With respect to Japan, for example, Vogel only accepts the existence of three tributary periods: from 600 to 838 as the most important; from 1403 to 1547 when this was accepted openly by Japan; and 1547-1862, when there weren't official relations (Vogel, Op. Cit, p. 31).

The idea of the construction of a moral State proposed by Confucius (551 B.C. 479 B.C.) predates the modern Chinese State by a quarter of a century; almost a millennium before the first Korean unification of Shilla and nearly two millennia before the Japanese unification of Tokugawa. Its philosophical-political approach, constantly renewed by its followers through the centuries, has accompanied East Asia throughout its modern life.

Confucianism in Japan

From its first pre-modern states, by way of Korea, Japan received the political and social ideas of Confucianism that was gradually incorporated into the construction of its ethnicity and political organization. From the 3rd and 4th centuries, tradition already speaks of the first Confucian antecedents on the island. In the year 513, the king of Paekche, one of the three Korean kingdoms of the time, sent doctors to Japan that specialized in the five classical books of China. This inaugurated the intermittent arrival of Chinese and Korean scholars who were in charge of disseminating Confucian thought of the time (Tanaka, p. 50).

Confucian influence in the 6th and 7th centuries was fundamental in the construction of the first political organizations. Under its rules, the nobility was organized, protocols were established, and customs and habits were inaugurated. In Korea and China public administration found a theoretical foundation for both its centralization and its bureaucratic organization. Yamato and Soga were two of the early kingdoms that assimilated the Chinese-Confucian model for the organization of political power and social organization of their time. The Chinese language was the medium that facilitated and accelerated this learning process.

The interaction of the Imperial Academy, which was built mainly to disseminate Confucian knowledge, appeared from the 7th century with similar replicas in each of the provincial capitals. This Academy, and its various schools, were mainly dedicated to the teaching of Chinese classical studies, as well as to the preparation of meritocratic examinations for aspiring officials of the central or provincial government, examinations that, unlike in Korea and China, were mediatized over time by the feudal nobility.

Smith comments that some of the clearest evidence of the early influence of Confucianism in Japan comes through the founding document of the Seventeen Articles of Prince Shōtoku, which were promulgated in 604 under the reign of Princess Suiko (Smith, 1959, p. 6). In this document, known

as the Shōtoku Constitution, Confucianism was decisive in the organization of a central power of a vertical nature (filial piety), as well as in the duties of the people to their sovereign. In its second article, for example, the Constitution described the vertical forms of power and morality as essential elements of the State: that superiors act and inferiors obey; that ritual, justice, trust, and harmony be respected; that wickedness be punished. These were the criteria of a relevant document of Japanese history that, as Mason and Caiger point out, were borrowed from Confucian doctrine (Mason, 1997, p. 41) to build the first links of the Japanese state.

In 646, Emperor Kotoku continued the lines of political control and social organization through his Edict of the Four Articles, by which he limited the political participation of the rest of the clans by means of a more advanced central order of Chinese influence. The content of this Edict is pointed out by some specialists (Vogel), as an important influence on the Five Articles Edict issued in 1868 by the Meiji restoration. In 701 the Taiho Code appeared, which strengthened and expanded the teaching of Confucianism and Chinese scripture by reinforcing respect for its five bonds of filial piety, especially in the military, government, and family. This Code was made with the advice of Chinese scholars. Also, in 718, the Yoro Code abounds in Confucian themes and introduces the Chinese well-field system that prevailed since the ninth century B.C. during the Zhou Dynasty. The Riten-Ryō codes in the 8th century were created under the influence of the Tang Dynasty legal system. The Riten Code, which established criminal law, and the Ryō Code of an administrative nature also emerged under an ideal of Confucian justice. This codification, Chapoy notes, was worked under the principles of the Chinese model, giving the utmost importance to the organization of state powers and to the punishment of undesired conduct. The practice of these activities, he adds, was what made the field of law develop in Japan. The precepts of this era were mainly of a moral character, since, following Confucian principles, their purpose was to invite good and punish bad behavior. Their ultimate aim was to gain access to the ignorant to direct them towards a Confucian ideal (Bonifafz, 2010, p.12).

Throughout the period of the ancient kingdoms and the medieval shogunate, Confucianism behaved in a way that depended on the vicissitudes that prevailed within the struggle for power of the different clans and kingdoms, just as happened in the evolution of Confucianism in the internal life of China. In the Kamakura and Muromachi periods (1185-1573), where

there was a return to diplomatic and commercial relations with China, Japan adopted the lines of a neo-Confucianism led by the thought of Zhu Xi (1130-1200), a scholar of the Song Dynasty (960-1279), which motivated a return to the classics (Confucius, Mencius, etc.). There was a deepening of Confucianism and a delving into the agnostic politics of power and society, addressing sophisticated metaphysical speculations on physical reality and the foundations of human knowledge. Japan's advance towards a more robust political integration through the arrival of Tokugawa Ieyasu's Shogunate in 1603 generated a new political and social stability that benefited the cultural rapprochement with China and Confucian principles.

As an interesting example of the Confucian influence on political and social life in the Tokugawa period, in 1649 the Shōgun Iemitsu decreed the following to the populace:

"People must have deep love and respect for their parents. This love is manifested, in the first place, in taking care of them so that they do not get sick and remain healthy. But the most pleasant thing for parents is that their children do not get drunk, that they do not start quarrels and that they behave well; that siblings live together amicably, that the older ones protect the younger ones, and the younger ones obey the older ones" (Tanaka, 2013, p. 139).

As can be seen from the above, Confucian doctrine was widely disseminated by the shogunates among the peasant population as a measure of control, but also as education of a form of behavior that with its general acceptance and the passage of centuries, was transformed into an ethnicity, and as Prince Shōtoku pointed out, Confucianism became the trunk of the tree of a Japanese civilization of Shinto roots and Buddhist fruits. The above certainly does not disprove the enlightened Confucian education of the Bakufu, the literati, or Daimyō; but it does endorse the universalization of Confucianism through its various forms of acculturation over time. Even in the Kasei period, where a heterodoxy of the doctrine appears, as Tanaka indicates, Confucian teachings were widely disseminated in the middle, urban and rural strata of the Japanese population (Tanaka, 2013, p. 170).

In the seventeenth century, along with stability and greater political integration in Japan (Pax Tokugawa), a nationalist current was born that sought to distance itself from overdependence on Chinese civilization through the impulse of a movement known as "National Studies" (Kokugaku), which led to the promotion of both Shintoism and Buddhist religion. Howe-

ver, until the end of the Tokugawa period in the 19th century, these studies could not replace the strength of a Japanese neo-Confucianism which, as Vogel points out, at that time represented the best Confucian tradition in the region including China (Vogel, 2019, p. 60).

For its richness of thought and development, the Confucian tradition in Japan during the Edo-Tokugawa period (1603-1868) is compared to the Chinese cycle of the "100 schools." Fukiwara Saka (1561-1619), with his studies on human nature; Nakae Toju (1608-1648), with his proposals on filial piety; Kumazawa Banzan (1619-1691), with his studies regarding the virtues of governance; Kaibara Ekken (1630-1714), with the pursuit of happiness; Asami Keisai, (1652-1711) regarding issues of rulers and tradition; especially Ogyū Sorai (1666-1728) with his debates on Answers to Questions; Ninomiya Sontoku (1787-1856) with his works on the good life, Buddhism, Daoism and Confucianism, are just a sample of the validity and practice of a Confucian thought that became its own and was enriched under a local vision of its own characteristics (Heisig et al., 2016, pp. 315-471).

After a millennium, where the first ancient kingdoms initiated the construction of the Japanese state under Chinese-Confucian precepts and principles; it was that Prince Shōtoku established the first constitution with Confucian content; the most successful state integration under the aegis of the Tokugawa Shogunate, and gave rise to one of the most lucid and prolific Confucian periods of the island.

The Tokugawa regime with its class hierarchy, its bureaucracy, its complicated coordination of daimyō throughout the country, etc., generally privileged a culture based on moral values; giving a special place to loyalty as a fortunate vertical form of filial piety to exercise and justify the construction and administration of power, similar to what is pointed out in classical Chinese texts.

Along these lines of the moral commitment of power, the Tokugawa Shogunate in its quest for social order and efficient administration, as Confucius recognized, gave priority to the education of the people and the propagation of the administration of the laws. As Kasulis comments, "No tradition in Japan valued literacy and appreciation of classical moral texts as much as Confucianism, and the secular academies were part of a cultural movement that, as mentioned above made Japan, in the 17th century, one of the most literate, if not the most literate, country in the world" (Kasulis, 2019, p. 321).

The Tokugawa rule allowed the development of a cultural base that propitiated the golden century of Confucian philosophy in Japan. Throughout this period, Confucian philosophers formed part of the Shogunate's power structure, including the support of the military class (Samurai), as well as, as already mentioned, that of the peasants, artisans, and merchants in general.

The second part of the 19th century was characterized by a profound disruption caused by the arrival of the West, which shook the structures not only of Japan, but of East Asia as a whole. The Meiji era before its restoration, together with the "National Studies", attempted a displacement of ancient Confucian thought, in a double opportunity of regional and cultural repositioning. The Meiji era promoted the construction of its own narrative through the veneration of the past, which led to the declaration of Shinto as the national ideology of the State in 1890, to which it could be added that, in 1940, Prime Minister Fumimaro also recognized it as the only religion of the country. However, despite this important fact regarding the construction of the new Japanese identity, in the middle of the Meiji era, the Minister of Education Fukuoka Takachika, despite the new Shinto ideology, could not avoid declaring that "In matters of discipline we must promote the only moral thought of this empire, which refers to the following of the doctrines of Confucianism." Without neglecting the importance of Shintoism for the political and social life of Japan, as Smith recognizes, Shinto nationalism and Confucianism communicate and consult with each other in a permanent way since their birth. This is based on a Confucian ethic of common values and a political and social order of a vertical nature at all levels, from a Confucian principle of filial piety as the starting point for organizing the State, and the utmost loyalty and devotion to the emperor, as the established central power (Smith, 1959, pp. 47-237).

However, despite the banishment attempted by the Meiji era, Confucianism continues to manifest itself in many ways: in a subtle way, before the first construction of the word "philosophy", which emerged in this period through a neologism that derived from ancient and modern Confucianism. However, more influential than the fact that the new word "Tetsugaku" catapulted Confucianism to the forefront of the "new" Japanese philosophy, was the work of Inoue Tetsujirō (1855-1944), the first Japanese to obtain an academic position in philosophy at the Imperial University of Tokyo. In his important trilogy, he revealed the importance of Confucian thought and its relevance in the Japanese philosophical corpus produced in the Tokugawa

era. Inoue's studies persuaded many Japanese and Western scholars that Confucianism had been a vitally important element in the Japanese tradition," comments Heisig on the subject" (Heisig et al., 2016, pp. 315-317).

Confucianism and its influence in Japan are a topic that came into debate with the end of its tributary era with China, a debate that became more complex with the economic and political success of Japan since the late nineteenth century and the second part of the twentieth century. Then the topic was relegated in parallel to the construction of a Japanese cultural history of its own, with this even being considered as a taboo discipline in intellectual and political circles of the country. New authors such as Kang Xiaoguang, Jiang Qing, or Kiri Paramore, structured new confrontations and realities against the "Leninism of the Chinese Communist Party," or the neo-liberal laissez faire, laissez passer, or conservative cultural nationalism, among others. New Confucian movements in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, China, etc., are part of a never-ending debate. However, scholars such as Abe Yoshio, Watanabe Hiroshi, Kojima Yasunori, etc., are part of a new wave of scholarship on the study of Confucianism in Japan and the rest of Asia. Scholars such as Yonaha Jun (*The Meaning of Japan*), an intellectual of great brilliance and highly respected in Japan today, irreverently and eruditely reconstructs the historical passage of Confucianism in Japan as part of a Huntingtonian event, a clash between the Chinese civilization and Japanese civilizations, in the hypothetical framework of the Westphalian agreements. Maruyama Masao, for his part, from 1945 onwards inspired the "Maruyama rule," which consists of speaking of Confucianism without mentioning its name. Today, as Paramore points out, the taboo on talking about the shared cultural forms in East Asia has shifted to a limitation of the subject derived from the challenges that both countries face in the 21st century (Paramore, 2016, pp. 173-182).

Confucianism in Korea

Korea is a nation relevant to the Confucian geography of East Asia. It belongs to that cultural community where people still eat with chopsticks, celebrate the tea ceremony, wear baggy attire, speak languages of common origin and where people still bow in respect, which, as Chang warns, makes them distinguishable from Western culture. In a special way, Chang adds, food, clothing, and housing are relevant, but family, social life, and human relations are more so, and in this area, Confucius offered a set of rules to be used, a

series of principles and special codes for human beings to differentiate themselves from animals, to love and respect their fellow human beings as well as themselves; and along with this, he proposed filial piety as the structure of an ordered and hierarchical society in the framework of a moral relationship of mutual commitments (Yun, 2016, pp. 375-376).

Korea, Yao comments, was perhaps the first country in which Confucianism exerted a sweeping influence that not only prevailed in the past, but in an important way is still relevant in 21st century Korea. Yun adds, "Korean Confucianism clearly contributed to the formation of a sense of national identity and sovereignty and became a major force in the evolution of Korean history. It has provided a universal cultural consequence that has given rise to a value system directly related to a highly developed view of ethics and politics and has helped to stimulate a unique national consciousness directly related to the existence and future prosperity of the Korean people" (Yun, cited in Yao, 2001, p. 151).

Korea managed to unify its state beginning in the year 668; however, Confucianism was present in its first social organizations. Both the *Nihon Shōki* and the *Kojiki*, the oldest books in Japan, attest to the arrival of Confucianism in Japan, when Wang Ren, a teacher from the Korean kingdom of Paekche, introduced the book of the *Analects of Confucius*, as well as the classic, the *Thousand Characters*. Likewise, the first written history of Korea, the *Sanguk Sagi*, indicates that in 372, during the reign of Koguryo, the nobles were already studying the Confucian classics at the National Academy (*Tae Hak*), which, as in the case of Japan, was reproduced in time to other Korean localities. The Korean kingdom of Paekche also initiated Confucian studies around the same time, which due to its proximity and communication with Japan, functioned as the cultural bridge to introduce Confucian knowledge to the island. Shilla, the third of the three kingdoms, and the one that consolidated the Korean unification, was not an exception; its leader Muyeol, visited Tang China in 648 and later became King, sending large groups of young people to study in China, preparing themselves in the organization of the administration of the kingdom. Confucianism appears with such force in its society and political power, that it has come to be said that Korea is the most Confucian country in East Asia (Chang, Yao, etc.). In the 9th century, as it was in the 7th century in Japan under Prince Shōtoku, the Korean scholar Choi Chi-Won (858-951) declared that the Korean religion was a composite of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism, and helped stimulate a unique na-

tional consciousness directly related to the existence and future prosperity of the Korean people.

Confucianism in Korea is presented as a political and social philosophy that developed along with its first pre-modern states and was taught in academies, schools, books, etc., by the State itself. Its diffusion became more successful with the use of the Chinese language, which in addition to giving the country its first communication bridge, introduced it to an explanation of its social and political life that gradually became part of its ethnicity. Confucianism in Korea, as in Japan and China, developed alongside Buddhism, which also participated in combination with other alternatives in the construction of the country's ethnicity and culture. However, due to its own characteristics of being a political and social philosophy, agnostic and temporary, Confucianism overflowed them, surviving through the centuries until today.

In the case of China, despite the success of Buddhism from 500 to 850, mainly during the Sui and Tang Dynasties, the Confucian scholars and bureaucracy exercised control over the Buddhist church, preventing it from minimizing the power of the Confucian State as the essential source of the political and social order of the country; besides, in Buddhist schools and monasteries the Confucian classics were studied, especially regarding the moral supply of the State and society. As for Taoism, "... by its nature, it could not become an energetic organized force in Chinese politics, since it expressed an alternative to Confucianism in the realm of personal beliefs, but in practice, it left the field open to the Confucians." (Fairbank, 1996, p. 111). Finally, as Yao notes, "Through Confucian efforts to limit the extreme practices of Buddhism, and Buddhist efforts to adapt to Confucian policies, a gradual acclimatization of Buddhism to the Chinese scene took place, and the Buddhist monk became a Chinese subject and the monastic community a religious organization under the jurisdiction of the imperial bureaucracy. Buddhism had become politically sinicized." (Yao, 2001, p. 294). In the Korean case this thought interaction had a similar development.

Korean Confucianism modulated its historical presence, but far from disappearing in time, it gradually became embedded in the reality of the country. Scholars initiated the interpretation of the Chinese classics in Korea centuries earlier than in Japan. Choi Chun, for example, known for his work as the Confucius of the East, during the 11th century, pointed out that from the Joseon (Yi) Dynasty (1392), Confucianism departed from Buddhism to beco-

me the foundation of Korean society, which is documented within its different historical currents. In the 14th century, An Hyang (1243-1306), Chung Mong-Ju (1320-1392), and Yi Saek (1328-1395) spread the neo-Confucian thought of the school of Cheng Zhu (Cheng Hao, Cheng Yi, and especially Zhu Xi). In the 16th century, Kyong-Dok (1489-1546) systematized the Neo-Confucian ideas of Zhang Zai and Zhou Dunyi, notable scholars of his time. At the time of the great scholars Yi Hwang (better known by his pseudonym Toegye, 1501-1570) and Yi I (Yulgok 1536-1584), two of the most notable names in Korean Confucianism, intense debates occurred on the Four Beginnings (the Four Sprouts of the virtues, or the Four Good Dispositions) (Mencius), in relation to the Seven Emotions (joy, anger, sorrow, fear, love, hatred, and desire), the generation of a Confucian debate with Korean roots that has continued throughout its history. T'oegye, Korea's greatest Neo-Confucian scholar, noted for his contributions on Zhu Xi, is known as the Zhu Xi of the East. In the 17th and 18th century, in tune with Qing Neo-Confucianism, a new stream of practical learning (Silhak) appeared which refocused on social and public welfare reform, passing through the compromise of the monarchy. In this line, Yong Yak Yong (1762-1836) pushed Confucian knowledge towards better teaching of social and political realities, calling for a return to the Analects of Confucius, i.e., to the original principles of the Confucian model. In the 19th and the early 20th century, another movement arose that sought the recovery of the central ideas of Confucianism for the improvement of social and political outcomes. Oriental learning (Tonghak) appeared as a new school initiated by Choi Te-Wu (1824-1864) and Choi Si-Hyong (1829-1898), in the face of the Western arrival, which sought to reform the feudal system and overcome the old customs that limited the welfare of the people (Yao, 2001, pp. 152-159).

Within the framework of the difficult Confucian debate in the face of the Western invasion of East Asia, as in China and Japan, the orthodox and renewed schools had a difficult period of orphanism and mutual reclamations, especially because of their hegemonic dependence on China at the end of the same century.

Finally, as Yao comments, "Korea has traditionally prided itself on being a more (orthodoxly) Confucian nation than the homeland of Confucianism" (Yao, 2001, p. 158).

The differences between the West and East Asia are real. They are historical, political, economic, cultural, and part of a shared axiomaticity that bifur-

cated in time, where East Asia has a better understanding and appropriation of the West, while the latter has not concluded a valid diagnosis of the other.

Cultural and historical issues must be incorporated into the analysis of East Asia and Southeast Asia. Historical factors will be very useful in identifying East Asian actors through their own axioms and myths. Knowing how they are, how they think, what they intend, how they intertwine, etc. is of great help to decipher, in this case, three tigers inhabiting the same mountain, to understand three sources of the same river.

China and its Influence in Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia and its Cultural Balkanization

There is no simple way to define Southeast Asia or to describe the important cultural currents that have influenced it since its origins; neither its original societies nor those that come from its proximity to Chinese, Indian, Islamic, and Western civilizations, among others.

Despite its importance, over time, Southeast Asia has distinguished itself by lacking an identity and a proper name that would differentiate it from other countries or geographical areas of its own continent.

From a Chinese perspective, Southeast Asia was considered part of the nanyang, like a continuum of the South Sea. From India's ancestral view, it was known as Subarnadvipa, which is translated as the Golden Island; or Suvarnabhumi or The Golden Land. For his part, the Greek cosmographer Claudius Ptolemy, from Egypt, already spoke of the India Extra Gangem Fluvium, or India beyond the Ganges (Miksic & Yian, 2017, p.1).

For centuries the region has been struggling for a credible and solid integration, which could give it perspective with respect to other regions of the world, within the framework of a vast Asian area that generates powerful civilizations such as the Chinese, Indian, Russian, Japanese, Muslim, etc.

Southeast Asia, within the framework of its history, has also been known as Far East Asia or the Hindu States of the Far East (George Cœdès); the Hindu-Javanese region (N.J. Krom), etc. Similarly, it has been improperly generalized as Indochina, a term that was imposed by the French in the 19th century³ when trying to locate their arrival in the area with respect to the

3 The term Indochina is usually attributed jointly to the Danish-French geographer Conrad Malte-Brun in 1804; and the Scottish linguist John Leyden who used the term in 1804

territories of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia; although its use became widespread for recognizing the geographical boundaries of the region from Burma to Hong Kong.

Another name for the area that appeared at the end of World War II was *Seasia* to refer, in general, to Southeast Asia. It arose from the historian O.W. Wolters who was trying to collaborate in building a unified narrative of the area (Miksic & Yian, 2017, p. 4). The term Southeast Asia, which encompasses the states of Burma, Thailand, Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines, is relatively recent, like the previous ones, as it was used in 1943 to integrate the Command of Southeast Asia to lead hostilities against the Japanese (Villiers, 2017, p.3).

Currently, Southeast Asia, South-East Asia, also called Southeast of Asia, Indochina, Seasia or Southeastern Asia, comprises an area of approximately 4.5 million km² representing 3% of the Earth's surface in which a population of approximately 700 million people lives, representing 8.75% of the world's population. In general, an integration formed by ten countries is recognized: among them are Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Brunei, and Indonesia (the United Nations (UN), includes East Timor in this area), which form a wide kaleidoscope of languages, races, and cultures that have inhabited the area since ancient times.

Under a combined integration of islands and mainland; with a geography that draws a capricious neighborhood, the region has on one hand, as an original neighbor, a wide sea that surrounds it on all sides, which has shaped both its ethnicity and its economy over time. On its northern side, on the other hand, Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, and Myanmar share a wide border with South China, one of the oldest civilizations in the world, which has always determined both its origin and its development. On the west side, they live in close proximity to Bhutan, Bangladesh, and India. For many centuries it was a geographical gateway to India, one of the oldest civilizational emporiums of humanity.

In addition to being boxed in by the sea and the borders of China and India, another element that has influenced the course of Southeast Asia is a geographical power represented by the mountain ranges that run along the entire Himalayas towards Southeast Asia by an orographic cord that goes from South China to the South China Sea, represented geologically by the

(Wikipedia 2025).

great Asian landmass, which, in the case of Southeast Asia, ends up in a series of mountain ranges that run, in general, North to South throughout Indochina and then through the islands of Indonesia until reaching the Philippines, like a backbone that runs through Arakan, the Andaman Islands, and Nicobar; it continues through Sumatra, Java, and Bali and then making a curve through the Tanimbar and Kay Islands to Seram and Buru. Other slopes run through the mountain ranges between Burma and Thailand continuing through the Malay Peninsula, returning in curve through Borneo and the Philippines; "So, the geological map of Southeast Asia looks like two arcs tucked inside each other; both start from the mountainous areas of northern Indochina. The presence of these mountain ranges has often been a barrier to communication and peoples' movement in the history of Southeast Asia. The mountain ranges leading from Sumatra to the Banda Sea are largely volcanic and the activity from the archipelago's multiple volcanoes has played an important role in the high fertility of many islands by scattering ash and increasing rainfall density." This North-South pattern of rivers and mountains also explains one of the most constant elements in the history of the peoples of Southeast Asia, their tendency to move south from the mountain areas, through the river valleys towards the fertile plains and deltas, and often beyond, towards the islands" (Villiers. 2017, p. 6).

Pre-modern societies in Southeast Asia already showed important lines of development in their political and social organization. Advanced irrigation and agricultural techniques and complicated handicrafts as well as various forms of social organization, class system, oligarchies, and tribal confederations were part of an autochthonous regional development that is presented as the first starting point in the construction of a southeastern building that has always encompassed multiple ethnic groups of great wealth. At the same time, the influence of more developed neighboring civilizations such as the Indian, Chinese, Muslim, and finally Western, would generate over time what has been called the most complex "Asian balkanization" (Charles A. Fisher) in the world.

Over time, this generated a mosaic of cultures where Buddhist, Christian, Islamic, Taoist, Hindu, and other beliefs coexist daily; where approximately 240 million Muslims, 140 million Christians, 240 million Buddhists, 8 million Hindus, etc. communicate and do business. They speak hundreds of languages that are grouped into about four families in which the Austronesian stands out, which includes the languages of Indonesia, Malaysia,

and the Philippines; as well as the languages used in Polynesia, Hawaii, and New Zealand. Austroasiatic includes Khmer and Vietnamese. Thai covers the languages of Thailand and Laos, as well as the Tibeto-Burman (Burmese). All these families were mixed to a greater or lesser extent with Sanskrit, Chinese, Arabic, Portuguese, German, English, etc. By recognizing the original and most important civilizing sources in the area, an open debate continues on which neighboring influences were the most powerful in Southeast Asia.

In light of the results of religious or cultural allegiances, over time, the Muslim influence captured a little more than 45% of the population of the area, leaving a percentage similar to the sum of the Buddhist and Christian population in very similar proportions; and paradoxically places Hinduism, which according to various authors (Villiers, Miksic, Mahbubani etc.) was the oldest and broadest influence that the region had over time, on a purely informative level.

It is said that the Indian influence in Southeast Asia is more than 3,000 years old, and that this process of Indianization developed in a variable way depending on the area in question; underlining the Indian character of much of the art, religious practices, social organization, and customs in Cambodia or modern Java, although its presence is not easily noticed in Vietnam or the Philippines.

The Chinese influence, on the other hand, stands out clearly in Vietnam, to the extent that the ancient societies of Tonkin and Annam (today Vietnam) were subjected from very early on to an intense Sinicization, unlike other areas of Southeast Asia that did not register the evident impact of Confucian culture. Similarly, one can speak of a strong presence of the Chinese culture in Thailand, where in the 18th century (1782) King Rama I ruled as a king of Chinese descent, as did his successor, King Mongkut (1851-1868), who proclaimed his Chinese lineage very proudly. Regarding this Chinese influence in Thailand, Mahbubani points out that it is of such magnitude, that it is difficult to distinguish Thai from Chinese in Thai society. Also, in modern day, Chinese influence must be added into Singapore and Malaysia, where the percentage of the population of Chinese descent in those countries is 77% and 12%, respectively.

Under an overall view, when discussing Indochinese influence in the region, Cotterell believes that India's presence is seen as a source of the area's religious ideas, and China has always been interpreted as playing a political role. Mahbubani, for his part, tells us that Southeast Asia is part of

the Sanskrit cultural world, and that China actually impacts the political and economic issues of the region.

Villiers also comments that the Chinese presence in Southeast Asia has been fundamentally political and economic rather than cultural, citing the idea that its civilization was superior to any other and that dealing with the barbarians of the South could not yield many valuable results. He also adds that most of the states of Southeast Asia regarded China as the greatest empire on earth and the source of all civilization (Villiers, 2017, p. 63).

For different geographical, historical, and cultural reasons, and despite the enormous strength of the Chinese civilization, its civilizational influence in its four cardinal axes: East Asia, North Asia, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia, showed different degrees of influence; being greatest by far in East Asia where it built a civilizing tributary system from its origin until the end of the 19th century. Its immediate northern zone, the Mongolias, Manchuria, and East Turkestan, also registered a profound influence of civilizational Confucianism. In Central Asia, geographical and ethnic conditions and the presence of other relevant empires prevented a further flourishing of cultural Confucianism even though China has been present since the second century B.C. Similarly, Southeast Asia, due to its own reasons, also presents a varied kaleidoscope of the different cultural expressions of the Chinese civilization.

Southeast Asia has vestiges of the Chinese presence from the first centuries of our era where, for example, ceramic vessels and bronze artifacts from the Han dynasty have been found on several Indonesian islands; even a Sumatran vessel dating back to 45 B.C.; a bowl engraved with Chinese shapes, and Han-style horses, etc. (Villiers, 2017, p. 63).

Beyond these historical discoveries of Chinese cultural products that appear in the region's anthropological sites, there is evidence that Southeast Asia paid tribute to various Chinese emperors from their first political organizations (Mahbubani, Villiers, Cotterell, etc.), as is the case of the kingdom of Funan (3rd century, 6th century, approx.), which together with its name of Chinese origin, sent tributes to China from its first political organizations until its decline and disappearance; in the same manner as the relevant societies that succeeded it such as the Srivijaya, the Chams, the Khmers, the people from Thailand, Bali, Java, Annam, etc.

Since the first Qin dynasty, China asserted its presence on its southern border in what is now Vietnam. The Han dynasty, for its part, expanded its presence in the region. During the Southern Zhou dynasty (420-499), and

the Sui (581-618) and Tang (618-906) dynasties, the tributary missions from Southeast Asia to China were very frequent expanding, in turn, China's important trade activities in the port area of the archipelago of Indochina. In 971, the Canton maritime customs service was reorganized and at the end of the 10th century it was declared that all trade was a state monopoly. During the 11th century, the Chinese began to spread throughout the archipelago organizing trade settlements in the Moluccas and the Philippines. Between 1405 and 1431, the Chinese naval prestige continued to grow by combining commercial activity with the empire's geopolitical influence (Ibid, pp. 63-64).

Precisely at the beginning of the 15th century, during the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), the famous expeditions of the Chinese admiral Zheng He were organized who, in 1405, integrated, in Southeast Asia, one of the largest navies of his time with about 300 ships carrying 27,000 people, where at least 62 of these ships, because of their size, were called treasure ships, since they could measure 122 meters long and 52 meters wide. For reasons not yet fully clarified, the trips were suspended by the Ming Empire despite the success achieved in technological, commercial, geopolitical, and military matters, with an excessive maritime capacity to expand its empire. It renounced its enormous maritime potential, precisely in the century where the great maritime developments of the time determined the rise of the European continent, which would eventually become the force of conquest for India, China, Japan, and the rest of Asia⁴.

4 “... Three points should grab our attention here. First, these official expeditions were not voyages of exploration like those of Vasco de Gama or Columbus: they followed the routes established by Arab and Chinese trade in East Africa seas. Second, Chinese expeditions were diplomatic, not commercial, much less piracy or colonizing adventures: they exchanged gifts, established the payment of tributes, and brought back geographical information and scientific curiosities such as giraffes, for example, which were exhibited as unicorns of luck. The third point, and the most impressive, is that once these voyages ceased in 1433, they were never resumed. Instead, the deputy minister of war destroyed the records around 1479, and Chinese international trade was severely restricted until 1567. In the great age of navigation that was beginning to arise around the globe, Ming's China had all the odds in its favor, since it was far ahead; however, it refused to go ahead. It took the Europeans almost half a century more just to start. After 1433, it would be another 37 years before Portuguese explorers from the west coast of Africa arrived as far south as the Gold Coast, and 59 years before Columbus undertook his first voyage with three small vessels totaling only 450 tons. Edward Dreyer describes how the great Chinese sea crossings were stopped by Confucian scholars-officials, who opposed foreign trade and contact on grounds of principle. Ray Huang emphasizes the regime's fiscal crisis, which didn't really have the funds to finance such expensive adventures...” (Fairbank, 1996, pp. 175,176).

However, as mentioned before, the cultural-civilizational influence of China in East Asia cannot be compared to that which it maintained in Southeast Asia. On this point, Reid (2015) provides four reasons why this was the case. The first, according to the author, concerns the difficulty of the Chinese writing system, which contrasts with the Hindi alphabet, a writing system that is easier and more logical to learn. The second reason refers to China's detachment from the sea for most of its imperial history—not because it was unaware of it, but because at various times it chose to renounce expanding its hegemony in this field. As an example, reference is made to the case of Taiwan, which, although geographically close to China, was not conquered until 1683. Likewise, maritime events involving Japan only occurred with the arrival of the Mongols, who attempted several incursions between 1274 and 1281, all of which ultimately failed. Mention is also made of the case of Admiral Zheng He (1405–24), when the Ming dynasty gave up its naval power.

The third factor noted by Reid (3026) concerns the low population in the region and its limited level of social organization, coupled with orographic conditions that posed a physical obstacle to Chinese penetration, making it difficult to transport military equipment and supply troops. The environment was also conducive to the spread of diseases such as smallpox, malaria, and cholera. This environmental and orographic disadvantage was so pronounced that, in Chinese, it was referred to as Zhang. The stench (Zhang) that pervaded the jungle environment led the powerful Emperor Qianlong (1736–95), during a campaign he attempted in the 1760s against Thailand—then Burma—to exclaim: “The land of Burma is horrible. Human beings cannot compete against the harshness of the water and the soil. It is most lamentable to see soldiers die and elite generals perish of Zhang for nothing.”. The fourth barrier to China's expansion into Southeast Asia, the author concludes, was the combative resistance of the different peoples of Vietnam along the Red River Delta.

Viet Nam and China's Cultural Confucianism

Vietnam could be one of the Asian countries that has one of the largest Chinese influences in East and Southeast Asia, rivaling Korea on the strength of this presence, to the extent that the two were neighboring countries, one

in the East and one in the South, of an expanding Chinese empire whose presence was always present since the birth of these two countries; in both cases, there is the phenomenon that they were able to maintain their civilizational identity despite this enormous Confucian culture, each under their own times and considerations.

In the case of Vietnam, unlike Korea that assimilated all Confucian knowledge through the adoption of the Chinese language and thought, from the 3rd century and clearly from the 7th century; the existence of their own languages in the early Vietnamese societies were part of a cultural defense towards a total assimilation of identities. Austroasiatic languages were already used in the area, with the Khmer and the original Vietnamese.

China's proximity to Vietnam and its expansion to the South generated a symbiosis between the two countries at the same time as a clear account of their history through the annals of Chinese historians or travelers who, as in the case of all their neighbors, documented the facts of their time, as happened with the essential histories of Japan, Korea, and Kashgaria in Central Asia, which were recorded by different Chinese chroniclers and historians from the Han dynasty or earlier. China's influence over Vietnam even reached the awarding of the country's name, when in 1803 Chinese diplomatic envoys objected to the official name of Nan-yue that the Southeast Asian country intended, changing it to the name of Vietnam.

As a border country of Southeast China, Vietnam was annexed by its first emperor Qin Shi Huang in the 3rd century B.C. At the fall of this empire, as in the case of Korea, a dissident Chinese general created his own government in the now territory of Vietnam and called it the Kingdom of South Yue, which in its time comprised both the Chinese provinces of Guangdong and Guangxi as well as the northern part of Vietnam.

However, at the beginning of the Second Han dynasty (206 B.C.- 220 A.D.) in 112 B.C., its territory was absorbed again and it was subject to an intense assimilation through all the Confucian cultural baggage. At that date, as is known, it already represented the fundamental lines of what is today the Chinese civilization where the classic Confucian books were included in the philosophical-political part and the lines of the already efficient Chinese administration were implemented with their ministries, civil service, and exams to select those best prepared to hold public office. Among the Confucian lawyers in Viet Nam, Nguyen Bing-gian stands out, a specialist in the

book of mutations; just as Pan Fu-xian and Wu Shih-lian stand out during the period of the Chen dynasty (1226-1428), (Chi-Yun, 2012, p. 398).

From this closeness and hegemonic control, the Chinese and Vietnamese coexistence merged over time. A prime minister of Vietnamese origin, Jang Gong-fu, joined the Chinese government of the Tang dynasty through civil service examinations. Similarly, Chinese lawyers such as Shi Xie came to Vietnam to promote Confucian studies, which were accepted successfully by the local people.

Vietnam's pro-independence line was also headed by a Chinese general named Wu Kuan in 939; and in 968, another Chinese general, Ding Bulig, becomes king. Twelve years later, a third Chinese general, Li Huan, ascends the throne (Ibid, p. 398).

Confucianism was the ideology of the Vietnamese people along with a civilizing tributary system that was lived in all its magnitude like no other country in Southeast Asia until before Vietnam fell under the Western influence of French Indochina. Nonetheless, the people and government would continue to use calligraphy and Chinese written language, and Confucian classics would continue to be taught in schools.

Annam, direct predecessor of Vietnam, was under the direct control of China for almost a thousand years, until the year of 939, during the Song dynasty. During this dynasty, an agreement of a Confucian nature was reached in which through the concept of filial piety an edict was published through which a new relationship was established for China and Vietnam (Dai Co Viet). In this edict, Vietnam declared itself an obedient son and China a benevolent father, within the framework of the idea of a Confucian world order where China was the center or kingdom in the middle of the world.

Although technically independent between 939 and 1883, as in the case of Japan and Korea, under their own circumstances, Vietnam remained a tributary nation of the Chinese civilization throughout that period.

- Champa

Until 1471, Vietnam, as was already mentioned, cohabited with the kingdom of Champa, which arises approximately from the 3rd century. This kingdom was a combatant of Vietnam and China until the time of its demise, although it was also a tributary kingdom like most of the kingdoms of Southeast Asia.



Historical Southeast Asia

Source: Mahubani (2017, p. 23).

Champa was present in the life of Vietnam in its southern part, since its earliest times. However, the Chams spoke an Austronesian language which was very different from that of Vietnam. From around the 4th century, the Indian influence was felt in the people of Champa through Hindu rites and beliefs, founding the compound of the temple “My Son”, which is located on the

banks of the Red River Valley, incorporating into their culture the dominant cult of Shiva and gods such as Vishnu, Brahma, and the goddess Uma, wife of Shiva, among others.

From the 5th century onward, the Chinese army came to the borders of the first kingdoms of Champa to demand tributary recognition. According to the Chinese accounts of the time, the local people lived in houses built with bricks and terraces and they were a people of prominent noses and very curly black hair, where men and women wore almost no clothes, only a few small strips around their bodies; and they pierced their ears placing on them small hoops, where the ruling classes wore leather shoes while ordinary people went barefoot (Cotterell, 2020, p. 90).

Champa regularly sent tributes to the different Chinese governments in search of legitimacy on the part of China for their internal and area recognition. When it saw the weakening of the empire, in turn, it avoided this type of obligation, but in the face of the repositioning of the new dynasties it once again accepted its collaboration. In 529, the Rudravarman dynasty attempted to stop its tribute payment. However, with the restart of the Chinese Sui dynasty in 595, once again it sent tributes in 623 and 625. In 628, it continued with the Tang dynasty that replaced the Sui in 618. Although the Mongol Empire (Yuan dynasty) disrupted China's internal life and the relations abroad, they quickly reinstalled and even expanded them once Kublai Khan took over the entire Chinese empire. According to Marco Polo, King Cham Indravarman V, upon the arrival of the Sino-Mongol armies sent emissaries to the Great Khan with the following message:

"Sir, the king of Champa greets you as his lord. He informs that he is an elderly man and that for a long time he has ruled his kingdom in peace. That he is willing to be your faithful servant and to send you elephants and aromatic woods every year. Therefore, he pleads with you politely, imploring your mercy, that your country will call back its commander, remove the forces that are ravaging his kingdom" (Cotterell, 2020, p. 95).

Faced with this plea, Kublai Khan had mercy on the king, who, in exchange for the Sino-Mongol consideration sent annually, as tribute, quantities of fine wood and elephants. Serving as an example of its influence in the region, the Chinese presence in Champa, continued directly during the Ming Empire.

In the 15th century, the Champa government suffered a sharp fall at the hands of the Vietnamese kingdom when the city of Bijaya was captured and annexed to the city of Da Nang; the small groups that survived were

absorbed in 1653. At present, remnants of these important people still persist. The influence that China exerted over two millennia—at times in the form of imperial domination and later intermittently through a tributary system—led Vietnam to construct a Confucian ethnicity in its family, social, and political life.

This Confucian orientation experienced a turning point with the French conquest of 1861–67 in southern Vietnam and 1884 for the rest of the country, when the French began an attack against Confucianism. Nevertheless, as Walter and George point out, Confucianism continued as a moral code and as a cultural influence for most of the Vietnamese people. Until the First World War, Vietnamese families continued to respect Confucian principles, even though scholars no longer enjoyed the prestige of their predecessors.

As in China, beginning in the 1920s, a critique of the traditional way of life emerged, lasting until the 1930s through a group of young writers led primarily by Tu Luc Van Doan, who promoted the implementation of modern Western ideas. Yet, as in China, this did not achieve the desired results in the face of families' continued respect for filial piety and Confucian morality.

With the division of Vietnam in 1954, Confucianism faced a major challenge, similar to that of China, under the imposition of Marxism-Leninism, which directly opposed Confucian precepts. Despite these profound changes throughout its history, Confucianism remains present in Vietnam's political and social life, although, of course, its reach and influence can no longer be considered representative of the entirety of the Vietnamese people.

Southeast Asia and the Present Confucian Lines

The Confucianism culture in Southeast Asia has a lower impact than is yet appreciated overall in East Asia. Despite this, the strength of its postulates politically, economically, and socially, was a permanent example that competed with other civilizational currents such as the Indian and the Muslim.

Confucianism in China emerges and evolves as a philosophical humanist current that has served to structure and give meaning to its society, to its political organization, and even to its economic development; thus, becoming an example with respect to its neighboring nations regarding a civilizational idea that influenced its identity and direction.

Throughout the history of Confucianism, the knowledge of its books and classical concepts has been part of a doctrinal inspiration, sometimes taken outside of China as a religion. The moral commitment to which Con-

fucius invites, as the starting point of a universal cosmogony where human beings can live his social and political reality in harmony; borders on religious ethical concepts that have also served over time as a form of Confucianism, especially outside of China. Regarding these, specialists such as Billioud identify three steps, namely, the theoretical elaboration of doctrine, the reform of the initiation ritual, and the reading and dissemination of the Chinese Confucian classics (Yong et al., 2021, p. 269).

Yong Chen tells us that today, these Confucian influences that originate along with the Chinese presence in Southeast Asia, continue through various schools that have been unfolding among different social groups of some of the countries of the area in the form of philosophy and religion during the 20th and 21st centuries.

As an example of the above, he discussed the currents of Yiguan Dao, De Jiao, etc., which advocate for a morally edifying society. The De Jiao current originated in 1939 in the middle of the Sino-Japanese War, it was born in the province of Guangdong and spread rapidly to the Chinese communities of Southeast Asia, arriving in the early 50s of the 20th Century to Singapore and Malaysia.

Since the 20th Century, within the framework of Confucianism renewal, these new expressions adopt Buddhist, Daoist, Christian, and Islamic teachings, although the teachings of the Chinese cultural tradition prevail within them in the name of virtue and cultivation of morality.

These new ethical-religious expressions are clearly oriented to Confucianism through the recognition and acceptance of its ten virtues, eight rules, and six precepts. The ten virtues are filial piety, brotherly love, loyalty and faithfulness, trustworthiness, propriety or courtesy, justice, incorruptibility, sense of shame, benevolence, and wisdom. Meanwhile, the eight rules consist of refraining from deception, falsehood, greed, recklessness, arrogance, laziness, bad temper, and hatred. The six precepts would be the detailed reiteration of the previous ones (Yong et al., 2021, p. 274).

Yong states that nowadays, Confucianism has adopted different strategies to continue within its host countries due to the political environment of Southeast Asia, which, as has already been mentioned, also occurs today in Japan and Korea. There, because of the Murayama Clause, Confucian philosophy can be discussed, but without mentioning the name of Confucius.

In that sense, Confucian influence in Malaysia commits itself to not participating and not intervening in political or religious activities, and in

Thailand it openly became a religious organization of the Chinese community generating a direct relationship with Chinese Buddhism and social assistance. In the case of Indonesia, on the other hand, the Agama Khonghucu line of thought is officially recognized as a private school oriented to the values of Confucius. So far, it is the only entity in the world that carries the word Confucianism in its name and operates fully as a religion. In addition, it enjoys legal recognition and designates the four books and five classics as the central canon of thought of the group (Yong, 2016, p. 277).

These types of expressions of a new Confucianism, that has been reviving under different modalities in Southeast Asia, are part of a more powerful cultural influence that permeated the Chinese empire under different modalities during its long life as a millennial Asian civilization; where Confucianism was part of a cultural tributary system that has prevailed over time with greater or lesser luck, with more or less impact, according to the circumstances of each country.

As they did two millennia ago, the ten nations that currently form this important region, within the framework of their multiculturalism and heritage, live the challenge of their coexistence and the mixing of their cultural and religious values.

As for China, as Sole-Farras points out, in its new role as the second economic power in the 21st century, it is unthinkable that it renounces the capacity that a new Confucianism gives it as a social binder of its inner life and as a strategic factor of its public diplomacy or soft power abroad (Sole-Farras, 2018, p. 360).

Southeast Asia and its Challenges

Mahbubani comments that in civilizational terms, Southeast Asia is the most diverse region on the planet; that no other region of the world comes close to its complexity; that it is therefore not easy to understand or decipher it properly (Mahbubani, 2017, p. XV). Regarding this, the author himself states that the success achieved to date by this complex region of the world should be worthy of the Nobel Peace Prize. That the success achieved in recent years has generated an optimistic discourse where it can be believed that the coexistence of Islam and the West may be possible; being therefore The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) a laboratory of peaceful coexistence, where Vietnam, as another example of this regional advance, reduced extreme poverty from 50% to 3% in 30 years; and where Indonesia

achieved the second highest confidence index in the world in 2015, etc. (Mahbubani, 2017, p. 1).

In this line of results, the role that the integration of the five ASEAN pioneer countries has been playing since 1967 stands out. They decided to undertake their association following the call of an important group of leaders from the area such as Thanat Khoman, a Buddhist from Thailand; Narciso Ramos, a Christian from the Philippines; Adam Malik, a Muslim from Sumatra; Abdul Razak, a Muslim from Malaysia; and S. Rajaratnam, a Hindu from Singapore; who, within the framework of their diverse cultures and beliefs, initiated this movement of association, development, and mutual defense in which all 10 of the countries that make up the association participate.

The current strength of Southeast Asia, agree other authors such as Yates, is born from the important decision to initiate the integration of ASEAN in the 60s of the 20th century and through it, to manage their objectives and to resolve their multiple differences avoiding conflicts, disputes, or conflagrations, in exchange for promoting a shared economic development and regional resilience (Yates, 2019, p. 2).

The integration path that ASEAN followed as of the first five signatory nations, which were Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, gradually expanded with the association of Brunei in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, Laos and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999, turning it today, as a whole, into the seventh largest economy in the world with a significant economic growth from 2000 to 2013 of more than 5% per year on average.

Its transformation in 1992 into a free trade area gave it greater strength. The signing of treaties with its important regional neighbors such as China, Japan, Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and India, gave it greater cohesion to attain the signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), (ASEAN + 5 before the non-joining of India) in 2020, which represented an economic and geopolitical turn of enormous importance whose consequences will be broadening from 2022 onward when the agreement will come into force. It also strengthens its geopolitical role in the area through the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) (1994) which now has 27 members. Among them, the controversial nation of North Korea participates. It also has the East Asia Summit which is a strategic regional forum of cooperation, together with the East Asia region.

In line with this important regional and global success, the economic and political confrontation between China and the United States inevitably

appears. Their first scenario of conflict passes through the control of the Asian leadership, which has been clearly held by the United States up to the end of the 20th century and which is today under debate, especially at the start of the third decade of the 21st century.

In this framework of analysis, some authors such as Fox, Mahbubani, etc., believe that the era of Western domination in Asia is coming to an end and they perceive a distancing on the part of the United States from the mainland of Southeast Asia, where it seems that the United States will not return soon. This opens the opportunity for China to relaunch the historic position of dominance that it exercised for many centuries in the region. Regarding this Auslin adds (Stuart-Fox, 2003, p. VIII) that, "As the world negotiates with China's new rules, much will depend on the balance of global power in the coming decades" (Auslin, 2020, p. 48).

The success achieved by ASEAN to this day will depend in many ways on the consistency and unity it continues to maintain towards the third decade of the 21st century to negotiate not only with China but also with all relevant global actors. Similarly, it will also depend on the "new tributary policy" that China is trying to impose on the region.

To date, in the face of the fading of the United States and the European Union, China is coming to be the most important trading partner of most ASEAN countries, most notably Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam. At the same time, it is the most important foreign investor in Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, the second in Vietnam, and the largest considering the entire region combined.

Likewise, since 2013 through the New Silk Road and its investment schemes such as the Asian Infrastructure Bank (AIIB), the Silk Road Fund, and its Development Bank, and through two of its six important international economic corridors, which cross the 10 ASEAN countries by land and its nine coastal countries by sea with the Maritime Silk Road, China has intensified all its significant investment lines by industrial corridors, roads, trains, digital route, energy, and most importantly, in the strategic ports of Cambodia (Koh Kong), Myanmar (Kyaukpyu), and Malaysia (Port Klang), etc.

Notwithstanding the above, at a meeting in 2010 held in Hanoi, Vietnam, between China and the 10 ASEAN countries, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi expressed the much-remembered phrase, "China is a big country and you are small countries, and that is a fact" reminding all the parties of the return of the idea of a forgotten geopolitical tributary system within the framework

of a millennial cultural tributary system where rebuilding a Chinese world order is back on the regional agenda.

Southeast Asia sometimes feels more pressured by China's new rules, but it will clearly obtain better results if the ten ASEAN countries prove to be more united and cooperative amongst themselves (Murray, 2020, p. 535).

Turning to history as a way of broadening the understanding with respect to what Southeast Asia has been over time, in line with its multiple differences, but also with its great coincidences and the long tributary relationship they have had with a millenary hegemon such as the People's Republic of China, will be fundamental to contributing to the creation of a better rapporteurship that explains a new global order where one of its most important epicenters is located in Southeast Asia.

Conclusions

At the start of the second quarter of the 21st century, unprecedented situations are arising. These transformations revolve around issues of the environment, globalization economy, trade and investment, geopolitics, technology, ideology and culture. From this perspective, studies on civilization and culture emphasize their importance to better understand the positions, similarities, and differences of the major nations; in this case, the countries of East and Asia-Pacific region.

This article has analyzed the importance of Confucianism in Asian culture, referring to the territories of East and Southeast Asia, without neglecting the Indo-Pacific. Naturally, the common denominator that gives unity and identity to most countries in this part of the Trans-Pacific region is the common origin of Asian ideology, language, and values expressed in Chinese Confucianism and its transcendence, among other important influences.

In this sense, Confucianism is the main substance that brings cohesion to populations of Chinese origin or cultural Chinese influence, not only in mainland China, but in virtually all East Asia, which encompasses around 15 nations that operate under better or worse the precepts of Neo-Confucianism, and this is what distinguishes them and gives them strength.

It could be concluded that Eastern Confucianism presents itself as a homogeneous whole, despite the diversity of ethnic groups and endogenous populations in Asian countries and forms a diverse and certainly heterogeneous common front full of convictions, visions, and aspirations for a shared community. In this context, the idea that China and its Confucianism

is currently playing an important role in the named – the economic miracle of the zone; and it's an important hypothesis in the

The 21st century is still in its first half, and at this historical stage of its development, it remains to be seen whether, after more than half a century since the Asian nations were reconstituted after the Second World War, they will be able to confirm Confucianism as the option that East Asia and, in general, all countries with Chinese roots offer to the world, and that it stands firm against Western ideology and culture.

References

- Asia-Pacific Centre of Education for International Understanding (APCEIU). (2015). *The Story of Nine Asian Alphabets*. Hollym International Corporation.
- Auslin, M. (2020). *Asia's New Geopolitics: Essays on Reshaping the Indo-Pacific*. Hoover Institution Press.
- Bonifaz Chapoy, D. (2010). *Evolución del concepto de derecho en Japón*. Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas, Serie Doctrina Jurídica Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México.
- Botton Beja, F. (2010). *China: su historia y cultura hasta 1800*. El Colegio de México.
- Chi-Yun, C. (2012). *Confucianismo una interpretación moderna*. Popular.
- Cotterell, A. (2020). *A History of Southeast Asia*. Marshall Cavendish International.
- Diamond, J. (2018). *Armas, gérmenes y acero*. Debate.
- Fairbank, J. K. (1996). *China, una nueva historia*. Andrés Bello, 1996
- Heisig, J., Kasulis, T., Maraldo J. y Bouso R. (2016). *La filosofía japonesa en sus textos*. Herder.
- Hoffman, P. (2016). *¿Por qué Europa conquistó el mundo?* Crítica.
- Holcombe, C. (2016). *Una historia de Asia Oriental. De los orígenes de la civilización al siglo XXI*. Fondo de Cultura Económica. Holco
- Kaplan, R. (2013). *La venganza de la Geografía*. RBA Libros.
- Kasulis, T. (2019). *La Filosofía japonesa en su historia*. Herder.
- Kissinger, H. (2012). *China*. Debate.
- Lee, P. (1992). *Sourcebook of Korean Civilization*. Columbia University Press.
- Mahbubani, K. (2017). *The ASEAN Miracle*, National University of Singapore Press. <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1xz0m3>
- Mason, R. & Caiger, J. (1997). *A History of Japan*, Tuttle Publishing.
- Miksic, J. N. y Yian, G. G. (2017). *Ancient Southeast Asia*, Routledge, 2017. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315641119>
- Miller, T. (2017). *China's Asian Dream: Empire Building along the New Silk Road*. Zed Books <https://doi.org/10.5040/9781350219120>
- Mori, H. (2019) "Historia y naturaleza jurídica del derecho japonés", in Arturo Oropeza (Coord.) Japón. *Una visión jurídica y geopolítica en el siglo XXI*. p.14.
- Murray, H. (2020). *Under Beijing's Shadow: Southeast Asia's China Challenge*. Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2020
- Nahm, A. (1996). *Korea: Tradition and Transformation: A History of the Korean People*. Hollym Intl.

- Paramore, K. (2016). *Japanese Confucianism. A cultural History*, Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107415935>
- Qixiang, T. (1992). *The Historical Atlas of China*. Beijing China Map Press.
- Reid, A. (2015). *A History of Southeast Asia: Critical Crossroads*. Wiley-Blackwell.
- Relinque, E. A. (Coord). (2009). *La Construcción Del Poder En La China Antigua*. University of Granada.
- Romero, A. (2019). "De Choson a Chosen: unión y fractura de la nación coreana", en José Luis León Manríquez (Coord.), *Historia mínima de Corea*. El Colegio de México.
- Seligson, S. (2019). "Desde los orígenes hasta fines del siglo XIV d.C." en José Luis León Manríquez (Coord), *Historia mínima de Corea*. El Colegio de México.
- Smith, W. (1959). *Confucianism in Modern Japan. A Study of Conservatism in Japanese Intellectual History*. Hokuseido Press.
- Sole-Farras, J. (2018). *El nuevo confucianismo en la China del siglo XXI*. Tirant Humanidades.
- Stuart-Fox, M. (2003). *A Short History of China and Southeast Asia: Tribute, Trade and Influence*. A Short History of Asia series, Allen & Unwin.
- Tanaka, M. (2013). "Época formativa: los orígenes del pueblo y la cultura", en Tanaka Michiko (Coord.), *Historia mínima de Japón*. El Colegio de México.
- Villiers, J. (2017). *Asia Sudoriental antes de la época colonial*. Siglo XXI.
- Vogel, E. (2019). *China and Japan: Facing History*. Belknap Press: An Imprint of Harvard University Press. <https://doi.org/10.4159/9780674240759>
- Wikipedia. (2025). Mainland Southeast Asia. Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mainland_Southeast_Asia
- Yao, X. (2001). *El confucianismo*. Cambridge.
- Yates, R. (2019). *Understanding ASEAN's Role in Asia-Pacific Order*. Palgrave Macmillan. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12899-9>
- Yong, C., Botton Beja, F. y Cervera, J.A. (2021). *Historia mínima del confucianismo*. El Colegio de México.
- Yun Chang, C. (2016). *Confucianismo. Una interpretación moderna*. Editorial Popular.

La Ley de Promoción de la Economía Privada de la RPC en contexto: Un análisis histórico-político

Law on Promoting the Private Economy in context: A historical-political analysis

Franco Maximiliano Lagarrigue

<https://orcid.org/0009-0002-0180-2200>

maxilagarrigue@gmail.com

Universidad Nacional de La Pampa, La Pampa, Argentina

Fecha de recibido: 05 de agosto de 2025

Fecha de aceptación: 13 de septiembre de 2025



Resumen: Este artículo analiza la Ley de Promoción de la Economía Privada de la República Popular China sancionada en 2025. La metodología adoptada es de carácter cualitativo y se basa en el examen de fuentes jurídicas, gubernamentales, periodísticas y bibliografía secundaria vinculada al proceso de reforma y apertura de la RPC, así como a los cambios legislativos recientes. El estudio busca situar la norma en un proceso más amplio de reformas económicas y jurídicas, con el objetivo de evaluar sus alcances y límites. La hipótesis sostiene que, aunque se trata de la primera ley en reconocer de forma explícita el papel del sector privado en la economía nacional, dicho sector permanece jurídicamente subordinado al sector público y a la dirección política del Partido Comunista de China.

Palabras clave: Ley de Promoción de la Economía Privada, China, Partido Comunista de China, derechos de propiedad, propiedad privada.

Abstract: This article analyzes the Law of the People's Republic of China on Promoting the Private Economy, enacted in 2025. The methodology employed is qualitative and draws on legal, governmental, and journalistic sources, as well as secondary literature on China's reform and opening-up process and recent legislative changes. The study aims to situate the law in a broader framework of economic and legal reforms in order to assess its

Cómo citar: Lagarrigue, F. M. (2025). La Ley de Promoción de la Economía Privada de la RPC en contexto: Un análisis histórico-político. *China Global Review*, 3(6), 47-66. <https://doi.org/10.53897/REvChinaGR.2025.06.02>

scope and limits. The central hypothesis argues that, although this is the first law to explicitly recognize the role of the private sector in the national economy, the sector remains legally subordinate to the public sector and to the political leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.

Key words: Law on Promoting of the Private Economy, China, Communist Party of China, Property Rights, Private Property

Introducción

En 2025, la Asamblea Popular Nacional de la República Popular China (APN) aprobó la Ley de Promoción de la Economía Privada (LPEP), la primera ley dirigida específicamente al sector privado nacional (Horsley, 2025). A primera vista, la norma puede interpretarse como un nuevo paso en el proceso de reformas jurídicas orientadas a profundizar la liberalización económica de la República Popular China (RPC). Sin embargo, un análisis más detenido —considerando antecedentes históricos, políticos y jurídicos— revela que el sector público mantiene un estatus jurídico superior, así como un rol directivo fundamental en la estrategia de modernización impulsada por el Estado.

El objetivo de este escrito es analizar la LPEP situándola en un contexto histórico-político más amplio que incluye los cambios legislativos en materia de propiedad y las opiniones del Consejo de Estado sobre el sector privado chino. La metodología utilizada es de tipo cualitativa y se basa en el análisis de fuentes jurídicas, gubernamentales, periodísticas y bibliografía secundaria sobre el proceso de reforma y apertura de la RPC, con especial atención a los cambios jurídicos y políticos sobre la propiedad. La hipótesis de este trabajo sostiene que la LPEP muestra la autonomía relativa del sector privado respecto al sector público, hecho que resulta coherente con el desarrollo del capitalismo nacional chino (Walker y Buck, 2007). Si bien la norma unifica el marco legal aplicable al sector privado y le ofrece mejores condiciones institucionales y mayores garantías jurídicas, también reafirma su subordinación al sector público-estatal y al PCCh como coordinador del desarrollo económico. En este sentido, se espera que el enfoque histórico-político contribuya a evaluar con mayor rigor los alcances y límites de la nueva norma.

El artículo se organiza en cuatro secciones. En la primera, se reconstruye la evolución de la legislación sobre los derechos de propiedad desde el

inicio del proceso de reforma y apertura en 1978 hasta el ingreso de la RPC a la Organización Mundial del Comercio en 2001. En la segunda, se examinan las reformas jurídicas y las opiniones emitidas por el Consejo de Estado entre 2004 y 2020, identificando los antecedentes inmediatos de la LPEP. En la tercera se presenta la LPEP y se describen sus principales aportes normativos. En la cuarta se analiza la ley a la luz del proceso de reforma jurídica y su articulación con el sector público-estatal. Para finalizar, se ofrecen algunas conclusiones sobre el lugar de la LPEP en la trayectoria de las reformas de mercado de la RPC.

Derechos de propiedad, legislación y reforma (1978-2001)

La reforma y apertura marcó el inicio de una profunda transformación del orden jurídico y de los derechos de propiedad (Wang et al., 2021). La transición hacia una economía de mercado implicó el reconocimiento, tanto tácito como explícito, de la propiedad privada de los agentes económicos, ya sea sobre los medios de producción o sobre los beneficios derivados de su uso. Entre los hitos iniciales vinculados a los derechos de propiedad destacan: el establecimiento del sistema de responsabilidad por contratación familiar (1980), que permitió a las familias rurales arrendar tierras para su explotación privada; la creación de Zonas Económicas Especiales (1980), que garantizaban derechos de propiedad y retornos al capital extranjero; y las privatizaciones de pequeñas y medianas empresas estatales hacia finales de los años ochenta y comienzos de los noventa. A ello se suman los beneficios privados obtenidos por funcionarios locales y gestores de empresas públicas rurales y urbanas (Coase y Wang, 2012).

En la práctica, los derechos de propiedad se desarrollaron de forma gradual y selectiva, a medida que el mercado capitalista se abrió camino en China (Harvey, 2007; Arrighi, 2007; Naughton, 2007; Weber, 2021). Esta evolución se sustentó en diversas teorías sobre los derechos de propiedad, promovidas por asesores de organismos internacionales —el Banco Mundial y el Fondo Monetario Internacional—, así como por académicos nacionales y extranjeros que buscaron adaptar y/o impulsar enfoques reformistas, neoliberales y neoinstitucionales acordes con la nueva realidad económica del país (Friedman, 1990; Chow, 1994; Li, 2016; Gewirtz, 2017; Weber, 2020). En este contexto, se destacan los aportes tempranos de Wu Xiangong en *The*

Relationship between the Ownership, Possession, Disposition, and Use of the Means of Production (1982) y *Three Types of Possession and Proper Separation of Ownership and Right of Management* (1985) (Huang, 2012).¹

Dado que la reforma y apertura requería una liberalización controlada del mercado, sin que el Partido-Estado perdiera el dominio sobre medios de producción estratégicos —como la tierra, el sistema bancario o las empresas de sectores clave—, la redefinición de los derechos de propiedad permitía delimitar con mayor claridad el alcance de estos derechos, especialmente en relación con propiedades públicas arrendadas o corporativizadas (Ho, 2005).

Las reformas económicas impulsadas desde fines de los años setenta y la incorporación de la teoría de los derechos de propiedad se tradujeron rápidamente en una nueva legislación, orientada a alinearse con los estándares jurídicos del capitalismo internacional. Tras el ingreso de la RPC a la Organización Mundial de la Propiedad Intelectual en 1980, se sancionaron nuevas leyes en materia de marcas registradas y derechos de autor. En 1984, el PCCh abolió oficialmente el sistema de comunas populares y adoptó el sistema de responsabilidad por contratación familiar (Fan, 2018).

En 1988, se modificó la Ley de Gestión del Suelo de 1986 para autorizar arrendamientos a largo plazo (Walker y Buck, 2007; Lagarrigue, 2024a, 2024b). Mientras tanto, la Constitución de 1982 consagraba el estatus jurídico superior de la propiedad pública socialista, describiéndola como “sagrada [shensheng] e inviolable [buke qinfan]” y definiéndola como base del sistema económico, con el sector estatal como “fuerza rectora”. Sin embargo, una enmienda constitucional en 1988 reconoció por primera vez a la economía privada como complemento de la propiedad pública socialista (Constitución de la RPC, 1982; Enmienda a la Constitución de la RPC, 1988; Zhang, 2008).

Ese mismo año, la APN aprobó la Ley de Empresas Industriales Propiedad de Todo el Pueblo, que establecía la separación entre la propiedad estatal de las empresas y la autoridad de gestión (Ley de Empresas Industriales, 1988). Pocos meses antes, el Consejo de Estado había emitido un reglamento provisional sobre empresas privadas, con el objetivo de “estimular y orien-

1 En abril de 1986, en el marco de las discusiones internas entre reformistas y conservadores, el académico Li Yining pronunció un discurso en la Universidad de Pekín titulado: “La reforma de la propiedad es la cruz de la reforma”. En mayo de ese mismo año, publicó un artículo en Beijing Daily en el que instaba a centrar la atención no en la reforma del sistema de precios, sino en la del régimen de propiedad de las empresas chinas. Sus ideas influyeron en el primer ministro y principal impulsor de las reformas de mercado Zhao Ziyang (Gewirtz, 2017).

tar el sano desarrollo de las empresas privadas, salvaguardar sus derechos e intereses legítimos, fortalecer la supervisión y gestión, y hacer prosperar la economía mercantil planificada socialista” (Consejo de Estado, 1988). Este reglamento puede considerarse el primer antecedente directo de la LPEP.

En la década de 1990, bajo el liderazgo de Jiang Zemin, se incorporó oficialmente la expresión “economía de mercado socialista” (Jefferys, 2009). El mandato de Jiang estuvo marcado por el *boom* industrial, la proletarianización de la fuerza de trabajo, la privatización de pequeñas y medianas empresas estatales, así como de las viviendas vinculadas a las “unidades de trabajo” o *danwei*. Fueron también característica de esta época las grandes migraciones del campo a la ciudad, y la emergencia de la cuestión social y ambiental (Walker y Buck, 2007; Perry, 2011; Friedman, 2014; Fan, 2018). Durante este período la literatura sobre los derechos de propiedad se incrementó. Los académicos buscaban adaptar las teorías de los derechos de propiedad al marxismo y a la nueva realidad económica. Entre los temas de discusión sobresalía el uso del término “economía privada” (Huang, 2012; Cheng y Liu, 2017; Zhou, 2020)².

En 1999, una enmienda constitucional reafirmó la primacía de la propiedad pública, pero establecía que las demás formas de propiedad dejaban de ser un mero “complemento” para convertirse en un “componente importante de la economía socialista de mercado” (Enmienda a la Constitución de la RPC, 1999). Hacia fines de los años noventa, la legislación china permitía reconocer ya cinco tipos de propiedad: 1) pública; 2) privada; 3) pública reformada (con cesión parcial de derechos de control e ingresos a empresas y directores); 4) pública contratada (con gestión delegada a un administrador externo), y 5) bienes públicos arrendados (donde el arrendatario asume todos los derechos de control e ingresos a cambio del pago del arriendo) (Oi y Walder, 1999).

En 2001, tras haber cumplido con las exigencias del régimen de comercio internacional y del sistema jurídico de una economía de libre mercado, la RPC ingresó formalmente a la Organización Mundial del Comercio (OMC)

2 Huang (2012) destaca, para este período, los siguientes trabajos: *New Discussion on Property Rights* (1993) y *Subjective Property Rights Theory* (1998) de Liu Shibai; *Property Rights Relationship, Operation Mechanism, and Function of Joint-Stock Companies* y *On Property Rights of Legal Person in Social Sciences in China* de Wu Xuangong escritos entre 1994 y 1995, y la tesis de Wu Yifeng *Marx's Property Rights Theory and Property Rights Reform of SOEs* (1995).

(Clarke, Murrell y Whiting, 2008; Lagarrigue, 2024a). Este logro impulsaría una serie de nuevas reformas al régimen de propiedad durante el primer cuarto del siglo XXI.

Derechos de propiedad, legislación y reforma (2004-2025)

En 2004, una reforma constitucional reconoció por primera vez el derecho a la propiedad privada.³ La nueva redacción del artículo 11 establecía que el Estado “protege los derechos e intereses legítimos de los sectores no públicos de la economía tales como los sectores económicos individual y privado”, y que “estimula, apoya y guía el desarrollo de sectores no públicos de la economía y, de acuerdo con lo previsto en la ley, ejercita la supervisión y control sobre ellos” (Constitución de la RPC, 2004, art. 11). En su artículo 13 se afirmaba que la “legítima propiedad privada de los ciudadanos es inviolable”, pero sin atribuirle la condición de “sagrada” que quedaba reservada a la propiedad pública. Asimismo, la Constitución establecía que el Estado “protege los derechos de los ciudadanos a la propiedad privada y su herencia” (Constitución de la RPC, 2004, art. 13). De forma complementaria, una serie de artículos reforzaban el papel del Estado en el desarrollo de las fuerzas productivas, la distribución y la seguridad social (art. 14), la mejora de los mecanismos de ajuste macroeconómico (art. 15) y la gestión de las empresas estatales (art. 16).

En 2005, el Consejo de Estado emitió un documento con “diversas opiniones” sobre “el fomento, apoyo y orientación del desarrollo de las economías privadas individuales y otras economías de propiedad no pública” para los gobiernos provinciales, de regiones autónomas y municipios. Estas recomendaciones buscaban estandarizar los criterios de promoción y trato equitativo hacia el sector privado por parte de funcionarios públicos y gestores estatales, así como habilitar una mayor participación del capital privado en la economía nacional (Consejo de Estado, 2005).

3 En rigor, la primera Constitución de la RPC (1954) reconocía este derecho que, en reformas posteriores, sería suprimido: “El Estado, de acuerdo con la ley, protege el derecho de propiedad de los capitalistas sobre los medios de producción y sobre otros capitales” (Constitución de la RPC, 1954, art. 10). Sobre la coexistencia de diversos tipos de propiedad véase, Fan (2018).

En 2007, la APN sancionó la primera Ley de Propiedad, cuyo objetivo declarado era “salvaguardar el sistema económico básico del Estado, mantener el orden económico de mercado socialista, clarificar la propiedad, dar juego a las utilidades de las propiedades y proteger el derecho real de los titulares de derechos” (Ley de Propiedad, 2007: art. 1). La nueva legislación respondía, tanto a las demandas del capital privado, como a las de propietarios individuales afectados por expropiaciones forzosas. Estas expropiaciones, destinadas a proyectos inmobiliarios y obras públicas, carecían de una justa compensación, lo que, sumado al aumento de la corrupción de los funcionarios, desencadenaría una ola de protestas sociales (Fewsmith, 2008; Heilmann, 2017).

El crecimiento económico acelerado, la industrialización y la urbanización intensificaron los litigios sobre los bienes inmuebles. El vacío legal hacía imperioso una ley que clarificara los alcances y límites de la propiedad pública y privada. De aquí, que varios capítulos de la nueva norma —en particular los capítulos VI, VII, VIII, XII y XIII— se dedicaron específicamente a los derechos sobre la propiedad inmueble.

Al igual que la Constitución, la Ley de 2007 establecía una clasificación jerárquica de la propiedad en tres tipos: estatal, colectiva y privada, en ese orden. El Capítulo V incluía doce artículos dedicados a la enumeración y protección de los bienes estatales (art. 46 a 57); seis artículos sobre los bienes colectivos (art. 58 a 63), y cinco artículos referidos a los bienes privados (art. 64 a 68), ello mostraba la importancia formal que la APN aún le atribuía al sector público.

Un año más tarde, en el marco de una reorientación del modelo de desarrollo económico —centrado ahora en el fortalecimiento del mercado interno y del sector estatal—, la APN sancionó la Ley de Activos Estatales de las Empresas. Esta norma formalizó las funciones de la Comisión Supervisora y Administradora de Activos Estatales (SASAC, por sus siglas en inglés), creada en 2003, y buscó mejorar el control y la dirección de la propiedad estatal en la economía, promoviendo la coordinación económica, científica y tecnológica entre las distintas empresas estatales (Milhaupt y Lin, 2013). Frente al ciclo de liberalización económica impulsado por la administración de Jiang Zemin, el gobierno de Hu Jintao (2003–2013) respondió con una estrategia orientada al fortalecimiento del sector público, al estímulo del consumo interno, al abordaje de la cuestión ambiental y a la inversión en

capital humano. Durante su mandato se registró un aumento de la inversión en servicios sociales, educación, ciencia y tecnología.⁴

El 7 de mayo de 2010, el Consejo de Estado emitió nuevas recomendaciones a los gobiernos con el objetivo de ampliar la participación del sector privado, de modo que este contribuyera a “la expansión del empleo social, el aumento de los ingresos de los residentes, el impulso del consumo interno y la promoción de la armonía y la estabilidad social” en la “etapa primaria del socialismo” (Consejo de Estado, 2010). El documento ponía especial énfasis en la inversión del capital privado en el sector de servicios y en el fomento de la investigación y el desarrollo. Estas recomendaciones serán las bases de la LPEP.

En 2018, durante un simposio sobre empresas privadas, Xi Jinping subrayó la importancia del sector privado mediante la fórmula “cinco, seis, siete, ocho, nueve”. Según sus palabras, este sector, “aporta más del 50 % de los ingresos fiscales, más del 60 % del PIB, más del 70 % de los logros de innovación tecnológica, más del 80 % del empleo laboral urbano y más del 90 % del número de empresas” (CGTN, 2022). Al año siguiente, el Consejo de Estado reforzó las recomendaciones sobre “la creación de un mejor entorno de desarrollo para apoyar la reforma y el desarrollo de las empresas privadas” (Consejo de Estado, 2019). Las medidas propuestas abarcaban desde la reducción de la carga fiscal y el apoyo financiero, hasta la protección de la propiedad privada legítima y la creación de canales de comunicación estandarizados e institucionalizados entre el gobierno y las empresas. En ese mismo documento, el Consejo de Estado destacaba la importancia de que las empresas privadas establecieran organizaciones del Partido, “exploren e innoven activamente las formas de construcción del Partido, trabajen en torno a la difusión e implementación de las líneas, principios y políticas del Partido, unan y movilicen a las masas trabajadoras” (Consejo de Estado, 2019, XXVI; véase también CPCNEWS, 2019).

4 Hu buscó combinar “el socialismo como sistema básico con el fomento de la economía de mercado”, la “transformación de la base económica” con la “reforma de la superestructura”, el “robustecimiento de las fuerzas productivas” con la “elevación de las cualidades cívicas de toda la nación”, “la eficiencia con la promoción de la equidad social”, la “independencia y autodeterminación con la participación en la globalización económica”, “la contribución a la reforma y el desarrollo con la preservación de la estabilidad social, y la propulsión de la gran causa del socialismo” con “la construcción del Partido” (Hu, 2007, pp. 16-17). Sobre la administración de Hu Jintao, véase Fewsmith (2008), Perry (2011) y Friedman (2014).

En 2020, la APN sancionó el primer Código Civil de la RPC. El Código incorporó la anterior Ley de Propiedad y mantuvo la clasificación jerárquica de la propiedad en estatal, colectiva y privada. La norma dedicaba catorce artículos a la propiedad estatal (art. 246 a 259), seis a la propiedad colectiva (art. 260 a 265) y cuatro a la propiedad privada (art. 266 a 269) (Código Civil de la RPC, 2020). Tres años más tarde, el Consejo de Estado emitió nuevas opiniones sobre la promoción del desarrollo y el crecimiento de la economía privada. El documento incorporaba el pensamiento de Xi Jinping sobre el socialismo con peculiaridades chinas para la nueva era y manifestaba la intención de promover una economía privada “más grande, mejor y más fuerte”. Asimismo, remarcaba la presencia activa del Partido en el sector privado y la participación de empresarios en organismos representativos del Estado: “Mejorar el mecanismo de construcción ideológica y política de las figuras económicas privadas. Realizar una labor eficaz y constante de reclutamiento de miembros del Partido entre los representantes y elementos avanzados de la economía privada” (Consejo de Estado, 2023, XXI). Estas opiniones del Consejo de Estado constituyen el antecedente inmediato de la LPEP.

La Ley de Promoción de la Economía Privada

La ralentización económica experimentada por la RPC tras la pandemia de COVID-19, sumada a la guerra comercial con las principales potencias de Occidente y a la contracción del sector privado chino, llevó al PCCh a acelerar la promulgación de una ley orientada a promover la economía privada (Borst, 2024; Ministerio de Justicia de la RPC, 2024; Horsley, 2025).

La importancia estratégica de la LPEP está directamente relacionada con el peso del sector privado en la economía del país (Piketty, Li y Zucman, 2019). Según datos de 2025, de los 189 millones de empresas registradas en China, el 96,76 % corresponde a empresas privadas e individuales (Xinhua, 2025a). Como observa Horsley (2025), “estas entidades comerciales están reguladas por leyes generales y legislación específica”, que abarca diversos tipos de empresas —como compañías, empresas de propiedad individual o colectiva, sociedades privadas, hogares individuales y empresas con inversión extranjera—, aunque “ninguna ley nacional aborda específicamente las economías privadas o no públicas”. En este contexto, la LPEP busca, por un lado, proporcionar un marco legal específico al sector privado mediante la unificación de una normativa previamente dispersa y, por otro, garantizar un

trato equitativo respecto del sector público, al cual supera en generación de riqueza, ingresos fiscales, innovación tecnológica y empleo urbano.

El proceso de debate y aprobación del proyecto de ley fue inusualmente rápido, marcando un récord de tres sesiones consecutivas del Comité Permanente de la APN (Gao, 2025). El borrador de la ley fue presentado en diciembre de 2024 y la aprobación final se obtuvo en abril de 2025, con entrada en vigor prevista para el 20 de mayo del mismo año (Proyecto de LPEP, 2024; Xinhua, 2025b). El 17 de febrero de 2025, en un simposio con los principales empresarios chinos, Xi Jinping expresó públicamente la voluntad del Partido de respaldar al sector y anticipó algunos de los ejes centrales del proyecto de ley (Xinhua, 2025c).

Varios conceptos introducidos en el borrador de la LPEP resultaron novedosos, aunque también imprecisos. Uno de los más destacados fue la sustitución del término constitucional *siying* (“privada”) por *minying* (“persona” o “ciudadano”) para referirse a la economía “privada”. Esta modificación semántica pretendía disolver la oposición entre la economía privada y el interés público, entendiendo ahora por la primera una “economía civil” o socialmente integrada (Cheng y Liu, 2017; Horsley, 2025).⁵

Los cambios introducidos al proyecto original fueron limitados (Gao, 2025). Aunque la LPEP incluyó bajo la categoría de “economía privada” a los grandes hogares individuales y otras organizaciones no constituidas en sociedad, excluyó a las empresas extranjeras, y no ofreció precisiones sobre la articulación de la nueva ley con las acciones y normativas previas destinadas a promover al sector privado (Horsley, 2025).

La LPEP se compone de nueve capítulos. En su Capítulo I, Disposiciones Generales, se establecen los objetivos de la norma: 1) “optimizar el entorno de desarrollo de la economía privada”; 2) “garantizar que todos los tipos de organizaciones económicas participen de manera justa en la

5 Horsley explica que el término *minying* (民营) se popularizó bajo la administración de Xi, desplazando al término constitucional *siying*, para referirse a la economía “privada”. “Los académicos chinos -explica la autora- vieron la “economía *minying*” como un término útil para contrastar con el sector estatal (国营) y representar las nuevas formas, a veces mixtas público-privadas, de propiedad y operación que evolucionaron durante la reforma del sistema económico de China. “*Minying*” también evita las connotaciones políticamente negativas de *siying*, que incluye el carácter “*si*” (私), que significa personal, privado o egoísta, y sugiere la búsqueda de intereses puramente privados, no estatales. No obstante, algunos académicos chinos abogaron contra el uso de términos no legales como *minying* en la legislación” (Horsley, 2025).

competencia del mercado”; 3) “promover el sano desarrollo de la economía privada y el sano crecimiento del personal económico privado”; 4) “construir un sistema económico de mercado socialista de alto nivel”, y 5) “dar pleno juego al importante papel de la economía privada en la economía nacional y el desarrollo social” (LPEP, 2025, art. 1).

Estos objetivos están condicionados a la adhesión al liderazgo del PCCh, “al enfoque centrado en el pueblo”, al “sistema socialista con características chinas” y a la obligación de “asegurar la dirección política correcta del desarrollo de la economía privada” (LPEP, 2025, art. 2 y 5). La norma aclara que el Estado “adhiera a y mejora el sistema económico básico socialista, incluyendo la propiedad pública como pilar fundamental y el desarrollo común de las economías de propiedad múltiple”. Mientras el PCCh “consolida y desarrolla inquebrantablemente” a la propiedad pública, “alienta, apoya y guía inquebrantablemente” a la propiedad no pública (LPEP, 2025, art. 2). El Partido gobierna de manera directa al sector estatal y, por medio de éste, coordina al sector privado.

Asimismo, el capítulo establece uno de los principios centrales de la ley: la igualdad de trato con el sector público: “El Estado se adhiere a los principios de igualdad de trato, competencia leal, protección igualitaria y desarrollo común para promover el desarrollo y el crecimiento de la economía privada” (LPEP, 2025, art. 3). La mutua colaboración entre el Partido y el sector privado, ya esbozadas en las recomendaciones del Consejo de Estado de 2019, reaparece en el artículo 5. Entre las obligaciones del sector privado se incluyen: “cumplir las leyes y reglamentos, observar la moral social y la ética empresarial”, así como “cumplir con sus responsabilidades sociales, proteger los derechos e intereses legítimos de los trabajadores, salvaguardar los intereses nacionales y los intereses públicos sociales y aceptar la supervisión gubernamental y social cuando participen en actividades de producción y operación” (LPEP, 2025, art. 6).

El Capítulo II, Garantías de acceso equitativo al mercado, amplía estos principios. El Estado debe garantizar a las organizaciones económicas privadas igual acceso a factores de producción y servicios públicos, como financiamiento, tecnología, recursos humanos, datos, tierra y otros recursos naturales, así como acceso a las políticas estatales de fomento al desarrollo (art. 12). Además, se prohíbe la discriminación por parte de los gobiernos en la asignación de recursos, licitaciones y contrataciones públicas, procesos de supervisión y acceso a información oficial (art. 13 al 15).

El Capítulo III, Promoción de Inversiones y Financiamiento, asegura el respaldo estatal a las organizaciones privadas que contribuyan a la innovación, inversión y creación de industrias estratégicas e infraestructura moderna (LPEP, 2025: art. 16). Este apoyo se traducirá en financiamiento preferencial, siempre que las inversiones “estén en línea con la dirección estratégica nacional” (art. 17 al 26).

El Capítulo IV, Innovación tecnológica, establece el compromiso estatal con la financiación de la investigación básica, la tecnología de vanguardia y la tecnología orientada al bienestar social (art. 27); además, garantiza el acceso del sector privado a infraestructura científica nacional. Este capítulo refuerza la protección de los derechos de propiedad intelectual, tanto dentro como fuera del país (art. 33).

El Capítulo V, Operaciones estandarizadas, insiste en el rol del liderazgo del PCCh (art. 34) y en el papel activo que deben asumir las organizaciones económicas privadas en “la expansión del empleo, la mejora de las condiciones de vida de las personas, la innovación científica y tecnológica y contribuir a satisfacer las crecientes necesidades de las personas para una vida mejor” (art. 35). Se conmina a las organizaciones económicas privadas, tanto a adoptar una gobernanza estandarizada que incluya “un sistema de gestión democrática con el congreso de trabajadores como forma básica”, como a reconocer la importancia de “los sindicatos y otras organizaciones de masas” (art. 38). El capítulo, además, exige adoptar mecanismos anticorrupción y de prevención de fraude fiscal; separar los activos empresariales y personales, y mejorar el empleo, la distribución salarial y la responsabilidad social (art. 39 al 43).

El Capítulo VI, Servicio y apoyo, compromete a las autoridades estatales en todos los niveles a impulsar activamente el desarrollo de las organizaciones económicas privadas, a evitar abusos administrativos, a mantener canales de comunicación permanentes con el sector y a promover la formación de mano de obra especializada, en colaboración con instituciones educativas y de investigación. En sus artículos se alude a sanciones por deshonestidad comercial y a la necesidad de mejorar los mecanismos de resolución de litigios (art. 48 al 56). El capítulo concluye con una declaración de apoyo a la internacionalización de las operaciones del capital privado (art. 57).

El Capítulo VII, Protección de los derechos, responde a una de las principales demandas del sector privado: la protección efectiva de los derechos personales, de propiedad y de autonomía empresarial. Entre otras

garantías, la ley establece la prohibición de abusos de poder, el derecho a compensación justa y razonable en caso de expropiación, y la protección contra interferencias arbitrarias (art. 58 al 70). Por su parte, en el Capítulo VIII, Responsabilidad legal, se contemplan sanciones para los agentes estatales y privados que infrinjan las disposiciones de la ley (art. 71 al 76).

El Capítulo IX, Disposiciones complementarias, incluye dos precisiones jurídicas clave. En primer lugar, define como “organizaciones económicas privadas” a las “personas jurídicas con fines de lucro, personas no jurídicas y hogares industriales y comerciales individuales” establecidos en China y controlados por ciudadanos chinos, así como aquellas controladas directa o indirectamente por estas organizaciones (art. 77). En segundo lugar, aclara que las empresas con inversión extranjera también están sujetas a la legislación específica sobre inversión extranjera (art. 77). El artículo 78 fija la fecha de entrada en vigor de la ley.

En términos generales, la LPEP combina garantías jurídicas y apoyo estatal con compromisos políticos explícitos. Detrás de la norma subyace un principio clave del derecho socialista chino: el estado de derecho es inseparable de la conducción política del Partido. Un grupo de académicos chinos resume esta visión del derecho como expresión política en los siguientes términos: “Detrás de cada forma de estado de derecho se encuentra un conjunto de teorías políticas, en cada modelo de estado de derecho hay una lógica política, y bajo cada camino de estado de derecho hay una postura política” (Wang et al., 2023, p. 187). Desde esta perspectiva, aunque la LPEP amplía los derechos del sector privado, esto no conlleva necesariamente una limitación al poder público. Por el contrario, los mismos académicos chinos sostienen que “gobernar conforme a la ley” implica mejorar los métodos y la capacidad de gobierno del Partido (Wang et al., 2023). En este sentido, la LPEP cumple una función táctica: a medida que se profundiza la legislación que garantiza mejores condiciones al capital privado, este queda simultáneamente sujeto a la autoridad política, a la que normativamente está obligado a respaldar.

Entre lo táctico y lo estratégico

Con la LPEP, el reconocimiento jurídico y económico al sector privado puede interpretarse como una señal de confianza del PCCh hacia el libre mercado y a los capitalistas nacionales, a quienes valora por su capacidad de innovación, su contribución al crecimiento económico y su lealtad política (Xinhua, 2025c). En esta línea, el PCCh sostiene que el sector privado cumple un papel

insustituible en el desarrollo de las fuerzas productivas nacionales (CGTN, 2022). Sin embargo, conviene tener presente que, para el gobierno chino, el rol del sector privado en la economía es de naturaleza táctica, no estratégica. Su promoción forma parte de una fase instrumental en la realización del “socialismo con características chinas”, más que de una transformación estructural del modelo económico (Fan 2018; Weber, 2020).

Cuando el PCCh abandonó la economía planificada, pronto se enfrentó a una serie de obstáculos ideológicos, políticos y sociales que le impidieron adoptar un modelo neoliberal pleno (Harvey, 2007; Arrighi, 2007). Aunque en 1978 el Partido descartó la planificación maoísta, las “directrices” gubernamentales (*guihua*) continuaron orientando el funcionamiento del mercado, sin permitir su desregulación ni privatización completa (Meisner, 1985; Jeffreys, 2009). En 1987, el entonces secretario general del Partido, Zhao Ziyang, uno de los principales arquitectos de la reforma, rechazó las recomendaciones de Milton Friedman sobre una liberalización total del mercado chino, defendiendo en cambio un modelo donde el Estado ajusta al mercado y el mercado guía a la empresa (Friedman, 1990; Naughton, 1995; Weber, 2020).

Como resume Weber, “el paradigma reformista chino que emerge en la primera década de reformas es la mercantilización bajo la primacía del Estado, y no de la propiedad privada. El mercado y la propiedad privada están destinados a servir a la agenda desarrollista estatal” (Weber, 2020). En este sentido, el análisis de la legislación vinculada a la propiedad privada —y, en particular, de la LPEP— permite identificar tres rasgos centrales: 1) La propiedad pública (estatal) mantiene una jerarquía superior respecto de otras formas de propiedad (colectiva, privada e individual); 2) el sector privado depende del sector estatal para su estímulo, apoyo y orientación; y 3) el sector privado se encuentra sujeto al control político ejercido por el PCCh.

Estos tres elementos se reiteran en normas de distinto alcance, desde la Constitución de la RPC hasta el Código Civil, siendo su expresión más reciente la LPEP. Esta última establece que la propiedad pública constituye el pilar fundamental del sistema económico, y afirma que su consolidación y desarrollo representa el primer “inquebrantable” de la economía socialista (LPEP, 2025, art. 2). La jerarquía de la propiedad pública frente a otras formas de propiedad se explica, en parte, por el peso del derecho público en la tradición jurídica china (Potter, 2005) y por el valor estratégico que el marxismo-leninismo asigna al Estado como gestor de los medios de producción (Meis-

ner, 1985; Fan, 2018; Lagarrigue, 2024c). Los medios de producción estatales son el instrumento mediante el cual el PCCh controla el mercado, orienta el desarrollo económico y garantiza la soberanía territorial y social. El Estado mantiene una posición dominante sobre sectores clave —tierra, recursos naturales, comunicaciones, alimentación, minería, energía, infraestructura crítica, transporte y sistema financiero— lo que le permite ejercer el control indirecto del mercado a través de concesiones, asociaciones, habilitaciones o sanciones. Mecanismos estos contemplados en la LPEP.

En segundo lugar, la LPEP confirma que el sector estatal es un socio indispensable para las organizaciones económicas privadas, a las que garantiza acceso equitativo a recursos financieros, capital humano, patentes de instituciones públicas y otros factores de producción bajo control estatal (LPEP, 2025, art. 12). En ninguna otra norma como en la LPEP el PCCh ha asignado un rol tan destacado a la economía privada, a la que califica de “componente importante”, “nuevo motor para impulsar la modernización al estilo chino”, “base fundamental para un desarrollo de alta calidad” y “motor fundamental para impulsar la construcción integral de un país socialista moderno y la realización de la gran revitalización de la nación china” (LPEP, 2025, art. 3). Para el PCCh, este sector es clave en la innovación tecnológica, especialmente en áreas estratégicas como la inteligencia artificial y la infraestructura digital, fundamentales en la competencia económica y militar con los Estados Unidos (Varoufakis, 2024). Además de su aporte en I+D, el sector privado cumple funciones críticas: absorber el excedente de mano de obra, generar ingresos fiscales y sostener el dinamismo económico nacional. En términos tácticos, el PCCh mantiene una alianza funcional con un sector cuya contribución es cada vez más necesaria para el desarrollo de las fuerzas productivas, la estabilidad social y la disputa tecno-comercial global.

En tercer lugar, esta alianza tiene un reverso político: la LPEP exige al sector privado lealtad institucional, obligándolo a adherir al liderazgo del PCCh y a garantizar la correcta orientación política del desarrollo económico (LPEP, 2025, art. 2 y 5). Si bien la ley proporciona protección legal a la propiedad privada y promueve su expansión mediante políticas públicas, también refuerza el compromiso político del empresariado con los objetivos estratégicos del Partido-Estado. Esta relación puede entenderse como una fase propia de los procesos de modernización capitalista, en la que el Partido cumple un rol mediador entre capital y trabajo, impulsando el mercado,

canalizando sus beneficios hacia objetivos nacionales y respondiendo, de forma gradual y selectiva, a las demandas sociales y ambientales.

En síntesis, la LPEP responde a la tendencia de un capitalismo nacional que busca consolidarse bajo el control centralizado del PCCh. Por un lado, la ley brinda garantías jurídicas a la burguesía nacional para promover sus inversiones y apuntalar un modelo desarrollista, por otro, reafirma las limitaciones estructurales que impone el Partido-Estado al desarrollo de una economía plenamente capitalista. Ello explica la paradoja de una norma que busca proteger al sector privado del abuso estatal imponiéndole legalmente la subordinación política al PCCh.

Conclusiones

El análisis histórico-político de la LPEP permite ponderar los alcances y límites de la norma. Su valor jurídico radica en ser la primera ley en su tipo orientada específicamente al sector privado. A este sector la ley otorga reconocimiento formal, acceso a bienes estatales, apoyo legal y financiero, y garantías para una competencia justa con el sector público. Desde una perspectiva histórico-política, la LPEP constituye un paso más en la institucionalización del mercado como catalizador del desarrollo de las fuerzas productivas, sin que esto implique la renuncia del Estado a su papel de coordinador del desarrollo. La ley, en efecto, refleja la lógica dual que estructura la economía china: mientras el sector privado se consolida como un aliado táctico del Partido, este último conserva el control estratégico sobre sectores clave de la economía. En este sentido, la LPEP es la norma que fija y regula la expansión del capital privado con los objetivos desarrollistas establecidos por el PCCh.

Entre los escenarios posibles que la LPEP habilita se encuentran, por un lado, una mayor expansión del sector privado con acceso ahora a recursos y bienes públicos antes denegados y, por otro, una mayor subordinación del sector privado al poder político del PCCh. No obstante estos pronósticos, la LPEP debe ser comprendida a la luz de las tendencias económicas de un capitalismo nacional, y no como el punto de partida de una nueva relación entre el sector público y el sector privado. En este sentido, la norma contribuye a una mejor caracterización del “modelo chino” al explicitar los esfuerzos del PCCh por articular una estructura económica capitalista con una superestructura política de herencia socialista.

Cuando en 1979 el PCCh abandonó la estrategia de la lucha de clases y priorizó el desarrollo de las fuerzas productivas, con la economía como

“ciencia general” y la división social del trabajo por principio, su viraje hacia el neoliberalismo parecía irreversible. Sin embargo, el rechazo de los reformistas a otorgar un papel preponderante al sector privado en el mercado mantenía al PCCh en una actitud cautelosa (Partido Comunista Chino, 1981; Weber, 2020). Décadas más tarde, las reformas legales en materia de propiedad, el crecimiento sostenido del sector privado en la economía y la reciente sanción de la LPEP demostraron que la propiedad privada había alcanzado un alto grado de legitimidad tanto en el Partido como en la sociedad china.

Referencias

- Arrighi, G. (2007). *Adam Smith in Beijing*. Verso.
- Borst, N. (2024). How deeply rooted are China's economic woes? OMFIF, 30 de agosto de 2024. <https://www.omfif.org/2024/08/how-deeply-rooted-are-chinas-economic-woes/>
- CGTN (2022). Apoyar la innovación en la economía privada beneficia a China y al mundo. <https://espanol.cgtn.com/n/2022-06-11/HcJacA/Apoyar-la-innovacion-en-la-economia-privada-beneficia-a-China-y-al-mundo/index.html>
- Cheng, L. y Liu, N. (2017). Jingji zengzhang, zhidu bianqian yu “minying jingji” gainian de shangyan [Crecimiento económico, cambio institucional y evolución del concepto de “economía privada”]. <https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/rMidLGGUjFMCaRgIXiS-pA>
- Chow, G. (1994). *Understanding China's Economy*. World Scientific Publishing. <https://doi.org/10.1142/2430>.
- Clarke, D., Murrell, P. y Whiting, S. (2008). The Role of Law in China's Economic Development. En L. Brandt, y G. Rawsky (Ed.). *China's Great Economic Transformation* (pp. 375-428). Cambridge. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511754234.012>
- Coase, R. y Wang, N. (2012). *How China Became Capitalist*. Palgrave Macmillan. <https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137019370>
- Código Civil de la RPC (2020). Civil Code of the People's Republic of China. https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/lawsregulations/202012/31/content_WS5fedad98c6d0f72576943005.html
- Consejo de Estado (1988). Zhonghua renmin gongheguo qiye zhanxing tiaoli [Reglamento provisional de la República Popular China sobre las empresas privadas]. <https://law.pkulaw.com/chinalaw/3889.html>
- Consejo de Estado (2005). Guowuyuan guanyu guli zhichi he yindao geti siying deng fei gongyouzhi jingji fazhan de ruogan yijian [Diversas opiniones del Consejo de Estado sobre el fomento, apoyo y orientación del desarrollo de las economías privadas individuales y otras economías de propiedad no pública]. https://www.gov.cn/zwjk/2005-08/12/content_21691.htm
- Consejo de Estado (2010). Guowuyuan guanyu guli he yindao minjian touzi jiankang fazhan de ruogan yijian [Diversas opiniones del Consejo de Estado sobre el fomento, apoyo y orientación del desarrollo de las economías privadas individuales y otras economías de propiedad no pública]. https://www.gov.cn/zwjk/2010-05/13/content_1605218.htm

- Consejo de Estado (2019). Zhonggong zhongyang guowuyuan guanyu yingzao geng hao fazhan huanjing zhichi minying qiye gaige fazhan de yijian [Opiniones del Comité Central del PCCh y del Consejo de Estado sobre la creación de un mejor entorno de desarrollo para apoyar la reforma y el desarrollo de las empresas privadas]. https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2019-12/22/content_5463137.htm
- Consejo de Estado (2023). Zhonggong zhongyang guowuyuan guanyu cujin minying jingji fazhan zhuangda de yijian [Opiniones del Comité Central del PCCh y del Consejo de Estado sobre la promoción del desarrollo y el crecimiento de la economía privada]. https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/202307/content_6893056.htm
- Constitución de la RPC (1954). Constitution of the People's Republic of China. <http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=14754&CGid>
- Constitución de la RPC (1982). Constitution of the People's Republic of China. <https://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=1&lib=law&SearchKeyword=&SearchCKeyword=>
- Constitución de la RPC (2004). Constitution of the People's Republic of China. https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/lawregulations/201911/20/content_WS5ed8856ec6d0b3f0e9499913.html
- CPCNEWS (2019). Xin shidai minying qiye dangjian jingyan jiaoliu hui zai zhongyang dangxiao juban [En la Escuela Central del Partido (Escuela Nacional de Administración) se celebró la reunión de intercambio de experiencias sobre la construcción del partido en las empresas privadas en la nueva era]. <http://dangjian.people.com.cn/n1/2019/0624/c117092-31176698.html>
- Enmienda a la Constitución de la RPC (1988). Constitution of the People's Republic of China. <https://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=40850&lib=law&SearchKeyword=&SearchCKeyword=>
- Enmienda a la Constitución de la RPC (1999). Amendment to the Constitution of the People's Republic of China. <https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/A4%21en.assist.pdf>
- Fan, S. (2018). From Control of the Commanding Heights to Control of the Whole Economy and Back: Chinese Ownership Theories Since 1949. J. Kovacs (Ed.). *Populating No Man's Land: Economic Concepts of Ownership under Communism* (pp. 47–86). Lexington Books.
- Friedman, M. (1990). *Friedman in China*. Centre for Economic Research.
- Friedman, E. (2014). *Insurgency trap*. Cornell University Press. <https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9780801452697.001.0001>
- Fewsmith, J. (2008). *China since Tiananmen*. Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511790454>
- Gao, F. (2025). *China Passes Private Economy Promotion Law*. <https://www.fredgao.com/p/china-passes-private-economy-promotion?open=false#%C2%A7law-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china-on-promoting-the-private-economy>
- Gewirtz, J. (2017). *Unlikely partners: Chinese reformers, Western economists, and the making of global China*. Harvard University Press.
- Harvey, D. (2007). *Breve historia del neoliberalismo*. Akal.
- Heilmann, S. (2017). *China's Political System*. Rowman & Littlefield.
- Ho, P. (2005). *Institutions in Transition. Land Ownership, Property Rights, and Social Conflict in China*. Oxford. <https://doi.org/10.1093/019928069X.001.0001>
- Horsley, J. (2025). Will China's private economy promotion law reassure its private sector? <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/will-chinas-private-economy-promotion-law-reassure-its-private-sector/>
-

- Hu, J. (2007). Informe presentado ante el XVII Congreso Nacional del PCCh. <https://ebook.theorychina.org.cn/ebook/upload/storage/files/2022/10/28/19fc20dfb14e2d6d4f3e472c94c3b4f85325/mobile/index.html>
- Huang, S. (2023). *Developing Property Rights Theory*. Springer. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0883-7>
- Jeffreys, E. (2009). *China's Governmentalities: Governing Change, Changing Government*. Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203873724>
- Lagarrigue, F.M. (2024a). Propiedad privada y gubernamentalidad en China, una aproximación. *Perspectivas De las Ciencias Económicas y Jurídicas*, 14(2). <https://doi.org/10.19137/perspectivas-2024-v14n2a07>
- Lagarrigue, F.M. (2024b). Valencias de la propiedad privada. Una mirada al régimen de la propiedad en la China contemporánea, *Observatorio Latinoamericano y Caribeño*, 8(2), pp. 6-23. <https://doi.org/10.62174/olac.9848>
- Lagarrigue, F.M. (2024c). Constituir un socialismo: Constitución, partido y propiedad privada en la República Popular China (1954-2018), *Asia/América Latina*, 9(16), pp. 11-29. <https://doi.org/10.33177/16.varia1>
- Ley de Empresas Industriales (1988). Zhonghua renmin gongheguo quanmin suoyou zhi gongye qiye fa [Ley de la República Popular China sobre Empresas Industriales de Propiedad de Todo el Pueblo]. <http://www.lawinfochina.com/Display.aspx?lib=law&ID=1188>
- Ley de Promoción de la Economía Privada (2025). Zhonghua renmin gongheguo laogong jingji cujin fa [Ley de la República Popular China sobre la Promoción de la Economía Privada]. https://www.gov.cn/yaowen/liebiao/202504/content_7022018.htm
- Ley de Propiedad (2007). http://english.www.gov.cn/services/investment/2014/08/23/content_281474982978047.htm
- Li, M. (2016). *China and the Twenty-First-Century Crisis*. Pluto Press.
- Meisner, M. (1985). The Chinese rediscovery of Karl Marx: Some reflections on post-maoist Chinese Marxism. *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, 17 (3), pp. 2-16. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14672715.1985.10409822>
- Milhaupt C.J. y Lin, W-L. (2013). Los grandes grupos empresariales chinos: entendiendo los mecanismos del capitalismo de estado en China. *Revista Chilena de Derecho*, 40(3), 801-858. <https://doi.org/10.4067/S0718-34372013000300004>
- Ministerio de Justicia de la RPC (2024). Sifa bu guojia fazhan gaige weiyuanhui guanyu "zhonghua renmin gongheguo shuishou jingji cujin fa (zhengqiu yijian gao)" gongkai zhengqiu yijian de tongzhi [Aviso del Ministerio de Justicia y la Comisión Nacional de Desarrollo y Reforma sobre la solicitud de opinión pública acerca de la "Ley de la República Popular China sobre la Promoción de la Economía Privada (Proyecto de Ley para la Solicitud de Opinión)"]. https://www.moj.gov.cn/pub/sfbgw/lfyjzj/lffjyzt/202410/t20241010_507325.html
- Naughton, B (1995). *Growing out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform, 1978-1993*. Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511664335>
- Naughton, B. (2007). *The Chinese Economy. Transitions and Growth*. MIT Press.
- Oi, J. y Walder, A. (1999). *Property Rights and Economic Reform in China*. Stanford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9780804764193>
- Partido Comunista Chino (1981). Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the People's Republic of China. <https://www.marxists.org/subject/china/documents/cpc/history/01.htm>

- Perry, E. (2011). From Mass Campaigns to Managed Campaigns: 'Constructing a New Socialist Countryside'. S. Heilman, y E. Perry. (Eds.). *Mao's Invisible Hand*, pp. 30-61, Harvard Contemporary China Series. <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1sq5tc6.8>
- Piketty, T., Li, Y., y Zucman, G. (2019). Capital accumulation, private property, and rising inequality in China, 1978-2015. *American Economic Review*, 109(7), pp. 2469-2496. <https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20170973>
- Potter, P.B. (2005). *The Chinese Legal System*. Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203995624>
- Proyecto de LPEP (2024). Zhonghua renmin gongheguo laogong jingji cujin fa (cao'an) [Ley de la República Popular China sobre la Promoción de la Economía Privada (borrador)]. <http://www.law-lib.com/fzdt/newshtml/20/20241226162127.htm>
- Varoufakis, Y. (2024). *Tecnofeudalismo: El sigiloso sucesor del capitalismo*. Ediciones Deusto.
- Walker, R. y Buck, D. (2007). The Chinese Road. *New Left Review*, 46, pp. 39-66. <https://doi.org/10.64590/qm7>
- Wang, W. et al. (2021). *Fa lixue* [Jurisprudencia]. Editorial del Pueblo.
- Wang, W. et al. (2023). *Xij Jinping xin shidai zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi sixiang gaiyao* [Introducción al pensamiento de Xi Jinping sobre el socialismo con características chinas para una nueva era]. Editorial del Pueblo.
- Weber, I. (2020). Origins of China's Contested Relation with Neoliberalism: Economics, the World Bank, and Milton Friedman at the Dawn of Reform. *Global Perspectives*, 1(1), 12271. <https://doi.org/10.1525/gp.2020.12271>
- Weber, I. (2021). *How China Escaped Shock Therapy*. London: Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429490125>
- Xinhua (2025a). Crece número de entidades del sector privado en China. <http://www.spanish.xinhuanet.com/20250627/27268565526b47708b339b49099cdf7c/c.html>
- Xinhua (2025b). China aprueba ley dedicada a fomento del sector privado. <https://spanish.xinhuanet.com/20250430/9f3602280e0049f8b95bdde8e2a8dd62/c.html>
- Xinhua (2025c). Xi insta a promover desarrollo saludable y de alta calidad del sector privado del país. <https://spanish.xinhuanet.com/20250217/8d1dae8a339e42828f2a594451aa9d4d/c.html>
- Zhang, M. (2008). From Public to Private: The Newly Enacted Chinese Property Law and the Protection of Property Rights in China. *Berkeley Business Law Journal*, 5, 317-363.
- Zhou, Q. (2020). *Property Rights and Changes in China*. Peking University Press and Springer Nature Singapore. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9885-2>

Institutions Role in the Economic Development of Underdeveloped Countries. Lessons From China for Mexico

El Papel de las instituciones en el desarrollo económico de los países subdesarrollados.
Lecciones de China para México

Andrea Salazar Aguilar¹
<https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0519-0929>
andrea.salazar@alumni.sjtu.edu.cn
Universidad Jiao Tong de Shanghai
República Popular China

Fecha de recepción: 23 de septiembre de 2025
Fecha de aceptación: 28 de octubre de 2025



ABSTRACT: The present article examines, from a neo-institutional framework, the role of institutions in the economic development of Mexico and China, according to their development models. It highlights China's gradual state-led institutional reforms that took place in 1978, which were able to foster sustained growth, innovation, and social welfare improvements through adaptative institutions. In contrast, Mexico pursued a neoliberal, market-driven model since the 1980s, limiting state intervention and resulting in slower, volatile growth and persistent low improvements in social welfare, ultimately development. Through the analysis and comparisons of constitutional mandates from 2001 to 2024, it is argued that China's success is due to a pragmatic institutional evolution, whereas Mexico's underperformance is linked to weakened institutions and insufficient state role. China's approach of incremental reform and active State involvement can serve as a lesson for developing countries like Mexico to achieve sustainable development objectives.

1 Graduada de la Maestría en Ciencias políticas por la Universidad Jiao Tong de Shanghai, República Popular China; Estudiante del Doctorado en Relaciones Transpacificas por la Universidad de Colima, México, becada por SECIHTI.

Cómo citar: Salazar, A. (2025). Institutions Role in the Economic Development of Underdeveloped Countries. Lessons From China for Mexico. *China Global Review*, 3(6), 67-109. <https://doi.org/10.53897/REvChinaGR.2025.06.03>

Key words: neo-institutionalism, Mexico, China, development, planning.

RESUMEN: El presente artículo examina desde un marco neo-institucional, el papel de las instituciones en el desarrollo económico de México y China. Se destacan las reformas institucionales graduales por el Estado en China en 1978, que impulsaron el crecimiento sostenido, la innovación y mejoras en el bienestar social mediante instituciones adaptativas. En contraste, México adoptó un modelo neoliberal desde la década de los ochenta, limitando la intervención estatal y resultando en un crecimiento más lento y volátil, así como lentitud en mejoras del bienestar social y del desarrollo. Mediante el análisis y la comparación de los mandatos constitucionales de 2001 a 2024, se argumenta que el éxito de China se debe a una evolución institucional pragmática, mientras que el bajo desempeño de México se vincula con instituciones debilitadas y un rol estatal insuficiente. El enfoque chino de reforma gradual y participación activa del Estado puede servir de lección para que países en desarrollo como México alcancen sus objetivos de desarrollo sostenible.

Palabras clave: neo-institucionalismo, México, China, desarrollo, planeación.

Introduction

The twentieth century witnessed significant political and economic transformations worldwide. Both Mexico and the People's Republic of China (hereinafter China), experienced significant shifts in their economic and political models, which have shaped their current patterns of growth and development.

China's economic transformation represents a dynamic, long-term process that extends from the first phase of pure socialism (1949-1976), through the phase of reform and opening (1978-1998), to the present day. Anticipating the collapse of the Soviet Union, China embarked on a path of reform and integration into external markets, leaving behind its semi-autarkic and centralized system. The reform process initiated in 1978 was institutional in nature and characterized by gradualism, a pragmatic and incremental strategy of adaptation, a distinctive feature of China's development model.

Gradualism provided the foundation for the continuity and resilience of China's economic reforms, enabling the country to sustain long-term growth and steadily improve its socioeconomic indicators. The State played a central role not only as a planner and regulator, but also as a coordinator and facilitator of interactions among economic agents.

Among the most notable strategies of this process was institutional innovation through the establishment of Special Economic Zones (SEZ). As Paul Romer (2010) notes, the creation of these zones fostered new forms of urbanization and institutional experimentation that enhanced economic dynamism and accelerated economic progress and development.

These institutional changes have been fundamental to China's sustained improvement in indicators such as economic growth and income levels. The SEZ successfully attracted foreign capital, promoted technology transfer, and generated productive incentives through clear rules, property rights protection, and encouraged competition (González & Meza, 2009). However, they also contributed to deepening regional disparities, particularly between coastal and interior provinces.

In the twenty-first century, China consolidated its position as world's second-largest economy in nominal terms, the largest in purchasing power parity (PPP), and the leading exporter of goods (UNCTAD, 2025a; World Bank, 2025b). These achievements are not fortuitous; they derive from deliberate institutional reforms and gradual strategic adaptation. China's economy has shown resilience, maintaining a positive growth in periods even during major global crises, such as 1997-1998 (7.8%), 2008-2009 (9.3%) with the Great Recession, and recently in 2020 (2.2%) with the Covid-19 pandemic.

In contrast, Mexico has followed the trajectory of global economic liberalization, transitioning from the import substitution industrialization model, which prevailed from the 1930s, to a neoliberal model since the early 1980s. Guided by the principles of the Washington Consensus (1989) and reinforced by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994, Mexico reoriented its economic model toward the external sector, privatization of key industries, and trade liberalization.

However, this shift has been accompanied by recurrent crises and growth instability, as evidenced by the contractions of -5.9% during the 1994-1995 crisis, -6.2% in the 2008-2009 Great Recession and -8.3% more recently in 2020 with the Covid-19 pandemic (World Bank, 2025c).

Notably, in the 1990s, both countries shared certain structural similarities. Politically, each was characterized by a dominant party system, and in both cases the State's role in economic management was partially diminished to encourage private and foreign investment. Economically, growth in both nations was driven primarily by manufacturing exports, labor-intensive

production, and foreign capital inflows into special zones, factors that contributed to regional disparity.

In 1978, Mexico's share of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) stood at 1.78% compared to 1.36% for China (World Bank, 2025c). In addition, since the start of the economic and institutional reforms, China's average annual growth rate has been around 9% (1978 to 2023), while Mexico's shift to a neoliberal model has meant an average GDP growth of 2.1% (1982-2023), illustrating the widening developmental gap between both economies. Nevertheless, these quantitative trends alone are insufficient to explain the divergence in outcomes of other indicators.

Such contrasts demand a review of the theoretical framework of economic development and institutions. Among the classical perspectives, Joseph A. Schumpeter (2005) emphasized the transformative role of entrepreneurs as the main agent and innovation in reshaping institutional structures. Paul Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) advocated for an institutional framework supported by the State as an agent that promotes industrialization and development in marginalized regions. John R. Common (1990) classified economic transactions according to the power relations that institutions regulate through stimulus or sanctions under rules. Gunnard Myrdal (1959) analyzed the persistence of retarding effects and his attention to overcoming inequality in underdeveloped countries.

Neo-institutionalism has emerged as a theoretical proposal that emphasizes the understanding of development processes. It underscores the importance of the State's role as a facilitator and promoter of development through the creation of efficient institutions that provide incentives to individuals who are agents of change.

Douglass North (1990) outlines that economic growth is determined by institutional performance and evolution. Institutions can evolve and they are also the ones that structure and create organizations to achieve development objectives. The incremental change and certainty perceived by the economic agents creates a dynamic of efficiency and productivity which is oriented toward the maximization of potential benefits.

From this perspective, neo-institutionalism offers an ad hoc theoretical perspective for explaining China's recent economic success. This is relevant to understanding how China has managed to transcend underdevelopment by adapting its institutions to the demand of modernization and global economic integration.

On the other hand, for Mexico, the neoliberal model adopted since the 1980s has not produced the expected outcomes. Institutional weaknesses and insufficient State coordination have limited a sustained growth trajectory. Therefore, it is necessary to reconsider Mexico's approach, addressing the structural conditions that perpetuate underdevelopment, inequality, and low growth. Institutions that are adaptative and coherent in strengthening the State capacity and active participation of economic agents in key sectors are needed.

The objective of this study is to identify and compare the institutional elements that are involved in the national development planning processes of Mexico and China, to evaluate their role in achieving economic and social targets within a comparative analytical framework. Based on the literature reviewed, the proposed hypothesis is that developing countries, particularly Mexico, must adopt an institutional framework compatible with their domestic conditions, establish effective incentive mechanisms, and respond strategically to the uncertainties of the international system in order to achieve sustained economic growth and development.

Thus, the questions that remain are: how did two economies, both initially driven by external sector growth, come to exhibit divergent development trajectories? When and why did they begin to diverge? What lessons can Mexico draw from China's experience of institutional transformation? Can China be considered a replicable model for other developing economies?

The text is structured as follows: first, a review of the most relevant theoretical foundations of development theory; second, an analysis of the main institutional frameworks shaping economic planning in Mexico and China; third, a summary of each country's development objectives; fourth, a comparative analysis of the principal economic and social outcomes of both countries from 2001 to 2024; fifth, final conclusions.

Theoretical Aspects of Institutional Economic Development

One of the concerns and questions that persist in most, if not all, countries has been about achieving a sustained level of development in the long term and why certain countries fail to do so. For this to be achieved, it is assumed that it is necessary, although not sufficient, to achieve a high and stable level of economic growth, understood as the total production of goods and

services in each territory through economic agents. However, development requires an additional effort to ensure that growth serves the common benefit of society.

Development can be referred to as a higher goal for all nations. According to Gonzalez (2009b), economic development is defined as the transformation of the socioeconomic structure together with its institutions, increasing the possession of goods and services for the population which cover their needs, resulting in an improvement in the present and future with respect to the past.

Economic thought on the theory of economic development, is integrated into three main currents: classical, neoclassical, and Keynesian. Although more recently, the neo-constitutional is relevant, which is proposed by Douglass North (1990) to better support the analysis of the determinants of development. Classical thinking is based on free market equilibrium and accumulation to achieve certain levels of wealth. Although, in dominant thinking from Adam Smith, to Robert Malthus, to John Stuart Mill, the main concern focused on the accumulation and formation of wealth through production and commercial exchange. This was also taken as economic development (Sen, 1999).

Even though the role of institutions and their appropriate structure were considered as the guarantors of the necessary economic conditions, this is prioritized in areas such as property rights and trade incentives to promote accumulation, regardless of the level of state intervention. The model considered them as an exogenous factor to economic progress (González, 2009b).

John Stuart Mill (2009) emphasizes the changes that define material progress which then leads to institutional change. Institutions can provide protection and certainty to economic agents. What is also relevant in his argument is the distribution of income to reduce poverty levels, increase capital accumulation, production and population, along with better techniques for production. He stresses that institutions and cooperation achieve greater social and economic welfare.

Since the Great Depression of 1929, economic thought has been concerned with deepening the persistent inequalities between nations. Development was then attributed to the differences among the variables of growth rate and per capita income. However, it should be clarified that growth is considered as a part of development because there was no clear differentiation between the two concepts (Ros, 2012).

John Maynard Keynes (1965), from the context of depression cycles, had a proposal that revolved around achieving stability in the short term and the employment of productive factors. From the components of the aggregate demand function, investment and consumption, state action was needed to boost spending to increase the aggregate demand of economic agents, which would encourage economic growth and reduce unemployment.

Joseph Schumpeter (1983) was one of the first thinkers to question the static equilibrium theory of the neoclassicals in terms of production techniques and consumer preferences. Although Schumpeter did not analyze institutions in depth, his contribution was outstanding in incorporating innovation as an endogenous engine from the company itself, which explains the dynamic behavior of capitalism.

Schumpeter differentiates between growth and development and argues that the economy goes through initial phases of underdevelopment towards development in the long term. This is reflected in the indices of full employment and income or per capita income, which tend to expand in higher phases.

For Schumpeter, innovations and constant technological change are the primary source of economic dynamism, creating the process of development and can transform institutions, since change is evolving. The entrepreneur, in search of profit or benefit, with his entrepreneurial action, is the main agent of innovation (Schumpeter, 1983).

The consequence of this is “creative destruction”, giving rise to changes in technology, which generate new goods, productive methods, companies, markets, jobs, and a new industrial order, replacing participants with old forms or that are unable to compete. It is precisely this shift towards technological innovation that explains development, encouraging competition and productivity (Limón-Villegas & González, 2025).

For Robert Solow (1956), organizational change and technical progress were exogenous variables of growth. What stands out in his work are the technical changes due to the substitution of two productive factors, labor and capital, which contribute to the increase of the national product (Kurz, 2022).

Arthur Lewis (2003) was a pioneer of development theory. He focused on the conditions and forces that promote economic growth, but also pointed to differences in development among countries, even if they were endowed with similar resources. He defined underdeveloped countries in

terms of backward technology, as well as institutions that do not encourage investment, perpetuating conditions of capital scarcity per capita, or low per capita output. Thus, he points out that the main obstacle to growth, to the accumulation of capital, technology, and knowledge, relies on bad institutions, although subsequent changes in other areas are necessary once these are improved.

The Old Institutionalism Theory, or the American School, rejected the neoclassical notion of fully rational decision-making and behavioral habits of economic agents, as well as the tendency towards a steady state equilibrium. Institutions would then become the necessary instruments for decision making and uncertainty reduction. Kurz (2022) provides a brief and complete summary of economic thought that includes the evolution of Institutionalism to Neo-institutionalism.

Thorstein Veblen (2009) contributed to understanding how institutions respond to the ways of thinking of a certain time. From his critique of “conspicuous consumption” of mercantilist character, in terms of wealth and accumulation, mercantilist institutions served particular interests, so it was necessary to promote change in behavior, habits, and methods to achieve development.

Along a similar approach, John Maurice Clark (1918) pointed out that perfect competition was unrealistic and, therefore, rules and laws should be considered to prevent imperfect markets such as monopolies, so that institutions served to change behavior. John R. Commons (1959) asserted that institutions are the result of a process of collective action and limit the excessive private property of individuals, conflict resolution, and security in transactions. In fact, the solution of economic and social conflicts with legal frameworks is crucial, in addition to the role of the State as mediator.

In the 1980s, the exogenous view of growth and institutions proposed by the neoclassicals was highly questioned. A new current in the theory of institutions attempted to incorporate development but did not discard the neoclassical explanations of imperfect markets and profit-maximizing behavior on the part of economic agents, although behavior is complex.

That new current is neo-institutionalism under the perspective of Douglass North (1990). He does not align himself with the neoclassical answer that some countries are more prosperous than others due to the free market and the reduction of regulations or state intervention. He questions the “static” nature of this model, since it also fails to consider two key factors

in the economic performance of countries, the institutional framework, and the dimensions of time.

According to North, accumulated knowledge is transmitted through institutions, which are the formal limitations of a society translated into norms, rules, laws or constitutions; this conditions the patterns of behavior and their evolution forms the basis for changes in a society, for example, by protecting property rights or providing incentives by the State for infrastructure works necessary for productive activity (Vane & Mulhearn, 2005).

Cooperation and negotiation are also important to improve institutions because there is neither perfect knowledge nor complete information, and because changes generate uncertainty and the necessary conditions to act rationally are not in place. The government then, is the central agent through the rule of law in North's proposal for change (González, 2009b).

The efficiency of formal institutions and cooperation is promoted by the state to reduce uncertainty to achieve the objectives of economic development. If the government draws up the rules of the market, it will be able to function properly and can be corrected or improved. In addition, regulations, contracts, and protection of rights are positive for the economy because they encourage creativity and innovation.

In more recent views, Robert Lucas Jr. (1988) observed the persistence of underdevelopment through its correlation with patterns of per capita income and social welfare. Philippe Aghion et al. (2013), explore the impact of institutions as instruments that have a significant impact on the innovation process in a competitive context.

"Good institutions" are considered to be those that reduce uncertainty, promote efficiency, and ultimately, improve economic performance. A document prepared by the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2003), focuses on the correlation between the quality of institutions and economic performance, considering variables such as gross domestic product per capita, quality of government, and property rights, which generate greater certainty.

Moreover, Erik Meyersson (2009) argues that there are no prescriptions and each country at a certain development stage should follow appropriate institution arrangements. Failure to adapt institutions to technological development might lead to low levels of productivity and nonconvergence traps.

Justin Yifu Lin (2004), considers the evolution of institutions as endogenous. State intervention in developing countries to industrial catch

up is also crucial, because it is the most powerful agent to shape economic policies and follows a development strategy that produces changes in the structures. Bad institutions are not the cause of development restrictions, rather misguided strategies.

Lin identifies elements for development such as technological and industrial innovation, consistency between endowments and industrial structure (comparative advantage), inclusive growth, and adaptive institutions. The last point shortly highlights the importance of approaching a pragmatic process by the institutions.

Acemoglu & Robinson (2012), propose that countries with weak institutions are often associated with poor economic performance, which perpetuates underdevelopment. According to them, nations with strong democracies consolidate more participatory institutions that protect property rights, which encourage investment and innovation, leading to a state of growth. The opposite, according to them, occurs in societies with extractive institutions and authoritarian governments.

Lant Pritchett et al., (2017) identify the mechanism of development not necessarily from rules or changes to formal institutions for growth, but by deals. In developing countries, growth is determined by mediation that could increase investment and productivity. Joseph Stiglitz (2020; 1994) asserts that institutions, and particularly financial institutions, are not inherently efficient, therefore the government has a role to play in setting the rules of the game to ensure stability and equity.

In Mexico, there are valuable contributions and reflections on the comparative studies of Mexico and China, such as the works by Anguiano (1997), Cornejo (2002), Hernández (2018), Oropeza (2009), Rodríguez (2007; 2009) Rodríguez & Anguiano (2008; 2019). These are relevant in analyzing the economic policies and institutional changes that have happened in both countries, suggesting China as a case of learning and making the analysis from a Mexican perspective on the growth and development of the Asian country.

However, studies from the perspective of the theory of institutionalism in Mexico are still limited and even more so from a comparative angle between this country and China. Meza (2006), analyzes the fundamental role of institutions in the industrial transformation of China. Also noteworthy are the contributions of Ayala & González (2001) and González (1996; 2002; 2003; 2009b), who have made a comparative effort from the neo-institutional

theory to explain China's economic success since the economic reforms of the 1970s and its adaptive strategy.

It is worth noting that, in this paper, we agree with the position of González (2002; 2024) who argues that China's growth has been made possible in part, thanks to the Incremental Institutional Economic Reform, which was carried out in the late 1970s. He also highlights the achievement of the Development Goals outlined in its Five-Year Plans, changes that were a key factor for the success of its growth and development model.

In fact, the concept of "change" is key in the theories of Schumpeter (1983) and North (1990) and in both, it is considered endogenous. With the former, the origin of innovation derives from the company itself, with the entrepreneur being the agent of change and innovator in the pursuit of profits, but with North, this agent is the State, which promotes and sets the conditions for institutional change and adaptation.

This way, we adhere more closely to North's concept of the innovative agent. In China, the State, through an adaptive approach, directed the institutional and opening reforms, setting the rules and objectives of development to be achieved, as well as delegating and coordinating responsibilities to the rest of the public strata within the government levels.

Based on the key elements of economic development, from its own perspective, it can be said that it integrates the improvement of people's quality of life. It does not only refer to economic or monetary terms, such as increased income, volume, and methods of production, salaries and trade, but development also translates into elements that promote common welfare and equity, such as health, education, housing, through a comprehensive and organized institutional transformation. The institutional transformation and coordination can promote positive changes in the long term. In other words, development is not only economic, but also social, political, technical, and environmental.

Methotology

From the perspective of neo-institutionalism, North (1990) explains that institutions embody the "rules" that structure the interactions of economic and social agents. Institutions determine incentives, coordinate mechanisms, and are important for economic growth, development, and even industrialization (Lin, 2004). Therefore, it is crucial to consider institution quality and state ca-

capacity as key factors that influence economic performance and achievement of national objectives.

This study applies an analytical-synthetic method based on the neo-institutional theoretical framework. Causality is inferred through temporal and institutional sequence comparison, assuming that institutional reforms or transformations precede observable changes in economic performance, and that internal and external conditions produce different outcomes depending on institutional strength and adaptability. These institutional changes create measurable effects on economic growth, innovation, and social welfare, in line according to North's premise that institutional changes alter the rules and agents' behavior.

By combining the causal logic of institutional change with a comparative interpretative analysis, this study aims to demonstrate that differences in economic growth and development outcomes are not coincidental; rather, they are shaped by institutional structures underlying each country's policy framework. This approach allows to identify how formal institutional arrangements, embedded in constitutional mandates and planning mechanisms have, to a certain extent, influenced the economic trajectories of Mexico and China during the first quarter of the 21st century (2001-2024).

China's incremental and coordinated institutional evolution is interpreted as a causal mechanism that contributed to sustained growth and innovation. Contrastingly, Mexico's fragmented and market-oriented institutional reforms are understood as limiting factors that weakened the State's ability to guide long-term development. Thus, the comparative interpretation links theory, evidence, and context, providing a coherent causal explanation of institutional influence on economic development.

The analysis relies on primary sources that include the Constitutions of Mexico (1917) and China (1954, 1975, 1978, 1982), National Development Plans (NDP) for Mexico (2001-2024) and Five-Year Development Plans (FYDP) for China (2001-2024). The information selected in each mandate and plan corresponds to the main socioeconomic objectives, which reveal how formal institutions define objectives, and coordinate the government actions.

The institutional findings were systemized and compared across time by quantitative data from international organizations (World Bank, UNCTAD, UNDP, or IMF), which offer standardized and comparable statistics. In addition, official national data from both countries were consulted, including the Bank of Mexico (Banxico), the National Institute of Statistics and Geography

(INEGI) and the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC) for the selected years. From these sources, comparable variables were obtained, such as GDP growth, trade, productivity, public expenditure, and foreign investment to assess economic performance.

Indicators related to human development were obtained from the Human Development Index (HDI) dimensions: long and healthy life, knowledge, a decent standard of living (UNDP, 2025). These include variables like income, unemployment, inequality, poverty reduction, life expectancy, employment, and scholarship. To evaluate the innovation, variables such as R&D expenditure, patents, researchers, and tertiary education, graduates were compared. Institutional efficiency was assessed using the Institutional component of the Productive Capacities Index (UNCTAD, 2025b).

The methodological design combines qualitative institutional analysis with quantitative economic assessment, highlighting key differences in institutional design, state involvement, and policy continuity for both countries. Quantitative evidence complements the qualitative findings by providing a broader perspective on economic growth and development results and are aligned with the main objectives established in each country's planning framework.

Despite its mixed-method approach, the study acknowledges limitations, particularly in data comparability and the interpretative nature of institutional analysis, which may constrain the scope of causal inference.

Institutions in Development Planning in Mexico and China

Despite the contrasting political systems and conditions, both Mexico and China, have institutionalized national planning as a core mechanism to guide their own economies and to pursue development goals in the long term. The following lines examine the constitutional and main legal foundations that have empowered both countries to direct their national development plans, tracing the evolution of their institutional frameworks which shaped their economic transformation.

A brief description is made of the most direct antecedents of the current legal and institutional framework that took place since their foundation as a country. Since its independence in 1810, Mexico has had four political constitutions. The first three (1814, 1824 and 1836) are not explicit

about development planning. In the 1917 Constitution (Diario Oficial de la Federación, 1917), still in force, there is no mention of planning either, but the State is empowered to direct the economy, for example, in the control of the nation's resources and the regulation of private property (Article 27). These are the ones that establish a constitutional framework for the economic policies to be followed.

In 1983 a reform decree was carried out that modified Article 26. To date, it dictates that the State will organize a democratic planning system for national development, and the purposes of the planning project will determine the planning objectives. It is the Executive which has the power to establish the procedures in the planning system and determines the bodies responsible for this exercise (Diario Oficial de la Federación, 1983). In the last reform of 2025, Article 25 states that the State oversees national development; it will also plan, conduct, coordinate, and guide the national economic activity (Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación, 2025).

Although the National Development Plan is not explicitly determined, six-year plans have been developed since 1934. Initially, the purpose was to articulate and fulfill the demands of the Mexican Revolution under the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and thus institutionalize a continuity to what was expected in the next mandates (Gobierno de México, 2019). Since then and until 2024, fifteen six-year plans have been elaborated, and four in the 21st century.

On the other hand, since the foundation of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, the country adopted a centralized model with planning as one of its insignia in the fulfillment of its national objectives under the five-year plans (Giorcelli & Bo, 2021). Although in the different constitutions from 1954 to date, the formulation of five-year plans is not expressed either, but planning is one of the key functions of the State. As of this writing, fourteen five-year plans have been implemented in the PRC since its foundation and in five the 21st century.

In the 1978 and 1982 constitutions, it is mentioned that the State Council drafts and implements the economic and social development plans, while the National People's Congress is the organ that has the powers to approve and report on their implementation (Communist Party Member Network, 2015c). As in Mexico, the constitution and the periodic plans, set the economic policy approach to be followed for the established period. For

the purposes of this analysis, only the plans in the 21st century are considered for both countries.

In the Chinese Constitutions of 1954 (Article 15) and 1975 (Article 10), it is established that the State, through planning, directs the productive forces and the national economy (Communist Party Member Network, 2015a; 2015b). In the 1978 Constitution, the State develops a planned national economy (Article 11), (Communist Party Member Network, 2015c). Unlike the previous one, the 1982 Constitution fixes that the State must practice a socialist market economy, strengthen legislation, regulation, and prohibit the disruption of order (Article 15), (Communist Party Member Network, 2015d).

Goals and Strategies in the National Planning of Mexico and China 2001-2024

The work of González (2009a) provides a broad description on the main elements of economic policy planning and development goals. In the case of Mexico, the analysis goes from 1982 to 2012, and for China from 1949 to 2010. For the purposes of this paper, we take the synthesized descriptions up to those years of that contribution and extend the continuity of the analysis to 2024 for both countries.

In Mexico, the official document for outlining six-year objectives is the National Development Plan (NDP). In this document, the approach and guidelines to be followed in order to achieve these objectives can be observed from discourse. At the same time, there are also sectoral programs, such as the National Development Financing Program (PRONAFIDE for its acronym in Spanish) with more concrete quantitative goals.

The official planning documents in China are the different National Five-Year Plans for Economic and Social Development (FYPD) every five years. These plans set out the country's economic and social development priorities and quantifiable objectives in the short and medium term. So far in the 21st century, up to the time of this writing, there have been five FYPD, the first being the 10th FYPD from 2001 to 2005 and up to the first quarter of the century, the XIV FYPD 2021-2025, summarized in the following lines.

Mexico's National Development Plan 2001-2006

During the six-year term of Vicente Fox Quesada (2001-2006), the first alternation of power took place after seven decades. The consolidation of an

economic model with a greater preponderance of economic globalization and neoliberalism was sought, which brought about the reduction of State intervention as a correction to the import substitution model (Diario Oficial de la Federación, 2001).

In the NDP 2001-2006, there is no specific mention of quantifiable economic goals. It is divided into seven parts with their respective objectives and strategies: Elaboration of the plan; Mexico towards an accelerated take-off; The federal executive branch, 2000-2006; Social and human development area, 2000-2006; Growth with quality area; Order and respect area; and Commitments to Mexico.

Among the strategies for macroeconomic soundness are, coordinating fiscal policy with monetary policy; promoting a new public finance system; promoting effective regulation and supervision of the financial system; promoting sound and efficient commercial banking; strengthening non-bank intermediaries and a culture of insurance; promoting public sector productivity; and promoting instruments for risk control and stability.

PRONAFIDE 2002-2006 (Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público, 2002), proposes a scenario with structural reform 2002-2006: average GDP of 5.2%, inflation of 3.3%, average nominal interest rate of 8% and real accumulated interest rate of 4.9%, current account as a percentage of GDP of -3.8% in 2006. It was expected to create 1.2 million formal jobs per year and increase productivity by 5% per year. In the scenario with reforms, external demand would be the source of spending. With this, it was expected that dynamism would be given by physical investment and productivity growth with technology.

Mexico's National Development Plan 2007-2012

The NDP 2007-2012 (Diario Oficial de la Federación, 2007) focused on strengthening public safety and economic competitiveness. It was divided into five axes: rule of law and security; competitive and job-creating economy; equal opportunities; environmental sustainability; and effective democracy and responsible foreign policy.

The second axis, relevant to economic performance, consists of five relevant objectives and strategies. In general, for economic performance, sustained and accelerated growth of 5% of GDP in 2012 and 20% of GDP per capita in six years was proposed. Among the expected objectives some that stand out are responsible public finance for economic stability; efficient

financial system; generation of labor market conditions and high-quality formal jobs; promotion of competitiveness and productivity for insertion in global markets, adding value to production; comprehensive regional development; and access and coverage of infrastructure, transportation and communications.

PRONAFIDE 2008-2012 (Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público, 2008), recognizes that economic performance is linked to the U.S. growth expectations. As in the previous six-year term, this program proposes alternative evolution of growth, alluding to government programs and the Energy Reform. In a conservative scenario, it was expected to go from a GDP growth of 5.2%; total factor productivity (TFP) of 1.9%; investment at 7% and employment growth of around 335 thousand formal jobs to 858 thousand in 2012.

Emphasis is also placed on budgetary responsibility and the increase in public savings to 4.1% of GDP in 2012, destined to finance more infrastructure, while net private savings will grow to 9.6% of GDP due to an increase in household savings, partly because of the reform of the pension system and disposable income.

Mexico's National Development Plan 2013-2018

The NDP 2013-2018 (Diario Oficial de la Federación, 2013) unfolded in a context of challenges for the Mexican economy. Externally, the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis was still being overcome. Internally, there was a slowdown in the economy, attributed to low productivity and weak institutional strength, which led to the aspiration to increase the quality of education and strengthen human capital. With this, the package of structural reforms for the economy and institutions was proposed.

The NDP 2013-2018 consists of goals, objectives, and lines of action. Among the first are: Mexico in peace; Inclusive Mexico; Mexico with quality education; Prosperous Mexico; Mexico with Global Responsibility. Under this, three transversal strategies were outlined: democratize productivity; close and modern government, and gender perspective.

The economic policy objectives are found in the fourth goal, Prosperous Mexico. These are: maintaining macroeconomic stability; access to financing for projects with growth potential; quality employment; inclusive green growth; access to telecommunications services; accessible and quality energy supply; clear rules for the development of a competitive domestic

market; development of strategic sectors; transportation infrastructure with lower costs; and food security.

In PRONAFIDE 2013-2018 (Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público, 2013), it was projected that with the structural reforms, the economy would grow by an average of 5% in the period, being 5.3% in 2018. It was also expected to have effects on productivity growth, consumption credits, investment, promotion of formal employment and energy production. Likewise, inflation was expected to be controlled, a moderate deficit in the current account and higher domestic savings to stop depending on external savings.

Mexico's National Development Plan 2019-2024

The NDP 2019-2024 (Diario Oficial de la Federación, 2019) marks the beginning of another political transition and the intention of a change to the previous neoliberal model, which would not have brought the expected results. The plan was mainly based on eradicating corruption, distributing public resources, reducing poverty, strengthening the welfare state, and providing institutions as drivers of development.

This NDP was structured in three main areas: Politics and Government, Social Policy, and Economy. Regarding the latter, growth is conceived not as the ultimate goal, but as the generator of social welfare by increasing productivity, strengthening the domestic market with formal jobs, increasing income, social programs, and infrastructure projects for regional reactivation.

Among the general goals of the economic section are detonating growth; sound public finances; no more tax increases; encourage private investment; rescue the energy sector; economic reactivation, domestic market and employment; creation of the Banco del Bienestar (Welfare Bank); regional projects; food self-sufficiency; and science and technology.

This NDP establishes a vision of a growth rate of up to 6% in 2024 with an average of 4% over the period. It also does not establish fixed amounts, but mentions wage recovery of 20% in purchasing power, no indebtedness, fiscal discipline, and investment expenditures in regional projects. PRONAFIDE 2020-2024 (Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público, 2020) does not include explicit goals for annual GDP growth, national savings, current account or private investment. However, it is intended to increase productivity, financial inclusion and fiscal discipline.

China's 10th Five-Year National Development Plan 2001-2005

The 10th FYDP 2001-2005, takes place under a context of greater openness for China, since in that same year it was admitted into the World Trade Organization (WTO). The post-Keynesian plan is structured into ten titles and a total of 26 chapters.

The second title concerns the economic structure and covers chapters three to nine: Agriculture and the Development of the Rural Economy; Optimizing the Structure of Industry and International Competitiveness; Developing the Service Sector and Improving Supply Capacity; Accelerating the Development of the Information Industry and Promoting Informatization; Strengthening Infrastructure; Strategy for the Development of the Western Region and the Promotion of Coordinated Regional Development; Urbanization Strategy for the Common Progress of Urban and Rural Areas.

The goals proposed in chapter two of this plan are: Macroeconomic Stability by Maintaining a Rapid and Sustained 7% Annual GDP Growth in 2005; GDP Per Capita of ¥9,400 RMB; Average Income Growth of Around 5%; Maintaining Price and Current Account Balance Stability; Stability of Urban Unemployment at 5%; Infrastructure Improvements; Increasing Research and Development (R&D) Funding to 1.5% of GDP; Progress in Innovative and Technological Capabilities.

China's 11th Five-Year National Development Plan 2006-2010

China's 11th FYDP 2006-2010 is divided into 14 sections with their respective chapters out of 46. These sections are: Guiding Principle and Development Objective; Construction of New Social Villages; Industrial Structure Optimization and Upgrading; Development of Service Industry; Regional Development; Environmentally Friendly Society; Science and Education Strategy Through Human Resource Development; Deepen Structural Reform; Win-Win Opening Strategy; Harmonious Socialist Society; Socialist Democratic and Political Construction; Socialist Cultural Construction; Defense and Army Building; and Planning and Implementation Mechanism (China's State Council, 2006).

In the first section, the main objectives of Economic Policy and Social Development are presented: Average GDP growth of 7.5% and GDP

Per Capita of 6.6%, with ¥19,270 Yuan. Price Stability, Balance of Payments Equilibrium, Control of Urban Unemployment at 5%; Optimization of the Industrial Structure; 2% Share of GDP from R&D; Urban Disposable Income Per Capita of ¥13,390 RMB.

As for the institutional aspect, the need to adhere to a good macro-economic, institutional and market environment is mentioned. All this under the responsibility of the central and local governments, their control and direction in policies that guide the allocation of public resources. Implementation must be rational, using effective administrative power. At the same time, it adheres to the path of new industrialization under market orientation with enterprises and incentive to innovative capabilities.

The 12th Five-Year National Development Plan 2011-2015

The 12th FYDP 2011-2015 is composed of 16 sections and a total of 62 chapters (Xinhua, 2011). Those are the following: Method for a New Science-Based Development Situation; Strengthening Agriculture; Improving Competitiveness in Industry; Developing Service Industry; Developing Coordinated Regional Development; Green Development; Strategy Based on Innovation, Science and Education; Improving Living Conditions; Social Innovation Management; Promoting Great Development and Prosperity Culture; Reforming the Socialist Market Economic System; Mutual Benefit of Opening Up to the Outside World; Democracy and Socialist Political civilization.

Among the economic goals suggested for 2015, the most important are: 7% GDP growth; R&D expenditures as a percentage of GDP at 2.2%; increase in urban and rural disposable income by over 7%, the former being around 26,810 yuan; urban unemployment rate below 5%; increase in the consumption rate; increase in urbanization and life expectancy; trend towards greater participation of the service sector.

Finally, the role of the State is seen as one of active management and coordination at all levels for the structural transformation of the economy. The priority in the plan is high growth with stability. State planning is important in the efficiency and administration of resources, budgets, financing, prioritization of sectors, and management for the fulfillment of objectives. The institutions are conceived as the agents and the sectoral policies are the planning instruments of the State.

The 13th Five-Year National Development Plan 2016-2020

The 13th FYDP 2016-2020 (Xinhua, 2016) is structured into 20 sections and a total of 80 chapters distributed among these: Development Ideology and Goals; Innovation-Led Development Strategy; New Development System; Agricultural Modernization; Optimization of Industrial System; Expansion of Internet Economic Space; Modern Infrastructure Network; New Urbanization; Coordinated Regional Development; Improvement of Ecological Environment; New Opening-Up Pattern; Cooperation and Development; Poverty Alleviation; Education and Health; Livelihood Security; Socialist Spiritual Civilization; Social Governance; Construction of Socialist Democracy and Rule of Law; Economic Construction and National Defense; Guarantee of Planning Implementation

Regarding the economic and socio-economic goals for 2020, there are: maintaining medium-high speed growth at around 6.5% of GDP, double that of 2010; productivity increase above 6.6%; expansion of per capita disposable income around 6.5%. Innovation targets were also included: R&D spending at 0.4% more than 2015; 5.7% growth in patents; and contribution of technological advances in the economy at 60%.

Fiscal policy seeks stability with coordinated, prudent and proactive management. It can be said to be expansive because it calls for gradual proportional tax increases and efficient and expansive spending in areas such as innovation, poverty reduction and infrastructure; however, it also calls for prudent control of risks derived from debt and fiscal deficit.

The 14th Five-Year National Development Plan 2021-2025

As of this writing, the 14th FYDP (Xinhua, 2021) is the most recent and is nearing completion. It is composed of 65 chapters in 19 parts sectioned as follows: Building a Modern Socialist Country; Development by Innovation; Strong Domestic Market; Digital Development; High-Level Socialist Market; Agricultural and Rural Development; Urbanization Development; Coordinated Regional Development; Enhancing Soft Power; Green Development; High-Level Opening Up and Mutual Benefit; People's Overall Development; People's Welfare; Safer China; National Defense; Socialist Democracy and

Rule of Law; One Country, Two Systems; Guaranteeing the Implementation of the Plan.

It is worth mentioning that this plan does not specify a target for annual GDP growth, productivity, R&D spending, or unemployment that is quantifiable by 2025, but rather focuses on keeping these variables stable. It can be assumed that this is due to the volatile external conditions, which do not provide certainty in this matter, and on the other hand, the continued recovering from the Covid-19 pandemic that affected the world economy in 2020.

It is precisely in this plan where a change of course is perceived in comparison to what was previously outlined. Greater emphasis is placed on the entry into a new stage of development, to become a modern socialist country in all aspects of the centennial goal. There is clarity on the creation of a modern economy based on innovation, technological development, and a strong domestic market. This indicates the change of the development pattern towards the dual circulation strategy and stops relying solely on the external sector.

Tables 1 and 2 summarize the main objectives and goals of the respective national development plans of the two countries analyzed. In the case of Mexico, the economic objectives outlined in the different NDP are largely enunciative across the selected years. The structure, implementation process, and measurement methods vary significantly from one plan to another. While some plans include quantitative targets, others contain qualitative goals. Moreover, there is no clearly defined or consistent process for monitoring progress and assessment from plan to plan.

Table 1. Main Economic Objectives in the NDP for Mexico, 2001-2024

	2001-2006	2007-2012	2013-2018	2019-2024
GDP Growth Rate (Average %)	5.2	5.2	5	4
GDP Per Capita	Significant Increase	Increase Competitiveness	Through Growth and Formal Employment	NS
Productivity %	Total Factor Productivity (TFP) 3.5% Growth	TFP 1.9% Growth	TFP Index 106	National Production and Self-Sufficiency
Trade	Export Diversification; Liberalization and Competitiveness	Consolidation as Export Powerhouse; Value Chains with Canada and US; Eliminate Barriers to Protectionism	Trade Barriers Elimination; Diversification and Integration into GVCs	Focused on Strengthening Domestic Market and Small, Medium Enterprises
Trade Balance	NS	NS	NS	NS

FDI Inward	Average \$16.5 Billion USD	Attract FDI	Attract FDI by Structural Reforms	Attract FDI that Boosts Technological Transference, Competitiveness and Growth
Public Expenses	22.5% of GDP; Create Stability for Sustained Growth	Emphasis on Social Programs, Productivity, Infrastructure and Security	Efficient and Productive Public Expenses; Fiscal Discipline and Funding Reforms	Austerity, Reduce Bureaucratic Costs; Increase Investment in Infrastructure and Social Programs
Fiscal Balance	Promote Fiscal Balance and Macroeconomic Stability to Control Inflation	Balanced Budget; Adequate Debt Management	Balanced Budget by 2015 to Finance Investment Projects and Efficiency on Resource Usage	No Increase in Public Debt, Fight Tax Evasion, No Increase in Tax Payments.
Inflation	Stable Rate 3% (± 1) by 2003	Price Stability & Banxico's Primary Role	Stable at 3% (± 1)	Price stability at 3%
Interest Rate	Maintain Macroeconomic Stability, Inflation Control and	Reduce Differential Between Active and Passive by 1%	Monetary and Fiscal Policy to Maintain Price Stability, Control of Inflation	Restrictive Monetary Policy with Elevated Rate but Tendency to Decrease.
R&D Expenditure % GDP	Innovation as Central to Increasing Competitiveness; 1%	Increase Investment; NS	+1%	Budget Cuts; Incentives for Private Expenditure and Linkage Between Academia and Industry
Employment/ Unemployment	1.2 Million Formal Jobs	858,884 Formal Jobs by 2012	Formal Jobs Through Economic Growth	Job Creation that Strengthens Domestic Market; Promotes youth Employment
Life Expectancy	Increase Quality of Life; Life Expectancy; Healthcare Access	Increase Life Expectancy at Birth; NS; Reduce Maternal and Infant Mortality	Guarantees Access and Universal Health Coverage	Strengthening Access to Public Healthcare
Income Per Capita	Through GDP Per Capita Growth; NS	Sufficient Income Per Capita; NS	Through GDP Growth and Productivity	Double Minimum Wage
Poverty Rate	Significant Reduction Through Growth, Jobs and Social Programs	Reduce Poverty Through Economic Growth, Productive/Social Programs and Jobs	Reduction Through Growth, Social Programs and Security (<i>Cruzada contra el Hambre</i>)	Total Elimination Through Eradicating Corruption, Social Programs that Prioritize Vulnerable Groups
Scholarly Expected Years	Quality and Coverage at All Levels; Base of Social Development	Extend Coverage, Improve Quality for Higher Capacities, ICT	Full Coverage up to High School, Inclusion and Equity, Improve Quality for Competitiveness.	Promote Quality, Equity and Inclusion; Revision of Curricula

Source: Own elaboration with data from Diario Oficial de la Federación (2001; 2007; 2013; Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2019-2024, 2019); Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público (2002; 2008; 2013; Programa Nacional de Financiamiento del Desarrollo 2020-2024, 2020).

NS: not specified.

Note: the quantitative information corresponds to the projections made on PRONAFIDE and targeted by each NDP for different six-year terms.

As can be seen, throughout this century, similar lines have been proposed in economic policy strategies that are related to growth and economic development in Mexico. Among those, the following are listed: Macroeconomic

Stability, Coordination of Fiscal and Monetary Policy, Sound Public Finances, Inflation Control, Public Savings, High Growth, Productivity, Higher Levels of Schooling, Quality Jobs and Coordination with Science and Technology.

The NDP differs from PRONAFIDE in the sense that the former exposes the objectives and the latter the constraints and commitments of each government, every six-year term. At the beginning of the century, unrealistic goals were set (for example, 7% in 2006), but in Mexico's last NDP 2018-2024, a rate of 6% was still proposed.

The role of institutions was clear from the 2001-2006 NDP as the basis of the Rule of Law and facilitated agents of market activity. In 2018, the institution's relevance remains but they are perceived, after previous governments, as subordinated to corporate interests.

Table 2. Main Economic Objectives in the FYDP for China, 2001-2024

	2001-2005	2006-2010	2011-2015	2016-2020	2021-2025
GDP Growth Rate (Average %)	7	7.5	Around 7	>6.5	NS, Reasonable Range and High Quality
GDP Per Capita	¥9,400 (2000 Prices)	Double it from 2000; 6.6% Annually from ¥13,985 to ¥19,270	7%; Improve and Narrow Gaps	Aligned with Overall GDP; Double by 2020	Aligned with GDP Growth
Productivity %	Industrial Upgrading to Raise Productivity, Shifting from Capital Accumulation to Innovation-Led Growth; Leapfrog Development of Social Productivity	Through Endogenous Innovation and Structural Shifts to Be Less Reliant on External Demand and Capital Accumulation; Increase Agricultural Productivity for a New Socialist Countryside	Through Strategic Emerging Industries, Domestic Consumption, Efficiency, and Innovation	>6.6 Through Innovation and Higher Value-Added Manufacturing, Industrial Upgrade; Raise Per Capita Labor Productivity and Efficiency	NS; Aligned with GDP Growth; Through Tech Self-Sufficiency and Domestic Demand
Trade	Strengthening External Orientation, Quality and Diversification of Exports, Abide to International Rules of the WTO like Tariffs Reduction	Accelerate Foreign Trade; Structural Shift to Services and Quality-Benefit-Oriented; Improve Regulation; Support Exports of High-Tech Products	Develop Service Trade; Declining Trade Surplus; Trade Circulation Enterprises; Optimizing Structure from Labor Intensive to High Tech Products	Trade Diversification, Develop Trade of Services; Optimize the Structure of Trade and Growth; Foreign Trade into High-Quality and High-Price Products; Oppose Protectionism; Emphasis on Belt & Road Initiative	Improve and Modernize the Trade Circular System; Higher Quality Exports and Double Circulation; Standardize Foreign and Domestic Rules;
Trade Balance	Maintained a Balanced Balance of Payments	Sustain Export Growth, Expand Domestic Demand	Balanced Trade	NS	Balanced Domestic Circulation and Stability in External Demand
FDI Inward	Encourage Inflows; Improve Environment, Utilization, Regional Diversification	Attract FDI of High-End Manufacturing for Technology Transference and Improve Industrial Structure	Encourage FDI in R&D Key Areas; Improvement of Regulations	Restrictions on Some Services; Encourage Investment in Advanced Manufacturing, High-Tech Energy and Environment Conservation; Liberalization and Outward Investment (B&R)	Stable Inward and Outward Investment; Attraction of High-Tech Manufacturing FDI and Upgrade Traditional One; Improve Protection for Foreign Investment

Public Expenses	Investment in Infrastructure, Education, Environment; in Competitive Areas	Rational and Within the Budget; Social and Environmental Programs	Social and Green Investment, Urbanization, and Innovation	Rational Increase Responsibilities for Central and Local Governments; Transfer of Public Resources for Livelihood Security. Targeted Fiscal Spending to Support Key Areas	Standardization of Financial Expenditures; Ensure Basic Public Services, Innovation for High-Tech Enterprises, Social Welfare and Environment
Fiscal Balance	Adjustment and Fiscal Prudence; Active Fiscal Policies to Stimulate Investments	Proactive Fiscal Policy Programs; Improve the Deficit Management	Countercyclical Fiscal Policy; Adjust Fiscal Expenditure; Manage Local Government Debt	Modernize the Fiscal and Taxation System; Fiscal Support for Innovation and Infrastructure	Fiscal Policy for High Quality Development; Fiscal Sustainability; Strengthening of Budget Constraint and Performance Management
Inflation	Compatible Monetary and Fiscal Policies for Price Stability; 4%-5%	Stable Consumption, Food Prices; Reduce Inflation at 4%	Price Stability, 3.5% as the Bottom Line	Price Stability, Around 3%; Reduce State Intervention in Price Formation for Goods and Services in Competitive Sectors	Price Stability, Around 3%
Interest Rate	Interest Rate Adjustment to Maintain Price Stability	Adjustment for Money Supply; Push the Interest Rate Market Reform	NS	Reasonable Liquidity and Interest Rate	NS, Enhance Liquidity
R&D Expenditure % GDP	>1.5%	~2.0	2.2	2.5	>8 For Innovation Capacity
Employment; Urban Unemployment %	~5	45 Million Urban Jobs; 4% to 5% of Unemployment	45 Million Urban Jobs; Within 5% of Unemployment	NS; <5.5%	Controlled Unemployment at ~5.5
Life Expectancy	Improve Quality of Life, Medical Security and Health Services	Increase by 1 Year; Increase Quality of Life	Increased by 1 year to 74.5 years	Increase to 77.3	Increase by 1 Year
Income	5% Disposable Income; Improve System of Distribution	Increase Minimum Wages; Improve Income Distribution	Urban Income from ¥19,109 to ¥26,810	Expand the Proportion of Middle Class; Narrow Gaps	NS, Aligned with GDP Growth
Poverty rate	Poverty Reduction and Rural Development	Alleviate Poverty as Priority; Build a "Socialist Countryside"	Social Security and Poverty Alleviation in Rural and Poor Areas	Absolute Poverty Eradication	Consolidate Poverty Eradication; Rural Revitalization; mechanisms to avoid returning to poverty
Scholarly Expected Years	Improve Enrolment to Higher Education; Enrolment at 90% in High School and 9 Years Compulsory	Accelerate and Consolidate Compulsory Education; Retention Rate at 95% in Junior High School; Cultivation of Talents	Consolidation of Compulsory Education at 93%; Expand Higher Education and Specialized Personnel for Structural Upgrading	Universalize Secondary Education; Increase Higher Education; Promote Quality; Consolidate 95% of Compulsory Education	Consolidate results of Compulsory Education; Promote High-Quality and Integration of Urban and Rural Areas; Gross Enrolment Ratio in Upper Secondary Raised Over 92%

Source: Own elaboration with data from China's State Council (2001; 2006); Xinhua (2011); Communist Party Member Network (2016; 2021); Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2025a). NS: No Specified.

In China, there are no quantitative or specific goals for certain parameters; however, there is clarity regarding several key targets, as shown in Table 2. Between 2006 and 2015, China's development plans demonstrate a strategic evolution. From 2006 to 2010, the main objective remained achieving

high and sustained economic growth, while new concerns emerged around strengthening the domestic market, improving quality of life, enhancing the regulatory system, promoting sustainability, and achieving a more balanced trade structure.

The role of State and institutions is more explicit, highlighting coordination among different levels of government and establishing a clear structure, linking planning, implementation, and assessment to achieve the long-term objectives.

It is also important to note that, from the 13th FYDP 2016-2020, structural reforms were already underway. The plan placed strong emphasis on environmental protection, poverty alleviation, and the transition toward a growth model less dependent on exports and investments. The 14th FYDP 2021-2025 introduced an explicit shift to the dual circulation model, setting long-term to build a modern society based on innovation and high-technology production, with a forward-looking vision toward 2035.

Each of these plans reflected the prevailing circumstances and ideological orientations of their respective periods. Mexico's experience during the same years was shaped by its integration into economic globalization. This led to development plans inspired by neoliberal principles aimed at enhancing competitiveness in foreign markets. For instance, the NDP 2001-2006 emphasized economic stability, fiscal discipline, and openness through promoting the private sector participation, while minimizing the State intervention in the economy.

The NDP 2006-2012 unfolded in the context of two crises: domestically, the policies against drugs, and externally, the Global financial crisis in 2008. The main focus was set on rule of law and economic resilience, while at the same time it adhered to the previous neoliberal strategy, but overall, those crises affected the growth performance. The NDP 2012-2018 marked the post crisis recovery, witnessing a political transition and explicitly framed about implementing structural reforms and a market-driven economy.

In the last NDP 2018-2024, there is a shift in the perspective of State role and institutions and an approach to domestic markets, rejecting the neoliberal period. The economic ideology was based on republican austerity but increasing social programs, and there were no specific targets of indicators such as FDI or R&D expenditure. The global crisis caused by Covid-19 was not reflected in the plan for that period, although it had serious consequences for the national economy.

Contrastingly, in the case of China, there was a clear sequence and adaptation across its development plans, reflecting responses to both circumstances and international environment. In 2001, China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and expansion of its industrialization process, marked a turning point that deepened its integration into a globalized economy. By the 11th FYDP 2006-2010, concerns began to emerge regarding income disparities and environmental degradation. The 2008 Global Financial Crisis exposed the vulnerabilities of overreliance on exports and foreign investment.

Since 2011, the orientation of China's plans has shifted in response to global economic. The 12th FYDP 2011-2015 coincided with a period of political transition and the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative, which became central to the external economic strategy (Xinhua, 2013). The emphasis turned toward slower but higher-quality growth, driven by innovation and domestic consumption, early indicators of a gradual orientation toward a circular model. At the same time, greater attention was placed on the coordination of economic and social development policies, ensuring consistency between policy objectives and instruments.

The 13th FYDP 2016-2020 acknowledged a slower growth rate but prioritized stability. During this period, China faced new challenges like the unresolved trade conflict with the United States (Bown, 2005), which influenced subsequent policies. The plan emphasized upgrading the manufacturing sector, the transition to services, and stimulation of domestic consumption as the key drivers.

The 14th FYDP 2021-2025 unfolded amid severe disruption to global trade and production chains caused by the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020. The intensification of the US-China competition led to greater protectionism and economic decoupling, prompting China to reconsider its role and redefine globalization. As mentioned lines above, this plan introduced the dual circulation strategy, seeking to modernize the economy through high-technology development and self-reliance.

This period also reflects the consolidation of President Xi Jinping's second and third terms, during which political and economic thinking became emblematic of national policy (Xinhua, 2016). It marks an era where China positions itself as a more assertive actor, pursuing the construction of a "moderately prosperous society", while prioritizing innovation, promoting coordinated, green, open, and shared development.

Results

The results for Mexico are examined by considering the years marking the end and beginning of each presidential term in the current century. Additionally, years reflecting the immediate impact of major economic disruptions are included, such as 2009, during the Great Recession, and 2020 and 2021, amid the Covid-19 pandemic. For China, the analysis focuses on the corresponding years to the end and the beginning of each FYDP, as well as the same crisis periods.

The variables reviewed reveal a clear divergence between the economic performance of China and Mexico (Tables 3 and 4). China has achieved an average annual growth rate of 8.1%, maintaining a positive and stable behavior from 2001 to 2024, and showing resilience even during global economic downturns. This outcome aligns with a model of incremental institutional reforms (González, 2002), strong state coordination, and long-term policy planning, consistent with the principles of neo-institutional theory, which emphasizes institutional adaptability and coherence as drivers of development.

In contrast, Mexico's average growth rate of 1.54% over the same period reflects persistent volatility, particularly during external shocks. This instability can be linked to the implementation of market liberalization reforms that prioritized private actors in economic management, alongside enduring internal structural weaknesses. The reduction in state intervention debilitated institutional capacity for coordination and policy implementation. Consequently, Mexico has struggled to achieve the stable, long-term growth, necessary for sustained economic development, as evidenced by the indicators analyzed.

Table 3. General Variables for Mexico, Selected Years 2001-2024

	2001	2006	2009	2012	2018	2020	2021	2024
GDP Growth (%)	-0.5	4.8	-6.3	3.6	2	-8.4	6	1.5
GDP Per Capita (\$USD 2015)	9398.4	9813.8	9074.1	9782.5	10296.9	9234.6	9728.1	10313.5
GDP Per Capita (Growth %)	-1.9	3.4	-7.7	2.2	1	-9.1	5.3	0.6
Productivity Capacities Index (PCI)	43	46.6	47.7	50.2	50	47.8	49.8	NA

Human Capital	39	42.5	44.2	44.1	45.6	46.7	47	NA
ICT	22.4	32.9	39.5	44.5	51.8	45.7	52.4	NA
Institutions	56.3	52.3	51.5	52.5	46.5	45.9	44	NA
Productivity: GDP/Hour Worked (\$ at PPP)	NA	21.4	22.6	23.4	23.3	24.2	22.4	22.4
Trade (% of GDP)	44.7	54.5	54.6	64.3	80.2	76.9	83.1	74.7
Trade Balance (Millions USD)	-14109	-13991	-14820	-14581	-27611	21712	-23128	-16269
Exports (Millions USD)	171481	270740	250818	396157	491303	445859	537714	680798
Exports Growth (%)	-4.7	15.7	-20.7	6	9.7	-11.7	20.6	4.8
Imports (Millions USD)	185590	284731	265639	410739	518914	424148	560842	697067
Imports Growth (%)	-3.2	14.5	-22.6	5.4	10.3	-16.7	32.2	3.3
Participation in Global Trade (%)	2.34	1.88	1.64	1.8	2.02	1.95	1.98	2.17
FDI Inward (Millions USD)	30056	21232	17850	21769	34101	28225	33528	36872
FDI Outward (Millions USD)	4404	5784	9861	22313	8489	1720	-2125	5736
Public Income (Million Pesos)	8326709	14569605	17513722	22566843	33106835	34372128	37965551	49015100
Public Expenses (Million Pesos)	8201022	13534520	18749285	24238469	35681491	37444042	41294782	58492383
Public Balance	125687	1035085	-1235563	-1671626	-2574656	-3071915	-3329231	-9477284
Consumer Price Index	4.4	4.05	3.57	3.57	4.83	3.15	7.36	4.21
Exchange Rate (MXP-USD)	9.33	10.9	13.49	13.15	19.21	21.54	20.28	18.3
Monetary Supply (Change End of Period %)	NA	14.04	8.8	9.4	5.3	20.06	12.95	11.58

Source: Own elaboration with data from the World Bank (2025c); UNCTAD (2025b; 2025a); ILO (2025); Banco de México (2025); and Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2025b).

Table 4. General Variables for China, Selected Years 2001-2024

	2001	2005	2009	2011	2015	2020	2021	2024
GDP Growth (%)	8.3	11.5	9.4	9.5	7.0	2.3	8.6	5.0
GDP Per Capita (\$USD 2015)	2405.9	3465.8	5237.8	6275.9	8175.3	10573.6	11469.6	13121.7
GDP Per Capita (Growth %)	7.5	10.8	8.9	8.9	6.4	2.1	8.5	5.1
Productivity Capacities Index (PCI)	42.3	47.3	51.2	53.2	55.7	58.7	60.3	NA
Human Capital	41.3	45.8	49.9	51.7	56.0	61.2	63.3	NA
ICT	15.8	26.4	35.2	39.9	48.2	58.8	64.5	NA
Institutions	43.5	60.4	63.1	43.1	45.5	50.1	50.5	NA
Productivity: GDP/Hour Worked (\$ at PPP)	NA	4.5	7.2	8.3	11.1	16.1	16.7	18.9
Trade (% of GDP)	38.1	61.4	44.4	49.9	38.7	34.0	36.5	37.2
Trade Balance (Millions USD)	28084	124627	220130	181904	357871	358573	461494	538958
Exports (Millions USD)	208572	773339	1262664	2008852	2360152	2738898	3555231	3792951
Exports Growth (%)	9.8	27.9	-15.7	21.3	-4.2	4.1	29.8	8.1
Imports (Millions USD)	180488	648712	1042534	1826949	2002282	2380325	3093737	3253993
Imports Growth (%)	12.0	17.2	-9.3	27.5	-10.7	-4.8	30.0	4.2
Participation in Global Trade (%)	2.54	5.53	7.34	8.65	10.39	11.50	11.98	11.08
FDI Inward (Millions USD)	46878	72406	94061	123985	135577	149342	180957	116238
FDI Outward (Millions USD)	6885	12261	56529	74654	145667	153710	178819	162780
Public Income (100 Million RMB)	16386	31649	68518	103874	152269	182914	202555	219702
Public Expenses (100 Million RMB)	18903	33930	76300	109248	175878	245679	245673	284612
Public Balance	-2517	-2281	-7782	-5373	-23608	-62765	-43118	-64910
CPI	0.7	1.8	-0.7	5.4	1.5	2.5	0.9	0.2
Exchange Rate (RMB-USD)	8.27	8.19	6.83	6.46	6.28	6.9	6.45	7.19
Monetary Supply (Change End of Period %)	12.65	11.78	33.22	8.71	15.19	8.6	3.49	-1.4

Source: Own elaboration with data from the World Bank (2025c); UNCTAD (2025b; 2025a); ILO (2025); National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC, 2025); and Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2025b).

In the external sector, the divergence between China and Mexico became evident as early as the 1990s. China steadily increased its trade surplus, while Mexico's performance weakened after the entry into force of NAFTA (UNCTAD, 2025a). China's institutions proved more effective in promoting exports, attracting foreign direct investment (FDI), and facilitating technology transfer (González, 2018). As a result, its share in global trade expanded significantly from \$208 billion USD in 2001 to \$3.7 trillion USD in 2024, making China the world's largest exporter, with a consistent trade surplus of \$538 billion USD in 2024. Simultaneously, FDI inflows strengthened industrial modernization and technological upgrading.

Although Mexico maintains various free trade agreements, like the USMCA, its trade deficit remains persistent (-\$16 billion USD in 2024). This reflects its limited capacity to attract productive investment and to improve its export competitiveness. Weak institutional frameworks and insufficient coordination at the state level have hindered Mexico's ability to position itself as a competitive player in global markets. Consequently, the country's growing dependence on external trade, visible in the increasing share of trade in GDP, has heightened vulnerability to external shocks.

According to the Productive Capabilities Index (PCI) institutional component (UNCTAD, 2025b), Mexico's institutional rating deteriorated over time, while China's has strengthened. Although, Mexico has made some progress in information and communication technologies (ICT) and human capital components had advances but remain modest compared with China's achievements. This contrast is further reflected in the innovation indicators (Tables 5 and 6).

In recent years, China has invested over 2% of its GDP in R&D, granting more than one million inventions patents in 2024 alone, whereas Mexico invested less than 0.3% of its GDP in R&D and registered fewer than 20,000 patents annually. The gap is also evident in education, where both countries still show relatively low average years of schooling, although China's figures have steadily improved. Overall, the data illustrate how China's institutional evolution has fostered sustained progress in innovation and technological development.

Table 5. Variables of Innovation in Mexico, Selected Years 2001-2024

	2001	2006	2009	2012	2018	2020	2021	2024
R&D Expenditure (% GDP)	0.308	0.352	0.457	0.402	0.298	0.291	0.273	0.268
Patents for Inventions (Applications)	13566	14436	14281	15314	16424	14312	16161	16189
Patents for Inventions (Granted)	5479	8098	9629	12330	8921	7726	10369	10908
Percentage of Patents for Inventions Granted	40.39	56.10	67.43	80.51	54.32	53.98	64.16	67.38
Difference from Previous Year (Patents Granted)	139	1534	-811	845	411	-976	2643	437
Current Researchers (SNI)	8018	12096	15565	18555	28633	33165	35178	43923

Source: Own elaboration with data from the World Bank (2025c); Instituto Mexicano de la Propiedad Industrial (IMPI, 2025); and Sistema Nacional de Investigadoras e Investigadores (SNI, 2025).

Table 6. Variables of Innovation in China, Selected Years 2001-2024

	2001	2005	2009	2011	2015	2020	2021	2024
R&D Expenditure (% PIB)	0.9403	1.3079	1.664	1.78	2.057	2.406	2.432	NA
Full-time R&D Researchers (10,000)	95.65	136.48	229.13	288.29	375.88	523.45	571.63	774.5
Patents for Inventions (Applications)	63204	173327	314573	526412	1101864	1497159	1585663	1828000
Patents for Inventions (Granted)	16296	53305	128489	172113	359316	530127	695946	1045000
Percentage of Patents for Inventions Granted	25.8	30.8	40.8	32.7	32.6	35.4	43.9	57.2
Difference from Previous Year (Patents Granted)	3613	3945	34783	37003	126088	77323	165819	124203

Source: Own elaboration with data from the World Bank (2025c); and National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC, 2025).

Economic development also entails improvements in living standard and human welfare, several corresponding indicators were compared between the two countries (Tables 7 and 8). In 1990, Mexico surpassed China in various social indicators: gross national income (GNI) per capita, was \$2,820 USD compared to \$330 dollars for China, while poverty at \$2.5 dollars per day affected 3% and 28.3% of their populations, respectively (World Bank, 2025c). According to the World Bank's classification at that time, Mexico was a lower middle-income country, while China remained low-income.

By 2025, this situation is reversed. China is now poised to reach high-income status supported by improvements in GDP per capita and GNI per capita (World Bank, 2025b). The country has also achieved remarkable progress in poverty reduction, declaring near-zero extreme poverty in 2020, defined as living on less than \$3 USD a day (World Bank, 2025a). In contrast, Mexico still registered 4.3% of its population in extreme poverty that same year. Despite persistent inequality in both nations, life expectancy is now higher in China than in Mexico, while educational attainment in both remains close to the lower secondary level (UNDP, 2025).

Table 7. Variables of Social Welfare in Mexico, Selected Years 2001-2024

	2001	2006	2009	2012	2018	2020	2021	2024
GNI Per Capita (Atlas Method) (USD)	7100	9140	9230	10500	9560	8920	9880	12800
Unemployment (%)	2.5	2.6	5.3	4.9	3.1	4	3.7	2.6
Life Expectancy (Years)	74.6	75.3	75.1	75.6	75.9	70.9	70.8	NA
Disposal Income Per Capita (USD/Capita)	7883	9560	10147	11480	13889	13121	14642	17736
Gini Index	0.528	0.5	0.506	0.498	0.457	0.45	NA	NA
Poverty Ratio at \$3 USD (%)	16.3	11.7	10.1	7.3	3.9	4.3	NA	2.3
Population at Poverty Lines (%)	NA	NA	NA	NA	41.9	43.9	NA	36.3
Human Development Index	0.715	0.745	0.749	0.764	0.785	0.763	0.761	NA
Scholarship Expected Years	11.99	12.84	13.27	13.73	14.92	14.82	14.5	NA
Population with Tertiary Education	15.11	12.72	14.31	15.71	17.98	19.43	20.46	21.87

Source: Own elaboration with data from the World Bank (2025c; 2025a); Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público (2025); INEGI (2001; 2025a; 2025b); World Organization Health (WHO, 2025b); Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2025); CEPAL (2025); CONEVAL (2025; 2024); SEMARNAT (2009); UNDP (2025)

Table 8. Variables of Social Welfare in China, Selected Years 2001-2024

	2001	2005	2009	2011	2015	2020	2021	2024
GNI Per Capita (Atlas Method) (USD)	1020	1790	3740	5130	8040	10740	12220	13660
Unemployment (%)	3.6	4.2	4.3	4.1	4.1	4.2	4	NA
Life Expectancy (Years)	71.1	72.4	74.3	75.03	76.51	77.48	77.61	NA
Disposal Income Per Capita (USD)	4070	6385	10977	14551	21966	32189	35128	41314
Gini Index of Per Capita Disposable Income	NA	0.485	0.49	0.477	0.462	0.468	0.466	0.465
Poverty Ratio at \$3 USD (%)	NA	33.1	26.2	15.7	3	0	0	0
Population at Poverty Lines (%)	49.8	30.2	NA	12.7	5.7	0	0	0
Human Development Index (HDI)	0.608	0.654	0.7	0.717	0.75	0.786	0.794	NA
Scholarship Expected Years	10.16	11.54	12.85	13.15	13.97	15.21	15.47	NA
Graduated in Undergraduate Education	1036000	3068000	5311000	6082000	6809000	7971991	8265064	10593802
Postgraduates	67809	189728	371273	429994	551522	728627	772761	1083595

Source: Own elaboration with data from the World Bank (2025c; 2025a); World Health Organization (WHO, 2025a); National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC, 2025; 2002; 2010); UNDP (2025); China Economic Network (2006).

The data shows that China has made substantial improvements in social welfare, driven by active state participation and institutional coordination. These improvements correspond with the institutional component of the Productivity Capacities Index (PCI), where China's score rose from 43.5 in 2021 to 50.5 from 2001 to 2024, while Mexico's declined from 56.3 to 50 over the same period (Tables 5 and 6).

These contrasting trajectories illustrate how neo-institutional theory helps explain China's success: incremental and pragmatic reforms, supported by institutional coordination, have enabled long-term growth and development. In contrast, Mexico's slower progress reflects the diminished role of the State and the limited coordination among its institutions, which have constrained its capacity for sustained economic transformation.

Conclusions

The comparative analysis makes it possible to see divergent development trajectories of Mexico and China that are explained largely by their institutional configurations and state capacities. While both countries relied initially on external-sector growth and market liberalization, the outcomes diverged due, in part, to differences in institutional adaptation, policy continuity, and strategic planning.

As Stiglitz (2020) emphasizes, markets do not automatically self-adjust to generate the conditions for development, poverty reduction, or equitable outcomes. Likewise, no institution is perfect; their effectiveness depends on their ability to adapt, coordinate, and innovate in response to economic and social challenges.

Within each country's planning framework, there are efforts to achieve development objectives despite the inherent imperfect institutions. However, from the neo-institutional perspective, it is assumed that the contrasting results observed in the progress of Mexico and China's development objectives, derive from the central role of institutions and the State in shaping incentives, reducing uncertainty, and coordinating the behavior of economic agents.

The experience of Chinese gradualism is particularly significant from a neo-institutional approach. China's gradual and adaptive approach has proven effective in meeting growth targets and achieving national development goals under State management, coordinated institutional evolution, and interaction with other economic actors, providing certainty and stability.

Such process demonstrates the pragmatic capacity of institutional evolution, enabling China to transition from a centralized, semi-autarchic, and a protectionist planned economy to one that is decentralized, outward-oriented, selective, and strategically coordinated.

In contrast, Mexico's adoption of a market-driven neoliberal model establishes ambitious targets, such as sustained high GDP growth, while simultaneously diminishing the role of the State. By delegating economic management primarily to market forces and private actors, Mexico failed to consolidate the institutional frameworks necessary to foster productivity, innovation and resilience to external shocks. The resulting institutional fragmentation increased uncertainty among agents, producing slower, more volatile growth and limited progress in long-term development.

Hence, the contribution of neo-institutionalism lies precisely in re-incorporating the State as an innovative agent, and institutions as its primary instruments for planning, coordinating, and regulating, not only economic growth, but also comprehensive social development.

Regardless of the political system, China's economic trajectory represents a valuable case study. It provides a vision in which free market forces alone do not necessarily maximize economic benefits. Indeed, within a context of global uncertainty and shifting international dynamics, Chinese policymakers have opted to pursue a dual circulation strategy in the 14th FYDP, reinforcing the continuity of the State's role in addressing the challenges of underdevelopment through institutional adaptation.

There were identified lessons from the Chinese experience for Mexico and other developing countries. First, institutions need coherence and long-term planning for sustained development; second, the State must play a strategic role as a coordinator able to foster innovation, reduce uncertainty, and facilitate negotiations among agents; third, institutions should be able to adapt to domestic conditions and external shocks for resilience in the long term. While China offers these lessons, its trajectory cannot be replicated, since its success lies in the principles of gradual reform, state coordination, and institutional pragmatism.

Both countries, however, face pressing structural challenges within their respective development models. Education, regional disparities, and income inequality remain central concerns. For China, overcoming the middle-income trap and addressing regional income gaps are critical to sustaining progress. For Mexico, the priority should be to orient development strategies

toward the human capital formation and accumulation and educational investment and quality, while also reducing regional inequality, an area where China's experience offers valuable lessons.

China faces the challenges of sustaining growth within the parameters of state planning and the dual circulation framework. This will require maintaining innovation and expanding domestic market as the pillars of its development strategy, while consolidating its position as a global economic actor. It is expected that China will continue along the path of pragmatism and gradualism, adapting its institutions to changing conditions.

The 15th FYDP 2026-2030 is expected to unfold in a more complex international context, which requires strong state, leadership, and institutional coordination, potentially implying either a fourth term for President Xi Jinping or a greater delegation of authority to state institutions.

For Mexico, González (2007) rightly argues for the formulation of a long-term sustainable development plan defined by the participation of political, social, and economic stakeholders. Such a plan should respond to external challenges, institutional weaknesses, and declining competitiveness through an active State management.

Under the new administration (2024-2030), the initial draft of Plan Mexico outlines strategies for institutional strengthening and coordination, the expansion of the welfare state, productive diversification, and the promotion of technology, digitalization, and innovation, alongside infrastructure modernization to bridge regional disparities (Gobierno de México, 2025). These measures are expected to address persistent structural problems, such as inequality and poverty; however, achieving these goals will depend critically on the flexibility and adaptability of institutions.

This study has offered an alternative analytical perspective on the divergent development paths of two emerging economies through the lens of neo-institutional theory, emphasizing the role of institutions in shaping economic performances. Nevertheless, there are two key limitations. First, a deeper analysis of the impact of multilevel state coordination on economic performance is required. Second, a quantitative and comparative evaluation is needed to assess the extent to which institutional change has influenced both countries differently. While these limitations lie beyond the scope of the present study, they open valuable avenues for future research within the proposed analytical framework.

References

- Acemoğlu, D., & Robinson, J. E. (2012). Por qué fracasan los países. México: Booket.
- Aghion, P., Van-Reenen, J., & Zingales, L. (2013). Innovation and Institutional Ownership. *American Economic Review*, 103(01), 277-304. <https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.103.1.277>
- Anguiano, E. (1997). China de las reformas recientes a la era pos-Deng. (Ciclo 1997: ¿El año de la gran China?) (Cuadernos de Trabajo ed., Vol. 2). México: El Colegio de México. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv75dbbt>
- Anguiano, R. E., & Rodríguez, y. M. (2019). China reformada y sus dilemas en el siglo XXI. México: CIDE.
- Ayala, E. J., & González, G. J. (2001). El neoinstitucionalismo, una revolución del pensamiento económico. *Comercio Exterior*, 51(1), 44-57.
- Banco de México. (2025). Sistema de Información Económica. Banco de México: <https://www.banxico.org.mx/SielInternet/>
- Bown, C. P. (2005). US-China Trade War Tariffs: An Up-to-Date Chart. Peterson Institute for International Economics: <https://www.piie.com/research/piie-charts/2019/us-china-trade-war-tariffs-date-chart>
- CEPAL. (2025). Estadísticas e Indicadores. CEPALSTAT: <https://statistics.cepal.org/portal/cepalstat/dashboard.html?theme=1&lang=es>
- China Economic Network. (2006). Asian Tiger Challenges China Pressure in Rural India Issues in Unemployment Rate [亚洲之虎挑战 中国压力在农村印度问题在失业率]. China Economic Network [中国经济网]: http://www.ce.cn/macro/gjbd/zq/200605/30/t20060530_7139213.shtml#
- China's Central Committee. (2001). Outline of the Tenth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development of the People's Republic of China [中华人民共和国国民经济]. Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China [中华人民共和国中央人民政府]: https://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2001/content_60699.htm
- China's State Council. (2006). The national economy of the People's Republic of China and Outline of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan for Social Development [中华人民共和国国民经济和]. Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China [中华人民共和国中央人民政府]: https://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2006/content_268766.htm
- Clark, J. M. (1918). Readings in the economics of war. California: University of California Press.
- Common, R. J. (1990). Institutional Economics: Its Place in Political Economy (Vol. 1). New York: Routledge.
- Commons, J. R. (1959). Institutional Economics. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press.
- Communist Party Member Network. (2015a). Constitution of the People's Republic of China (1954) [中华人民共和国宪法 (1954年)]. Communist Party Member Network [共产党员网]: <https://news.12371.cn/2015/03/18/ARTI1426665514681575.shtml>
- Communist Party Member Network. (2015b). Constitution of the People's Republic of China (1975) [中华人民共和国宪法 (1975年)]. Communist Party Member Network [共产党员网]: <https://news.12371.cn/2015/03/18/ARTI1426666984513758.shtml>
- Communist Party Member Network. (2015c). Constitution of the People's Republic of China (1978) [中华人民共和国宪法 (1978年)]. Communist Party Member Network [共产党员网]: <https://news.12371.cn/2015/03/18/ARTI1426667115741768.shtml?from=singlemessage>

- Communist Party Member Network. (2015d). Constitution of the People's Republic of China (December 4, 1982) [中华人民共和国宪法 (1982年12月4日)]. Communist Party Member Network [共产党员网]: <https://news.12371.cn/2015/03/18/ARTI1426664689523381.shtml>
- Communist Party Member Network. (2016). 中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十三个五年规划纲要(全文) [Outline of the Thirteenth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development of the People's Republic of China (full text)]. [共产党员网]: <https://www.12371.cn/special/sswgh/>
- Communist Party Member Network. (2021). The 14th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development of the People's Republic of China and the Outline of Long-term Goals for 2035 [中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十四个五年规划和2035年远景目标纲要]. Communist Party Member Network [共产党员网]: <https://www.12371.cn/special/ssw2035/>
- CONEVAL. (2024). Análisis de la población en situación de la población en situación de pobreza extrema. CONEVAL: https://www.coneval.org.mx/Medicion/MP/Documents/contribucion_estrategias_pobreza/Pobreza_extrema_Mexico.pdf
- CONEVAL. (2025). Cambios en la incidencia de pobreza 2001-2005. CONEVAL: <https://www.coneval.org.mx/Medicion/EDP/MP/Paginas/Cambios-2000-2005.aspx>
- Cornejo, R. (2002). Nuevas propuestas de cambio en el patrón de desarrollo de China. En J. L. Calva, Desarrollo económico: estrategias exitosas. (Vols. 2, Agenda para el Desarrollo, págs. 91-142). México: Cámara de Diputados LX Legislatura; Miguel Ángel Porrúa; UNAM. http://biblioteca.diputados.gob.mx/janium/bv/ce/scpd/LX/desa_eco_estra.pdf
- Diario Oficial de la Federación. (1917). Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos. <https://constitucion1917.gob.mx/work/models/Constitucion1917/Resource/246/1/images/const1917.pdf>
- Diario Oficial de la Federación. (1983). Diario Oficial/Poder Ejecutivo/Decreto. Diario Oficial de la Federación: <https://www.dof.gob.mx/index.php?year=1983&month=02&day=03#gsc.tab=0>
- Diario Oficial de la Federación. (2001). Plan Nacional de Desarrollo, 2001-2006. Gobierno de México: <https://www.gob.mx/cms/uploads/attachment/file/22317/PLAN1.pdf>
- Diario Oficial de la Federación. (2007). Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2007-2012. Gobierno de México: <https://www.gob.mx/conamer/documentos/plan-nacional-de-desarrollo-2007-2012>
- Diario Oficial de la Federación. (2013). Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2013-2018. Diario Oficial de la Federación: https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5299465&fecha=20/05/2013
- Diario Oficial de la Federación. (2019). Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2019-2024. Diario Oficial de la Federación: https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5565599&fecha=12/07/2019#gsc.tab=0
- Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. (2025). Chinese Yuan Renminbi to U.S. Dollar Spot Exchange Rate. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Economic Data (FRED): <https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DEXCHUS#0>
- Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. (2025). Mexican Pesos to U.S. Dollar Spot Exchange Rate (AEXMXUS). Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis: <https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?id=AEXMXUS>,

- Giorcelli, M., & Bo, L. (2021). *Technology Transfer and Early Industrial Development: Evidence from the Sino-Soviet Alliance*. Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research. <https://doi.org/10.3386/w29455>
- Gobierno de México. (2019). Plan Sexenal de Lázaro Cárdenas. Gobierno de México: <https://www.gob.mx/amlo/prensa/plan-sexenal-de-lazaro-cardenas>
- Gobierno de México. (2025). Plan México. Estrategia de Desarrollo Económico Equitativo y Sustentable para la Prosperidad Compartida. Primer Borrador. Gobierno de México: <https://www.planmexico.gob.mx/>
- González, G. J. (1996). China: Comercio exterior y crecimiento económico en el camino del mercado. *Revista Comercio Exterior*, 46(12), 981-987.
- González, G. J. (2002). Reforma económica institucional y modelo de desarrollo con orientación externa: similitudes y diferencias entre México y la República Popular China. *Problemas del Desarrollo*. *Revista Latinoamericana de Economía*, 33(129), 55-102. <https://www.probdes.iiec.unam.mx/index.php/pde/article/view/7431>
- González, G. J. (2003). China: Reforma económica y apertura externa. Transformación, efectos y desafíos. Un enfoque institucional. Ciudad de México: Miguel Ángel Porrúa / Cámara de Senadores LVII Legislatura.
- González, G. J. (2007). Lecciones del proceso de transformación económica institucional reciente de la República Popular China. En J. L. Calva, *Desarrollo económico: estrategias exitosas* (págs. 107-121). México: UNAM-Porrúa.
- González, G. J. (2009a). La política económica en México y China. México: Miguel Ángel Porrúa / Cámara de Diputados LX Legislatura / Universidad de Colima.
- González, G. J. (2009b). Teoría del desarrollo económico neoinstitucional: una alternativa a la pobreza en el siglo XXI. México: Cámara de Diputados LX Legislatura / Miguel Ángel Porrúa.
- González, G. J. (2018). Política Industrial al estilo chino: pragmatismo y visión de largo alcance. En J. L. Calva, *Nueva Estrategia de Desarrollo* (págs. 29-56). México: Juan Pablos Editor.
- González, G. J. (2024). Desafíos Económicos de China en la tercera década del siglo XXI. En J. L. Calva, *Estrategias Pragmáticas de Desarrollo Económico* (Vol. 2, págs. 9-15). México: Fontamara.
- González, G. J., & Meza, L. J. (2009). Shenzhen, Zona Económica Especial: Bisagra de la Apertura Económica y el Desarrollo Regional Chino. *Problemas del Desarrollo*, 40(156), 101-124. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.22201/iiec.20078951e.2009.156.7753>
- Hernández, H. R. (2018). El papel de la cooperación internacional en la estrategia de gran potencia de China. *Foreign Affairs Latinoamérica*: <https://revistafal.com/el-papel-de-la-cooperacion-internacional-en-la-estrategia-de-gran-potencia-de-china/>
- ILO. (2025). Indicators and data tools. International Labour Organization (ILO): <https://ilostat.ilo.org/data/>
- IMF. (April de 2003). World Economic Outlook Database. Growth and Institutions. International Monetary Fund: <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2016/12/31/Growth-and-Institutions>
- IMPI. (2025). IMPI en cifras. Instituto Mexicano de la Propiedad Industrial: <https://www.gob.mx/impi/documentos/instituto-mexicano-de-la-propiedad-industrial-en-cifras-impi-en-cifras>
- INEGI. (2001). Agenda estadística de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos: empleos y salarios. Sistemas de Consulta: <https://www.inegi.org.mx/app/biblioteca/ficha.html?upc=702825169503>

- INEGI. (2025a). Indicadores de Bienestar por entidad federativa. INEGI: <https://www.inegi.org.mx/app/bienestar/#grafica>
- INEGI. (2025b). Comunicado de Prensa 118/25. INEGI: https://www.inegi.org.mx/contenidos/saladeprensa/boletines/2025/pm/pm2025_08.pdf
- Keynes, J. M. (1965). *Teoría general de la ocupación, el interés y el dinero* (Séptima ed.). México: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- Kurz, H. D. (2022). *Breve Historia del Pensamiento Económico*. Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- Kurz, H. D. (2022). *Breve Historial del Pensamiento Económico*. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- Lewis, W. A. (2003). *The Theory of Economic Growth*. London: Routledge.
- Limón-Villegas, E. S., & González, G. J. (2025). Measuring Innovation in China: Construction of a Fundamental Index. *RAN - Revista Academia & Negocios*, 11(2), 1-19. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.29393/RAN11-14MILG20014>
- Lin, J. Y. (2004). Development Strategies for Inclusive Growth in Developing Asia. *Asian Development Review*, 21(02), 1-27. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1142/S0116110504000053>
- Lucas, R. E. (1988). On the mechanisms of economic development. *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 22, 3-42. <https://people.bu.edu/chamley/HSFref/Lucas-citiesJME88.pdf>
- Meyersson, E. (2009). Institutions and Nonconvergence Traps. En P. Aghion, & P. Howitt, *The Economics of Growth* (págs. 237-264). Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
- Meza, L. J. (2006). *El rol de las instituciones en las grandes transformaciones del sector industrial de China durante la reforma económica*. México: Miguel Ángel Porrúa; Universidad Autónoma de Baja California.
- Myrdal, G. (1959). *Teoría Económica y Regiones Subdesarrolladas*. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- NBSC. (2002). Statistical Bulletin of the Development of Labor and Social Security in 2001 [2001年度劳动和社会保障事业发展统计公报]. National Bureau of Statistics of China [国家统计局]: https://www.stats.gov.cn/sj/tjgb/qttjgb/qgqttjgb/202302/t20230218_1913248.html
- NBSC. (2010). Statistical Bulletin of National Economic and Social Development in 2009 [中华人民共和国2009年国民经济和社会发展统计公报]. National Bureau of Statistics of China [国家统计局]: https://www.stats.gov.cn/xxgk/sjfb/tjgb2020/201310/t20131031_1768616.html
- NBSC. (2025). Annual data. National Bureau of Statistics of China: National Data: <https://data.stats.gov.cn/english/easyquery.htm?cn=C01>
- North, D. C. (1990). *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- OECD. (2025). Data. Trusted statistics supporting evidence-based policy. OECD: <https://www.oecd.org/en/data.html>
- Oropeza, G. A. (2009). China y su modelo de desarrollo: líneas generales desde una perspectiva mexicana. En G. A. Oropeza, *México-China. Culturas y sistemas jurídicos comparados* (págs. 439-493). UNAM. <http://132.248.65.91/xmlui/handle/123456789/12271>

- Pritchett, L., Sen, K., & Werker, E. (2017). Deals and Development: An Introduction to the Conceptual Framework. En L. Pritchett, K. Sen, & E. Werker, Deals and Development: The Political Dynamics of Growth Episodes (págs. 1-38). England: Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198801641.001.0001>
- Rodríguez, y Rodríguez. M.T. (2009). China. Transiciones socioeconómicas en conexión con su desarrollo económico reciente. Estudios de Asia y Africa, 44(1), 31-57. <https://www.redalyc.org/pdf/586/58620936002.pdf>
- Rodríguez, y Rodríguez. M.Y., & Anguiano, R. E. (2008). Política de desarrollo económico: logros y perspectivas futuras. En R. Cornejo, China. Radiografía de una potencia en ascenso (págs. 271-325). México: El Colegio de México.
- Romer, P. (2010). Technologies, Rules, and Progress: The Case for Charter Cities. Center for Global Development: <https://www.cgdev.org/publication/technologies-rules-and-progress-case-charter-cities>
- Ros, J. (2012). La Teoría General de Keynes y la macroeconomía moderna. Investigación Económica, LXXI(279), 19-37. <https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=60123307002>
- Rosenstein-Rodan, P. N. (1943). Problems of Industrialisation of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. The Economic Journal, 53(210/211), 202-211. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.2307/2226317>
- Schumpeter, J. A. (1983). The Theory of Economic Development. An Inquiry into profits, capital, credit, interest, and business cycle. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
- Schumpeter, J. A. (2005). Development. Journal of Economic Literature, 43(1), 108-120. <https://doi.org/10.1257/0022051053737825>
- Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público. (2002). Programa Nacional de Financiamiento del Desarrollo 2002-2006. Diario Oficial de la Federación: https://dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle_popup.php?codigo=721315
- Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público. (2008). Programa Nacional de Financiamiento del Desarrollo 2008-2012. Diario Oficial de la Federación: https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle_popup.php?codigo=5047714
- Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público. (2013). Decreto por el que se aprueba el Programa Nacional de Financiamiento del Desarrollo 2013-2018 (PRONAFIDE). Gobierno de México: <https://www.gob.mx/shcp/documentos/pronafide-2013-2018>
- Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público. (2020). Programa Nacional de Financiamiento del Desarrollo 2020-2024. Diario Oficial de la Federación: https://dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle_popup.php?codigo=5597864
- Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público. (2025). Historico Tasa de Desempleo en México 2006-2024. Gobierno de México: https://www.proyectosmexico.gob.mx/por-que-invertir-en-mexico/mercado-potencial/sd_historico-tasa-de-desempleo-en-mexico/
- SEMARNAT. (2009). Pobreza y marginación. SEMARNAT: https://apps1.semarnat.gob.mx:8443/dgeia/resumen_2009/01_poblacion/cap1_4.html
- Sen, A. (1999). Development As Freedom. New York: Oxford University Press.
- SNII. (2025). Archivo Histórico del SNII. SECIHTI: <https://seciht.mx/sistema-nacional-de-investigadores/archivo-historico/>
- Stiglitz, J. E. (1994). The Role of the State in Financial Markets. World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics 1993. New York: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/239281468741290885/pdf/multi-page.pdf>

- Stiglitz, J. E. (2020). *Cómo hacer que funcione la globalización* (Segunda ed.). Debolsillo.
- Stuart-Mill, J. (2009). *Principles of Political Economy* (Ebook). New York: D. Appleton and Company / The Project Gutenberg.
- Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación. (2025). Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos. Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación: <https://www.scjn.gob.mx/sites/default/files/cpeum/documento/cpeum.pdf>
- UNCTAD. (2025a). Data centre. UNCTAD STAT: <https://unctadstat.unctad.org/datacentre>
- UNCTAD. (2025b). Productive Capacities Index. UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD): <https://unctadstat.unctad.org/EN/Pci.html>
- UNDP. (2025). Human Development Index (HDI). Human Development Reports (UNDP): <https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/human-development-index#/indicies/HDI>
- Vane, H. R., & Mulhearn, C. (2005). *The Nobel Memorial Laureates in Economics. An Introduction to Their Careers and Main Published Works*. Massachusetts: Edward Edgar Publishing Limited.
- Veblen, T. (2009). *Teoría de la empresa de negocios*. Granada: Comares.
- WHO. (2025a). World Health Organization Data by country: China. World Health Organization: <https://data.who.int/countries/156>
- WHO. (2025b). World Health Organization Data by country: Mexico. World Health Organization Data: <https://data.who.int/countries/484>
- World Bank. (2025). World Bank Country and Lending Groups. The World Bank: <https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups>
- World Bank. (2025a). Poverty and Inequality Platform. The World Bank: <https://pip.worldbank.org/country-profiles/IDN>
- World Bank. (2025c). World Bank Open Data. The World Bank Data: <https://data.worldbank.org/>
- Xinhua. (2011). Outline of the Twelfth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development (full text) [国民经济和社会发展第十二个五年规划纲要(全文)]. China Government Network [中国政府网]: https://www.gov.cn/2011lh/content_1825838_17.htm#
- Xinhua. (2013). Xi Jinping delivered an important speech calling for the joint construction of the "Silk Road Economic Belt" [习近平发表重要演讲 呼吁共建“丝绸之路经济带”]. Belt and Road Portal [中国一带一路网]: <https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/p/1875.html>
- Xinhua. (2016). Outline of the 13th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development of the People's Republic of China [中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十三个五年规划纲要]. Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China [中华人民共和国中央人民政府]: https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2016-03/17/content_5054992.htm
- Xinhua. (2021). Outline of the 14th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development of the People's Republic of China and the Long-Term Goals for 2035 [中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十四个五年规划和2035年远景目标纲要]. Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China [中华人民共和国中央人民政府]: https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2021-03/13/content_5592681.htm

The Global Community of Shared Future and Its Influence Mechanisms on China–Latin America E-commerce Cooperation

La comunidad global de destino compartido y sus mecanismos de influencia en la cooperación de comercio electrónico entre China y América Latina

Shiyang Liu

<https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3075-878X>

liushiyang@cfau.edu.cn

China Foreign Affairs University. Beijing, China



Fecha de envío: 18 de junio de 2025

Fecha de aceptación: 12 de agosto de 2025

Resumen: El concepto de una comunidad global de destino compartido propuesto por China, busca abordar los desafíos globales y promover la prosperidad colectiva. Con base en la teoría institucional y la teoría de capital social, así como el concepto de la comunidad global de destino compartido, este artículo formula un modelo de mecanismos de influencia de este concepto a la colaboración de comercio electrónico entre China y América Latina, que abarca políticas, tecnología, economía, cultura y distribución de riesgos. Se realiza un estudio de caso sobre el Proyecto de *Aldea Digital* de México para examinar las funciones de estos mecanismos. Los resultados muestran que una comunidad global de destino compartido tiene mecanismos de influencia efectivos que contribuyen al éxito del proyecto. Sin embargo, estrategias como profundizar la apertura institucional, aumentar la inversión conjunta y desarrollar mecanismos de formación intercultural deben implementarse para abordar los desafíos en la cooperación en el área.

Palabras clave: comunidad global de destino compartido, comercio electrónico, cooperación China-América Latina, proyecto de Aldea Digital

Cómo citar: Liu, S. (2025). The Global Community of Shared Future and Its Influence Mechanisms on China–Latin America E-commerce Cooperation. *China Global Review*, 3(6), 110–126 <https://doi.org/10.53897/REvChinaGR.2025.06.04>

This research was supported by China Association for Comparative Studies of Chinese and Foreign Languages and Cultures: “Research on the Pathways of China-Latin America Cooperation in the Belt and Road Initiative from the Perspective of International Public Goods” (Project No.: CACS25YB002)

Abstract: The concept of a Community with a Shared Future for Mankind (CSFM), proposed by China, seeks to address global challenges and promote collective prosperity. Grounded in institutional theory, social capital theory, and the concept of a global community with a shared future, this article formulates a model of the influential mechanisms of this concept on e-commerce collaboration between China and Latin America, encompassing policies, technology, economy, culture, and risk-sharing. A case study of Mexico's Digital Village Project is conducted to examine the roles of these mechanisms. The results show that a global community with a shared future has effective influential mechanisms that contribute to the project's success. However, strategies such as deepening institutional openness, increasing joint investment, and developing intercultural training mechanisms must be implemented to address challenges in cooperation in this area.

Keywords: global community of shared future, electronic commerce, China-Latin America cooperation, digital village project

Introduction

The concept of a *Community of Shared Future for Mankind* was first proposed by President Xi Jinping in 2013 at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, emphasizing that countries should foster partnerships based on mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, and collaboration in the context of globalization. This concept was further developed in 2015 into a "five-in-one" framework, encompassing political mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation, cultural mutual learning, collective security, and ecological co-protection. In Latin America, this concept has been operationalized through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In 2018, the Second Ministerial Meeting of the China-CELAC Forum adopted the "Special Statement on the Belt and Road Initiative", incorporating Latin America into the BRI cooperation framework. By 2023, China had signed BRI cooperation agreements with 19 Latin American countries, accounting for 56% of the 34 countries in the region. The State Council Information Office of China (2023) released the white paper "A Global Community of Shared Future: China's Proposals and Actions in September 2023", which states the concept of a global community of shared future, and indicates five pathways for a shared future, which include inclusive economic globalization, peaceful development, equitable international relations, genuine multilateralism and universal values with

respect for diversity. Following the five pathways can lead different nations to a cooperative world and thrive together through mutual respect and shared progress. This cooperation framework has laid the foundation for deepened international collaboration in the field of e-commerce.

In recent years, the commercial cooperation between China and Latin America has gained progress in quantity and quality. China-Latin America trade volume increased from US\$14.84 billion in 2001 to US\$518.47 billion in 2024, a roughly 34-fold increase. Since 2012, China has become Latin America's second-largest trading partner and has gradually become the largest trading partner of South American countries such as Brazil, Chile, and Peru. China and Latin America offer each other a vaster market space. Since 2001, the variety of products imported by China from Latin America has grown faster than that from the US and Europe, providing strong support for export diversification in Latin American countries. (Economic Daily, 2025, May 25) As the quality of bilateral cooperation continues to improve, collaboration in emerging sectors has attracted growing attention and significance. Among these, e-commerce cooperation stands out as a key area of strategic importance. According to data from the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the region's e-commerce market expanded by nearly 30% year-on-year in 2023, reaching US\$509 billion, demonstrating strong growth potential. Chinese e-commerce platforms have gained notable traction in Latin America, with surveys by the International Post Corporation indicating that approximately 70% of consumers in Brazil and Chile have made purchases on Chinese cross-border platforms, while penetration rates reached 40% and 30% in Mexico and Argentina, respectively. (Xinhua News Agency, 2024)

Chinese e-commerce companies are accelerating their presence in Latin America through localized operations and supply chain integration. For instance, SHEIN announced plans to invest R\$750 million (approximately US\$133 million) in Brazil over the coming years while establishing partnerships with 2,000 local garment manufacturers. AliExpress has strengthened its market position by optimizing logistics networks, while social commerce platforms such as TikTok and Kwai continue to enhance their regional operations. (Xie & Chen, 2024) Furthermore, China-LAC e-commerce collaboration is evolving beyond merchandise trade toward deeper industrial chain integration, encompassing platform development, logistics optimization, and payment facilitation.

E-commerce collaboration as an important collaboration form between China and Latin America, has a deep interrelationship with Chinese concept of global community of shared future. On the one hand, the vision of CSFM offers a guide and a value foundation for the e-commerce collaboration. This vision centers on the concept of shared interests, emphasizes that nations must balance their own pursuits with the concerns of others to achieve common development, propelling both sides toward equal consultation and mutual benefit in constructing a new model of digital economic relations. For instance, the China-CELAC Joint Action Plan for Cooperation in Key Areas (2025-2027) explicitly proposes “exploring mechanisms for China-LAC e-commerce cooperation dialogue”. On the other hand, the cooperation serves as a vehicle for the vision. The China-LAC e-commerce collaboration embodies the practical application of the shared future vision. Through cross-border platforms like SHEIN, Temu, digital infrastructure investments such as Huawei’s data centers, and trade facilitation measures like RMB settlement mechanisms in Brazil, both parties achieve technology sharing, market integration, and aligned interests. This synergy reflects the community’s core objectives, which are shared responsibilities and collective development.

However, the influential mechanisms of the Global Community of Shared Future for the e-commerce collaboration between China and Latin America is rarely studied. In this article, we intend to formulate a model of influential mechanisms of this concept to the bilateral e-commerce collaboration. This research has the following three objectives:

1. To propose influential mechanisms based on the Community of shared future for mankind concept and theoretical framework;
2. To demonstrate the generalizability of these mechanisms through multi-case data;
3. To conduct an in-depth single-case study validating the mechanisms’ operational dynamics and interactive effects.

We believe that this study addresses a critical gap in the literature and advances the institutionalization of e-commerce collaboration between China and Latin America. This article is divided into four parts. First, we establish the theoretical and methodological framework of the present research. Second, we analyze the influential mechanisms within the proposed framework. Third, we present a single case study examining Mexico’s Digital Village Project, to validate the model of influential mechanisms. Finally, we present the conclusions.

Theoretical and methodological framework

Institutional theory provides a structural lens for understanding how CSFM shapes China-Latin America e-commerce cooperation. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) introduce institutional isomorphism, comprising coercive, mimetic, and normative pressures, to explain organizational convergence within a field. Coercive isomorphism drives alignment through formal rules and policies, mimetic isomorphism encourages imitation of successful practices, and normative isomorphism fosters shared norms and standards. Scott (2014) extends this framework with three pillars—regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive. The regulative pillar emphasizes formal rules and compliance, the normative pillar focuses on values and norms, and the cultural-cognitive pillar addresses shared meanings and beliefs. Yan et al. (2023) extends this perspective by demonstrating that institutional distance—differences in regulations, norms, and cognitions between host and home countries—increases the challenges of cross-border e-commerce, such as communication and trust costs, leading to platform exit.

Social capital theory complements institutional theory by addressing relational and cultural dynamics. Coleman (1988) defines social capital as resources embedded in social networks that facilitate collective action, emphasizing trust and reciprocity. Putnam (2000) distinguishes bonding social capital (within-group ties) and bridging social capital (cross-group connections), which support knowledge diffusion and trust-building.

The essence of CSFM lies in the grand harmony and global common good. The researcher Han Qingxiang (2017) delineates five strategic pathways to construct a CSFM, emphasizing global cooperation and mutual benefit. According to Han, the five pathways are promoting interest convergence, fostering cultural exchange and mutual learning, establishing platforms for collective development, creating a just and shared security framework, building cooperative and mutually beneficial partnerships. These pathways serve to guide different countries through the synergy of market, technology, and culture, provide a solid foundation and sustained momentum for China-Latin America e-commerce cooperation.

As mentioned above, this study aims to propose and validate the model of impact mechanisms of the CSFM concept on China-Latin America e-commerce collaboration. In the formulation of the model, multiple China-Latin America e-commerce cases are used to enhance the generalizability of the framework. The data of the cases are collected by literature analysis

government reports, academic papers and news, while thematic analysis is applied to identify and validate mechanisms, ensuring methodological rigor. To validate the model, we adopt a single-case study methodology (Yin, 2014), and take the Mexico's Digital Villages Project as the empirical case, combining literature analysis and thematic analysis. The Mexican project was selected due to its strong alignment with CSFM principles, its importance in the bilateral e-commerce cooperation and its robust dataset.

Formulation and analysis of the main mechanisms of influence

Based on the connotation of the concept of global community of shared future and the development pathways, as well as the institutional theory and the social capital theory, we formulate a model of the five main mechanisms of the global community of shared future for the China-LAC e-commerce collaboration, which are policy coordination, technology empowerment, economic integration, cultural exchange and risk resilience.

The first mechanism of influence is the policy coordination mechanism. The concept of a global community with shared future underscores win-win cooperation and inclusive development in global governance. This philosophy has laid the foundation for policy coordination in China-Latin America e-commerce collaboration, which intends to pursue to reduce the institutional barriers and establish cooperation platforms, as well as realize flexible and inclusive policy adaptation. This mechanism reflects the alignment of rules and policies that facilitate e-commerce cooperation driven by regulative pressures (Scott, 2014) and coercive isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). For example, by 2022, China had signed e-commerce cooperation memorandums of understanding with five Latin American nations, including Chile and Brazil (Yang et al., 2023). These agreements facilitate trade facilitation measures, such as streamlined customs procedures and mutual recognition of digital trade standards. Moreover, in 2023, the upgrade of the China-Peru FTA was realized, which introduced dedicated e-commerce provisions on cross-border data flows, consumer protection, and digital authentication (MOFCOM, 2024). Such policy alignment has tangibly benefited businesses. Chilean cherries, wine, and salmon, for instance, have gained broader access to Chinese consumers through e-commerce platforms. (China Free Trade Zone Service Network, 2017).

Moreover, the policy mechanism also includes the establishment of institutionalized cooperation platforms such as the e-commerce industry alliance like China-LAC Digital Economy Cooperation Forum in May of 2025 in Xi'an, and the Digital economy pilot zones like Huawei-supported data centers in Brazil. These platforms serve as hubs for policy dialogue, technology transfer, and market integration, enabling stakeholders to align regulatory approaches and share best practices. This assertion aligns with the findings of Yan et al. (2023), who argue that institutional distance, like differences in norms, cultures and regulations, may increase foreign companies leaving the market. The CSFM contributes to reduce institutional and cultural obstacles, thus promoting commercial collaboration.

A third element of policy coordination is flexible and inclusive adaptation is also an action within the policy coordination mechanism. China has recognized the diverse developmental stages of Latin American economies, and has adopted tailored cooperation strategies. This argument is also supported by the research of Yan et al., (2023), who highlights that institutional distance—differences in policies, regulations, and cultures between the home and host countries—significantly affects the success of cross-border e-commerce platforms. This implies the need for policy adaptation to navigate diverse institutional contexts, to have a coordinated progress. For example, China realized localized infrastructure investments to establish Cainiao, Alibaba's logistics hubs, in Mexico, which offers high-efficiency delivery service. Additionally, China also organized capacity-building programs like cross-border e-commerce training for SMEs. We can see that the shared future governance model has enabled China and Latin America to build a resilient, rules-based e-commerce ecosystem.

The second influence mechanism is technology empowerment mechanism. The global community of shared future emphasizes technology sharing and inclusive development, providing systematic support for China-Latin America e-commerce cooperation through three interconnected pathways: joint construction of digital infrastructure, collaborative technological innovation and knowledge sharing. This mechanism not only enhances regional digital connectivity, but also promotes sustainable development in Latin America through shared technological dividends. This is supported by social capital theory (Putnam, 2000) and normative and cultural-cognitive pillars (Scott, 2014).

The technology and innovation are of great importance in the development of e-commerce in Latin America. (Ramírez & Casal, 2022) Chinese enterprises actively participate in Latin American digital infrastructure construction under the Belt and Road Initiative, completing numerous infrastructure projects to assist the local development. AliExpress established smart hub warehouses in Brazil and Mexico, achieving 3-day delivery coverage in major cities. Other technological innovations— including intelligent label recognition algorithms, robotic process automation, and automated inspection systems— have optimized customs efficiency. Moreover, Huawei deployed core network nodes in Mexico and Brazil and collaborated with Latin American operators to construct trans-Pacific submarine cables. This significantly improved internet quality in remote areas, with 5G base density increasing by 40% in Mexico City's smart transportation network. China has also enhanced Latin America's e-commerce capabilities through technical training and knowledge sharing. For instance, Alibaba's Electronic World Trade Platform (eWTP) provides training in e-commerce operations and digital marketing for small and medium-sized enterprises in Latin America, strengthening their ability to participate in global markets.

The third mechanism of influence is economic integration, which promotes interest sharing and value chain upgrading. This mechanism stems from the pathway of interest convergence and economic mutual benefit partnership. For example, the upgraded China-Chile Free Trade Agreement (effective 2019) marks a new phase in China-Latin America trade liberalization. Its core lies in achieving reciprocal market opening through institutional arrangements. Chinese consumers gain access to Chilean specialty agricultural products at lower costs; and at the same time Chinese manufactured products obtain price competitiveness in the Chilean market. This mechanism fosters complementarity between agricultural and industrial trade. The economic integration mechanism also leads to agricultural revolution. For instance, tariff reductions combined with e-commerce direct procurement models have made Chilean cherries a signature case in China's "dining table economy". Data shows that from January to October in 2024, China imported cherries worth RMB 19.267 billion from Chile, representing a 26 % year-on-year increase. In 2024, Douyin E-commerce partnered with the Chilean Fruit Exporters Association to initiate the "2024-2025 Season Chilean Fruit Exporters Association & Douyin E-commerce Live Marketing" project. This initiative integrates "in-store live streaming" with "wholesale market broadcasts" for

the first time. E-commerce platforms like Taobao Tmall and Douyin compress supply chain intermediaries through “origin-direct procurement + cold-chain optimization”, achieving “48-hour delivery from port to consumer” for the first shipment, which greatly enhanced supply chain efficiency. (Wang, 2024)

Another pathway of the economic integration mechanism is the value chain upgrade. Chinese e-commerce enterprises are driving Latin American SMEs to deeply integrate into the global digital trade network through technology exports and value chain restructuring. Via localized collaboration, Latin American economies can develop beyond simple commodity circulation to optimize production processes and enhance overall supply chain efficiency. Many Latin American products now benefit from the solutions characterized by “Chinese digital technology + Latin American specialty products”. For example, in 2025, JD Super signed a strategic cooperation agreement with the Argentine Beef Promotion Institute to jointly develop internationally renowned meat brands. This partnership establishes an end-to-end supply chain— from overseas production facilities to Chinese households—ensuring high-quality imported meat products reach domestic consumers efficiently. (Minsheng Weekly, 2025) The development of Latin American e-commerce can be explained by mimetic isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) and regulative and normative pillars (Scott, 2014).

The fourth mechanism of influence is cultural mutual trust, fostering collaboration through cross-cultural adaptation, brand building, and cultural exchange, to enhance mutual understanding, consumer trust, and market competitiveness. This mechanism is drawn from fostering cultural exchange and mutual learning. Social capital theory (Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 2000) and the cultural-cognitive pillar (Scott, 2014) offer the theoretical foundation for the cultural exchange and trust-building. Effective e-commerce cooperation relies on understanding and respecting cultural differences to tailor platform operations to local contexts. For instance, AliExpress has implemented localized strategies in Latin American markets, such as offering Portuguese-language customer service in Brazil and designing promotional campaigns aligned with local festivals. These adaptations which meets Brazilian consumers’ cultural preferences and enhances user engagement and platform accessibility.

Creating culturally resonant brand identities is also of great importance for gaining consumer trust and strengthening market presence. Chinese brands like Huawei has bolstered their recognition in Latin America by orga-

nizing cultural events, such as music festivals and sports events, which align with local values and establish emotional ties with consumers. Similarly, Latin American brands like Chilean wines also use numerous strategies to adapt to Chinese cultural preferences, like premium packaging for gift giving, and special promotion on Double 11 Festival, for enhancing brand appeal and consumer acceptance in China.

Within the cultural mechanism, China and Latin America also organize cultural activities to reduce cultural barriers and enhance mutual trust for e-commerce collaboration. Events such as the China-Latin America Cultural Year and the Cross-Border E-commerce Cooperation Forum create platforms for business collaboration to showcase culturally significant products. These activities deepen mutual understanding among Chinese and Latin American consumers on the one hand, and function as an effective promotion for typical products of different countries to attract potential consumers on the other hand. By integrating cross-cultural adaptation, brand building, and cultural exchange, the cultural mutual trust mechanism not only enhances consumer engagement but also fosters sustainable and mutually beneficial e-commerce cooperation between China and Latin America.

The fifth mechanism of influence is risk sharing. This mechanism is integral to China-Latin America e-commerce cooperation, emphasizing sustainable development, crisis response, and collaborative risk mitigation to ensure resilient and environmentally responsible partnerships. In the China-Latin America e-commerce collaboration, they promote green development initiatives and environmentally friendly policies aimed at minimizing the ecological impact of e-commerce activities. For example, Chinese e-commerce platforms like Alibaba promote sustainable packaging and low-carbon logistics in Latin America. Specifically, AliExpress collaborates with local logistics providers in Brazil to adopt recyclable packaging materials, significantly reducing carbon footprints and aligning with global sustainability goals, thereby fostering environmentally conscious consumer trust. Another important manifestation of this mechanism is crisis response to address unforeseen economic, logistical, or geopolitical crises, ensuring the stability of e-commerce cooperation. For instance, the upgraded Protocol to the China-Peru Free Trade Agreement includes provisions to enhance supply chain resilience, mitigating disruptions in global supply chains and ensuring the stable operation of cross-border e-commerce. (MOFCOM News Office,

2024) These bilateral agreements strengthen the capacity of both sides to face crises and tackle difficult situations.

Multilateral cooperation and agreements facilitate the sharing of potential risks, such as market volatility or data security threats, to bolster the resilience of e-commerce ecosystems. This mechanism is rooted in shared security pathway. By leveraging platforms like the China-Latin America Cross-Border E-commerce Cooperation Forum, China and Latin American countries develop coordinated strategies to address risks collectively. These frameworks enable risk diversification, ensuring that challenges like cybersecurity threats or economic fluctuations are managed through shared responsibility and mutual support. In sum, the risk-sharing mechanism strengthens resilience and sustainability in China–Latin America e-commerce cooperation.

Case study: Mexico's Digital Village Project

Analyzing specific cases of China–Latin America e-commerce cooperation, we can gain a deeper understanding of how the concept of a global community with shared future is applied in practice and its tangible impacts. This approach not only validates the applicability of theoretical analyses, but also provides empirical support for the influence mechanisms that we presented in the previous section of this article. In this section, we examine a representative and impactful case of China-Latin America e-commerce collaboration: Mexico's Digital Village Project. This analysis explores the project's background, current implementation status, and resulting benefits.

Mexico's e-commerce market has experienced rapid growth in recent years. Especially from 2000, Mexico has been adopting new technologies and the growth of e-commerce had a great leap. (González, 2020) converting into one of the fastest-growing e-commerce nations globally. However, rural areas continue to face challenges such as weak digital infrastructure and limited capacity for business transformation. There still exists differences between urban and rural areas in the internet access and telecommunication infrastructure. (Del Valle Soto et al., 2024; García-Mora & Mora-Rivera, 2021) To deal with these problems, Alibaba partnered with local Mexican governments in 2020 to launch the Digital Village Project. According to the standards set by the Aliresearch Institute, in rural areas, a village can be designated as a "Tao-bao Village" if it meets the following criteria: the annual e-commerce sales volume reaches 10 million yuan, and the number of active online stores in the village reaches 100 or 10 % of the local household count. (Zuo, 2021) The

“Taobao Village” form a part of the Chinese strategy of revitalize villages and agriculture with electronic commerce. Research by Zhou & Kang (2025) has shown that the expansion of the number of “Taobao Villages” has a significant positive impact on the level of rural revitalization. “Taobao Villages” enhance rural revitalization, industrial prosperity, and affluent living standards through the effect of employment transfer. and as a result of its positive results, the model has been replicated around the world, with Mexico being a pioneer in its regional implementation. (Morales Estay, 2024) Alibaba’s Digital Villages initiative in Mexico is guided by the same logic as that of the Taobao Villages in recognizing the value of, and need for, small enterprise digitalization in order to increase market access and growth, and to reduce socio-economic inequalities. (Larios-Hernández, 2024) This initiative initially covered five states, eight universities, and 1,500 small and micro enterprises, aiming to drive the digital transformation of traditional industries through training and technical support. In May 2022, the eWTP signed a cooperation agreement with the National Conference of Governors of Mexico (CONAGO) to expand the pilot experience to additional states, with the goal of fostering inclusive economic development in rural areas. (Huanqiu, 2022)

The cooperation mechanisms and implementation pathways of this Digital Village Project are manifested in the following aspects. To begin with, the policy coordination mechanism offers a framework for consultation, collaboration and shared benefits. In May 2022, the eWTP and CONAGO signed a cooperation agreement to advance e-commerce, smart logistics, and digital payments. Referring to China’s successful “Taobao Village” model, this framework supports Mexican SMEs in achieving digital transformation. The agreement establishes a governance structure based on consultation, collaboration, and shared benefits, which builds alignment with local needs and fosters sustainable development. On the other hand, it should be considered that the model of “Taobao” village rely on China’s unique digital infrastructure, state-backed entrepreneurial culture, and dense rural-urban supply chains. So the institutional distance should be considered, and transformations should be made to adapt to Mexico’s distinct socio-economic landscape.

Secondly, the technological empowerment mechanism offers technical support. Alibaba’s international platform facilitates global market access for Mexican enterprises, integrating digital payment and logistics systems. For instance, volcanic stone mortars (molcajetes) from rural villages have significant price and sales increases through e-commerce, with some enterprises

reporting revenue growth of 200 %–300 % (Huanqiu, 2022). In Guanajuato, the companies benefiting from the project went from a digital maturity of approximately 33 % to a digital maturity of nearly 75 %. (Vázquez Reyes et al., 2022) Technological empowerment enhances rural enterprises' competitiveness by bridging the digital divide and enabling global outreach. However, there are also findings that show that the Digital Village solution still haven't resolve completely the problem of digital differences, for the dissimilarity of infrastructure and platforms in China and Mexico. (Lario-Hernández, 2024; Vázquez Reyes et al., 2022) This reflects the lack of coordination between policies and local reality.

In the Digital Village Project, the economic integration mechanism promotes mutual benefits through trade expansion, value chain extension, and platform development. Alibaba's platform enables Mexican agricultural products, such as avocados, to enter the Chinese market, achieving market sharing and expanding trade cooperation. This approach strengthens economic ties and fosters win-win outcomes by integrating Mexican products into global value chains.

The cultural mutual trust mechanism facilitates cross-cultural adaptation and brand building to enhance consumer trust, to promote the product selling in e-commerce. For example, project leader Andrés, who studied in China for eight years, combines Chinese e-commerce expertise with Mexican cultural contexts, guiding artisans to adapt to online operations. In Guanajuato, traditional molcajete artisans, initially reliant on offline sales, now export products to Indonesia and South Africa via e-commerce, with prices rising from \$9.50 to \$200USD (Zhu, 2022). Successful cases, such as carpenters and beekeepers, have alleviated local skepticism toward Chinese e-commerce platforms, building trust and addressing rural "hollowing-out" by inspiring young entrepreneurs (Zhu, 2022). These are cases that prove the important function of cultural mechanism in promoting the bilateral e-commerce.

The Digital Village Project, with the positive influences due to the influential mechanisms, has gain many achievements, such as talents formation, economic benefits, social impacts and sustainable development. The eWTP's Global Digital Talent program provides Mexico with training in digital economy theory and practical skills, including new retail, smart logistics, and digital marketing. By 2023, over 400 teachers and 8,000 students were trained, forming nearly 1,000 service teams to support enterprise transformation. Mexican participants visited China's "Taobao Villages" like Bainiu Vi-

llage in Lin'an and Pearl Village in Zhuji to learn e-commerce operations and live-streaming, and then applied these skills to sell molcajetes and avocados. (Zhu, 2022) In Puebla's mountainous regions, apple farmers expanded market reach through digital marketing, e-commerce platforms, and smart logistics, increasing profits by 20 %. Some farmers plan to develop value-added products like organic soda and cider and establish guesthouses for apple-picking experiences (Lei & Liu, 2024). The project also has important social impacts. This project replicates China's "Taobao Village" model, enabling global sales of Mexican specialties like tequila and ceramics through Alibaba's platform. By showcasing entrepreneurial opportunities, it attracts young people to return to rural areas. This greatly mitigates population outflow and revitalizes local communities. The influx of young entrepreneurs also fosters rural vitality, contributing to sustainable development by encouraging long-term economic and social stability in rural Mexico.

Conclusions

The Mexico Digital Village Project exemplifies multidimensional empowerment through technology, talent, and ecosystems, driven by China-Mexico cooperation. Policy coordination provides institutional frameworks, technological empowerment enhances digital infrastructure and betters technological level, economic integration amplifies trade benefits, and cultural mutual trust promotes bilateral commerce. This initiative not only boosts rural economic vitality, but also offers a replicable model for digital transformation for rural areas of developing countries.

Despite the current development and future potential of China-Latin America e-commerce cooperation, we should not ignore that several challenges exist. First, policy volatility in Latin America poses significant barriers to e-commerce collaboration. For instance, changes in Brazil's taxation policies on imported goods can alter the cost structures of Chinese e-commerce enterprises. Second, the insufficiency of policy-reality coordination further undermines collaborative efficiency, reflecting a fundamental mismatch between top-down institutional designs and ground-level socioeconomic conditions. Third, China and Latin America have many cultural differences, which create value gaps and trust barriers, leading to the skepticism of local customers toward foreign brands and business models. Language barriers, differing payment habits, and misconceptions about the quality of products

also hinder the development of e-commerce enterprises of each side in target market.

To address these challenges, China and Latin America can enhance the mechanisms through the following strategies. First of all, both sides can deepen institutional openness and promote mutual recognition of Digital Trade Rules. By aligning regulations and standards, costs can be reduced, and market access efficiency can be improved. It can also provide a more stable business environment for enterprises on both sides. China and Latin American should increase joint investment in digital infrastructure and technology such as artificial intelligence. These efforts can provide stronger technical support for e-commerce development, particularly by addressing digital infrastructure deficiencies in certain Latin American countries. Moreover, both sides can collaborate to establish a cross-cultural training mechanism to deepen and broaden mutual understanding, and to form a group of talents for cross-cultural communication. In this way, the enterprises can develop more effective marketing and branding strategies in foreign markets.

Through these mechanisms, the concept of a global community of shared future provides a strategic framework for China–Latin America e-commerce cooperation. It also transforms into a sustainable driver of development through concrete practices, establishing a new paradigm for South–South cooperation.

References

- China Free Trade Zone Service Network. (2017, November). 中智自贸协定让智利车厘子等产品登陆中国市场 [China-Chile Free Trade Agreement enables Chilean cherries and other products to enter the Chinese market]. https://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/article/chinachileupgrade/chinachileupgradefguandian/201711/50144_1.html
- Coleman, J. S. (1988). Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital. *American Journal of Sociology*, 94(1), S95–S120. <https://doi.org/10.1086/228943>
- Del Valle Soto, C., Briseno, R. A., López-Pimentel, J.-C., Velaquez, R., Valdivia, L. J., & Varela-Aldás, J. (2024). Bridging the Digital Divide in Mexico: A Critical Analysis of Telecommunications Infrastructure and Predictive Models for Policy Innovation. *Telecom*, 5(4), 1076–1101. <https://doi.org/10.3390/telecom5040055>
- DiMaggio, P. J., & Powell, W. W. (1983). The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields. *American Sociological Review*, 48(2), 147–160. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2095101>
- Economic Daily (2025, May 25). 推动中拉经贸合作迈上新台阶 [Promote to a new stair the commercial cooperation between China and Latin America]. <https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1833042775688700328&wfr=spider&for=pc>

- García-Mora, F., & Mora-Rivera, J. (2021). Exploring the impacts of Internet access on poverty: A regional analysis of rural Mexico. *New Media & Society*, 25(1), 26–49. <https://doi.org/10.1177/14614448211000650>
- González García, J. (2020). Electronic commerce in China and Mexico: Emergence, evolution and perspectives. *México y la Cuenca del Pacífico*, 9(27), 53–84. <https://doi.org/10.32870/mycp.v9i27.688>
- Han, Q. (2017, April 14). 深刻把握人类命运共同体的丰富内涵和构建路径[Deeply understanding the rich connotations and pathways for building a community of shared future for mankind]. People's Daily Online. <http://theory.people.com.cn/n1/2017/0414/c40531-29209732.html>
- Huanqiu.com. (2022, May 18). 美洲第一站落地，eWTP和墨西哥州长联合会签署合作协议 [The first stop in the Americas, eWTP and Mexico Governors' Association sign cooperation agreement]. <https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1733094021362101503&wfr=spider&for=pc>
- Lei, M. X., & Liu, H. (2024, April 7). 看！数字丝路上的智慧农业和减贫故事 [Look! Stories of Smart Agriculture and Poverty Alleviation on the Digital Silk Road]. 光明网. [Guangming.cn] <https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1795638685725337880&wfr=spider&for=pc>
- Larios-Hernandez, G. J. (2024). Alibaba in Mexico: Adapting the digital villages model to Latin America. *The Information Society*, 40(2), 120–135. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01972243.2024.2315878>
- Minsheng Weekly. (2025, June 9). 中国与阿根廷达成牛肉商贸战略合作获阿根廷总统米莱社交平台转发 [China and Argentina reach strategic beef trade cooperation, acknowledged on Argentine President Milei's social platform]. <https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1834445550615778717&wfr=spider&for=pc>
- MOFCOM News Office. (2024, November 15). 商务部国际司负责人解读中国—秘鲁自由贸易协定升级议定书 [Interpretation of the Upgrade Protocol of the China-Peru Free Trade Agreement by the Head of the International Department of MOFCOM]. https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/syxwfb/art/2024/art_01bd47e57c2647b6bb9cd3ee9b8a4bea.html
- Morales Estay, P. (2024). De Aldeas Taobao a Aldeas Digitales: El modelo chino de crecimiento inclusivo a través del comercio electrónico. Programa Asia Pacífico, Departamento de Estudios, Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile. https://obtienearchivo.bcn.cl/obtienearchivo?id=repositorio/10221/36029/1/De_Aldeas_Taobao_a_Aldeas_Digitales__el_modelo_chino_de_crecimiento_inclusivo_a_traves_s_del_comercio_electro__nico.pdf
- Putnam, R. D. (2000). *Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community*. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster. <https://doi.org/10.1145/358916.361990>
- Ramírez M., C., & Casal de A., R. A. (2022). La gestión de proyectos en tecnología de información y comercio electrónico para el logro de los objetivos estratégicos organizacionales. *Sapientia Organizacional*, 9(19), 43–60.
- Scott, W.R. (2014). *Institutions and Organizations: Ideas and Interests*. Sage Publications.
- State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China. (2023). *A Global Community of Shared Future: China's Proposals and Actions*. [White paper]. http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/zfbps_2279/202309/t20230926_771260.html
- Vázquez Reyes, K. M., Meléndez Caudillo, A. I., Vargas Fuentes, L. E., Salazar Morales, M. M., Viñanto, L. A., & García Barragán, F. (2022). Las Aldeas Digitales y su Implementación

- en Guanajuato. *Jóvenes de la Ciencia*, 16, 1–15. <https://www.jovenesenlaciencia.ugto.mx/index.php/jovenesenlaciencia/article/view/3576>
- Wang, Y. (2024, December 27). 一键“点击”，智利车厘子的越洋“鲜”行记 [One-click journey: The transoceanic “fresh” voyage of Chilean cherries]. Xinhua Net. <https://www.news.cn/tech/20241227/987bd02ca90a46e795d93d686ed41828/c.html>
- Xie, J., & Chen, H. (2024, August 1). 中拉挖掘数字技术合作潜力 [China and Latin America tap the potential of digital technology cooperation]. People's Daily (International Edition), p. 17.
- Xinhua News Agency. (2024, August 12). Enfoque de China: China y América Latina aprovechan potencial de cooperación tecnológica digital [China Focus: China and Latin America tap potential for digital technology cooperation]. Spanish News. <https://spanish.news.cn>
- Yan, Z., Lu, X., Chen, Y., & Wang, K. (2023). Institutional distance, internationalization speed and cross-border e-commerce platform utilization. *Management Decision*, 61(1), 176–200. <https://doi.org/10.1108/MD-09-2021-1172>
- Yang, Z. M., Lu, S. H., & Lin, B. (2023). The 10th Anniversary of Joint Building of the “Belt and Road”: The Construction of China–Latin America Interconnection Partnership from the Perspective of Public Goods. *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 45(3), 47–70.
- Yin, R. K. (2014). *Case study research: Design and methods*. Sage Publications.
- Zhou, L. & Kang, Y. (2025) How can digital commerce rejuvenate agriculture in rural areas? Empirical evidence based on quasi-natural experiments in “Taobao” village. *Journal of China Agricultural University*, 30(05), 308-324. DOI:10. 11841/j. issn. 1007-4333. 2025. 05. 24
- Zhu, Z. (2022, April 28). 墨西哥也有“淘宝村”？3年前这个洋小伙“偷师”临安白牛村 [Mexico also has “Taobao Villages”? Three years ago, this foreign young man “learned” from Bainiu Village in Lin'an]. Sina. https://t.cj.sina.com.cn/articles/view/2659261621/9e811cb5001016bws?cre=tianyi&mod=pctech&loc=9&r=0&rfunc=22&tj=cxvertical_pc_tech&tr=12
- Zuo, C. (2021, October 12) 2021年淘宝村名单出炉 全国淘宝村数量已突破7000. [In 2021, the list of Taobao Villages was released, with the total number of Taobao Villages nationwide surpassing 7,000]. Aliresearch. <http://www.aliresearch.com/ch/information/informationdetails?articleCode=256317657652006912&type=%E6%96%B0%E9%97%BB>

Desarrollo regional México-China: Un análisis comparativo y de consistencia

Mexico-China Regional Development: A Comparative and Consistency Analysis

José Manuel Orozco Plascencia
<https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8878-2996>
manuel_orozco@ucol.mx
Universidad de Colima, México



Fecha de recepción: 13 de septiembre de 2025
Fecha de aceptación: 20 de octubre de 2025

Resumen: El estudio consistió en efectuar una valoración al método comparativo implementado en una investigación sobre el patrón de desarrollo regional México-China, dividiéndose en tres apartados: exploración de literatura; descripción de la metodología del Censo Económico de México y del Buro de Estadísticas de China; y revisión de la consistencia de cuatro componentes de la introducción: objetivos, hipótesis, justificación y metodología. Se concluye que es posible realizar comparación de los censos en años diferentes y con desigual tamaño de sus economías, utilizando la clasificación industrial de Naciones Unidas, de México y de China, con el propósito de resguardar la escala de similitudes, las cuales se afianzan al proponer un estudio de congruencia, que permite ligar la problemática, con la aplicación de herramientas para conocer la dinámica de las actividades del territorio.

Palabras clave: México, China, método comparativo, prueba de consistencia, desarrollo regional

Abstract: The study involved an evaluation of the comparative method applied in research on the regional development patterns of Mexico and China. It was structured into three main sections: a literature review, a description of the methodologies employed by Mexico's Economic Census and

Cómo citar: Orozco, J.M. (2025). Desarrollo regional México-China: Un análisis comparativo y de consistencia. *China Global Review*, 3(6), 127- 146. <https://doi.org/10.53897/REvChinaGR.2025.06.05>

China's National Bureau of Statistics, and an examination of the consistency of four key components of the introduction: objectives, hypotheses, justification, and methodology.

The findings indicate that it is feasible to compare censuses conducted in different years and across economies of unequal scale by employing the industrial classifications of the United Nations, Mexico, and China. This approach safeguards the framework of comparability, which is further reinforced through a congruence analysis that connects the core research problem with the application of analytical tools aimed at understanding the dynamics of territorial economic activities.

Keywords: Mexico, China, comparative method, consistency test, regional development

Introducción

En este documento se revisó el contenido y la consistencia de la investigación intitulada "Análisis del patrón de desarrollo regional en México y China, 1980-2012", con el propósito de responder a dudas que se generaron sobre el análisis comparativo de dos años o periodos diferentes, con respecto a la publicación de los censos económicos y sobre la metodología internacional estandarizada que utilizaron China y México para la elaboración de sus estadísticas económicas.

El estudio referido se efectuó por la necesidad de identificar y reconocer que China y México son dos economías con tamaños desiguales, por atender la inquietud de si era posible analizar dos años disímiles, debido a que las instituciones que levantan las estadísticas las publicaron en años diferentes (México en 2011 y China 2009), y de si había un estándar internacional que permitirá determinar que la generación de datos en las dos naciones mantenía una similitud.

Lo anterior permitió identificar que la Clasificación Industrial Uniforme de Todas las Actividades Económicas (CIIU-3) de Naciones Unidas coadyuvó a empatar las metodologías del Buro de Estadísticas de China y de los Censos Económicos del Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática (INEGI) de México, lo que facilitó la argumentación al momento de aplicar el método comparativo, cuyos beneficios o ventajas del mismo son: el que cuenta con "un potencial heurístico ya que renueva y genera conocimiento, y ha sido parte fundamental para la construcción de teorías dentro de las ciencias sociales en general" (Schteingart y Sierra, 2024, p. 2-3) y el que

“permite superar los límites nacionales y cronológicos, posibilita el paso de la descripción a la explicación de los problemas históricos, induce tanto a la generalización como a la individualización, y es esencial en la construcción de modelos”. (Bronislawski, 1995 p.107)

En ese tenor, la pregunta que se busca responder es la siguiente: ¿es posible comparar el patrón de desarrollo regional de dos economías emergentes con tamaños de mercado e información económica y estadística difundida en periodos de estudio diferentes?

El presente escrito se divide en cinco apartados: el primero refiere a la exploración de literatura acerca del análisis comparativo de dos años o periodos diferentes con respecto a la publicación de sus censos económicos, en el que se examina el método comparativo diacrónico, la utilización y aplicación del software titulado Técnica de Análisis Regional: Entrenamiento y Aplicación (TAREA) y de la Matriz Secre (Sector-Región)¹ del Instituto Latinoamericano para la Planificación Económica y Social (ILPES) de la Comisión Económica para América Latina (CEPAL) para las dos economías, México y China, así como el análisis de ocho aspectos que propone Nohlen (2020), con respecto a lograr reflexiones metodológicas razonables para la toma de decisiones armonizadas en el marco de los estudios comparados.

La segunda parte corresponde a la descripción de la metodología utilizada por el Buro de Estadísticas de China y de los Censos Económicos de INEGI, tomando en cuenta las consideraciones del Sistema de Clasificación Industrial de América del Norte (SCIAN) de México, de la Clasificación Industrial de la Economía Nacional para China y de la CIIU-3 de Naciones Unidas. El tercer apartado refiere a los resultados arrojados al revisar la consistencia de cuatro componentes del planteamiento del problema que aparece en la introducción de la investigación referida: objetivos, hipótesis general y secundarias, justificación y metodología. El cuarto punto refiere a la discusión de los resultados y, finalmente, el quinto corresponde a las conclusiones.

Exploración de literatura sobre el método comparativo

En esta sección, se reflexiona en torno a la existencia de bibliografía que permite explicar los análisis comparativos para dos años o periodos dife-

1 El Software TAREA fue realizado por CEPAL en 1975, cuando Sergio Boisier era Director de la ILPES-CEPAL

rentes, en el que se revisa el método comparativo diacrónico, la utilización y aplicación del software TAREA y de la matriz secre para México y China, así como la descripción

Tanto INEGI de México como el Buro de Estadísticas de China utilizan información metodológica y estadística internacional estandarizada para la realización de sus censos económicos independientemente del año de su aplicación, con base en la CIU-3 diseñado por Naciones Unidas (INEGI, 2013 y China Statistical Yearbook, 2013). Esta confirmación coadyuva a homologar y concluir que los datos recopilados son con base en una misma fuente internacional.

De acuerdo con “La comparación en las ciencias sociales” de Sartori y Morlino (2002), se identifica que la investigación aplicada representó una comparación de tipo diacrónico, ya que es posible analizar un objeto de estudio en un momento dado o en diferentes momentos sucesivos, jugando la elección de la variable tiempo un rol fundamental.

En la investigación se considera cómo caso, la ausencia o crecimiento y distribución de las actividades económicas producidas en el territorio (Lira y Bolívar, 2009), a través del uso y cálculo de variables y técnicas regionales contenidas en el software TAREA en dos años o momentos diferentes, 2009 para México (INEGI) y 2011 para China (Buro de Estadísticas de China).

Con respecto a la comparación diacrónica, Morlino (2002, p.22) indica que esta se registra “cuando decidimos analizar el mismo caso en momentos diferentes y sucesivos con el objetivo de ver la influencia de ciertos fenómenos acaecidos. El punto central es que no se ve un solo periodo, que en cualquier caso sería presupuesto en abstracto, sino que se quiere observar la mutación, a través de una aproximación de distintos momentos”, otorgando la permisibilidad de elegir dos periodos diferentes para el análisis de los resultados en el estudio de las características del desarrollo regional para México y China, permitiendo inferir que, al reducir al número de variables a utilizar, también se disminuye el número de atributos, lo que genera un mayor control de las mismas.

Comparar dos periodos diferentes (2009 y 2011), con un mismo atributo (información estadística estandarizada del CIU-3 de Naciones Unidas) en dos economías emergentes ubicadas en la cuenca del pacífico (González, et al., 2015: p.1) coadyuva a apuntalar entonces, que se espera un mayor control de las hipótesis o variables a utilizar. En ese sentido, el investigador debe asumir decisiones concretas con respecto a las variables espacio y tiempo,

donde con la primera se permite comprender la lógica de la comparación en la que, de acuerdo a Morlino (2002), debemos buscar diferenciaciones para explicar de modo más sólido y riguroso la relación causal.

Dicha variación, en los periodos de 2009 y 2011, se cobijó precisamente en la lógica comparativa del espacio y en la elección de casos (desarrollo regional en México y China), cuyos factores considerados como comunes o diferentes en cada conjunto de temas elegidos requirió de la aplicación de la cláusula “*ceteris paribus*” [en igualdad de condiciones] (Gómez, 2001, p. 69), es decir, justamente qué aspectos del análisis puede considerarse “*pari*” o bien constantes o cuáles no (Morlino, 2002, p.21). *Ceteris paribus* fortalece entonces la selección de casos (desempeño del desarrollo regional en México y China), con base en la aplicación de TAREA, y del análisis de resultados de los censos económicos para los dos países en etapas diferentes, con el sustento metodológico de una fuente internacional (CIU-3-NU).

De acuerdo con Sartori (2002) las comparaciones que nos interesan se llevan a cabo entre entidades que poseen atributos en parte compartidos (similares) y en parte no compartidos (declarados no comparados). Se establece como regla, que entre menor es el número de clases, mayor será la variación intra-clase. Al elegir sistemas más semejantes, cercanos y similares en la mayor cantidad de características posibles permitirá dejar de lado un número alto de variables bajo la cláusula del *ceteris paribus*, es decir, declarándolas iguales. Por el contrario, al elegir sistemas diferentes está claro que el fenómeno no se explica por factores sistémicos, los cuales deben ser ignorados.

Como un ejercicio adicional de lectura se revisaron las aportaciones de D. Nohlen (2020) al método comparativo, rescatándose ocho puntos vinculados a la toma de decisiones armonizadas entre sí en varios aspectos, para lograr una relación metodológica razonable que permite obtener más de cerca algunas variables en una selección fundada de casos. La caracterización de los ocho puntos da margen a esquematizar lo que debe contener la aplicación del método comparativo:

Ámbito de objeto: distingue entre las comparaciones de configuraciones de gran extensión (sociedad y sistema político) y segmentadas (partidos políticos y sindicatos). En el caso de la investigación se asume que es una comparación de gran extensión, ya que se revisa el modelo de apertura y los sistemas económicos implementados en México y China a inicios de la década de los ochenta.

Contexto: distingue entre contexto homogéneo (nacional) y heterogéneo (mundial). El examen de variables en escenarios heterogéneos se facilita con la comparación de equivalentes funcionales. La investigación a la que se hace referencia en este documento se configura en un contexto heterogéneo en el que se considera la selección de variables económicas y del análisis regional adaptada a las condiciones de cada país, con base en el sustento asociativo y con el uso de una fuente internacional de Naciones Unidas en materia de clasificación industrial.

Tiempo: distingue entre tres dimensiones de comparación (diacrónica, sincrónica y diferenciada en el tiempo). El estudio, se ubica en una comparación diacrónica, ya que el tiempo de análisis es longitudinal (1982-2012) con el uso de tiempos distintos en el análisis del software TAREA, 2009 para México y 2011 para China. Nohlen (2020) le encuentra una ventaja y una desventaja a la comparación diacrónica, en el primer rubro toma aspectos históricos-genéticos, mientras que en el segundo representa una situación desigual de los datos, manteniendo una comparación limitada

Espacio: distingue cuatro espacios de comparación —nacional, intranacional, supranacional y sociedad mundial—. La investigación se ubica en un espacio que Nohlen llama vía nacional (national bias) por el estudio de las naciones en la investigación comparativa, cuya característica general es tener un tiempo diacrónico, número de casos escasos (región centro de México y costera de China) y variables de contexto homogéneo (tasa de crecimiento y coeficiente de Gini).

Aplicación de estrategias de investigación: distingue entre el método de concordancia y el de diferencia. En el primero se busca una similitud de variables operativas (dependientes como independientes) y heterogéneas en la variable de contexto; en la de diferencia, se revisan variables operativas, como las que se tienen que explicar, así como las homogéneas en unas variables de contexto. En el estudio, se buscó aplicar el método de concordancia, ya que permite determinar la comprobación de hipótesis en el marco asociativo del modelo económico de apertura en los dos países, así como el comportamiento de variables económicas y de análisis regional.

Los conceptos deben ser precisos y transparentes: se asocia este aspecto con el vinculado a un marco teórico sólido, pertinente a las necesidades de investigación. En ese sentido, primero se articuló una propuesta relativa al pensamiento boiseriano del desarrollo regional (Boisier, 1981), y posteriormente se incluyeron a especialistas del desarrollo regional que

abordan dicha corriente desde la perspectiva del viejo y el nuevo paradigma del desarrollo regional.

Alcance de la comparación: el autor pide tener cuidado con la dimensión de las unidades analizadas en una investigación comparativa, pues si es grande, los conceptos son extensos y poco significativos. Lo que se recomienda es que se cuente con una delimitación como condición para que sea fructífera: en la investigación, se delimitan variables asociadas a los sectores económicos que aparecen en los censos económicos, a TAREA y al análisis de regiones seleccionadas desde los mecanismos de planificación en México y China.

Que el investigador cuente con libertad para el desarrollo de un diseño propio de investigación adecuado a la situación. Se asume que el marco de libertad implementado en la indagación está vinculado a la generación de un análisis comparativo diacrónico de dos economías emergentes con características de desarrollo similares que buscan ampliar las oportunidades de progreso hacia su contexto regional, conformado desde el ámbito de la planeación y la planificación económica, tomando en consideración a las dos regiones con mayor presencia económica: el centro en México y la costa en China.

Metodología

En esa sección, se realizan reflexiones sobre la metodología del Buro de Estadísticas de China e INEGI, de México, que se utilizaron para obtener información económica nacional y subnacional de los dos países, con base en el reconocimiento y estandarización de una fuente internacional para la clasificación de las actividades industriales que efectúa Naciones Unidas, que sirva de guía para la elaboración de comparaciones entre diferentes economías y que de sustento a las cifras generadas en sus censos económicos.

El levantamiento de la información que se requirió para alimentar el software TAREA para los dos países refiere a la utilización de datos de censos económicos para ambas naciones, en México se desarrolló su XI edición en 2009, documento que ha sido actualizado por INEGI para los periodos 2014, 2019 y 2024. Para el caso de China, en enero de 2014 se inició el tercer censo económico, el cual es elaborado por el Buro de Estadísticas de China, cuyos datos son publicados en el China Statistical Yearbook.

Cabe destacar que, no obstante a que los dos países utilizan fuentes internas para el levantamiento de los censos económicos, Sistema de Clasi-

ficación Industrial de América del Norte (SCIAN) para México y la Clasificación Industrial de la Economía Nacional para China, se identificó que tanto INEGI como el Buro de Estadísticas de China hacen alusión al uso de una misma fuente estandarizada y homologada de información en el contexto internacional diseñado por las Naciones Unidas, la cual distingue tres tipos de actividades económicas: principales, secundarias y auxiliares.

Con el objeto de corroborar la información se realizó una revisión de la publicación titulada "Metodología de los censos económicos: 2004-2013" editado por INEGI en 2013, cuyo contenido general abarca la respuesta a las preguntas: ¿qué son los censos económicos? y ¿cuáles son sus objetivos?, además de la comparabilidad histórica de los resultados de los censos económicos, los aspectos conceptuales (periodo de referencia, unidad de observación, clasificación, tipo de actividad), operativos (cobertura geográfica por actividad económica y marco geoestadístico nacional), procesamiento, revisión y análisis de la información, precisiones sobre la información y glosario.

En el anexo de dicha metodología, se observó una tabla para efectuar comparaciones entre los resultados de los censos a través de las definiciones de la observación censal, así como la temática de los cuestionarios de los censos económicos. La desagregación económica está basada en el SCIAN, el cual funge desde 1997 como el clasificador oficial de las actividades económicas de México, Estados Unidos y Canadá, estando conformado de 20 sectores, 95 subsectores y, 309 ramas, 631 subramas y 1051 clases de actividad (INEGI-SCIAN, 2023).

En la metodología de los censos económicos se establece que la mayoría de las subramas del SCIAN México son comparables con el nivel de dos dígitos del CIIU-3 de Naciones Unidas (2009). "Aunque el SCIAN difiere de otros sistemas de clasificación de actividades económicas, las estadísticas compiladas con el son comparables con las generadas con base en la clasificación industrial internacional uniforme (CIIU-3) de Naciones Unidas". (INEGI, 2013 p.10)

Al revisar el apéndice 11 titulado A comparison of indicators of economy and society among the people's Republic of China and other countries/regions que aparece en el China Statistical Yearbook del 2013, compilados por el Buro de Estadísticas de China, se indica que la mayoría de los datos para los países y regiones han sido ajustados con base en una organización internacional (Naciones Unidas), por lo que su alcance y cobertura son comparables (China Statistical Yearbook, 2013).

En la nota explicatoria de los principales indicadores estadísticos del China Statistical Yearbook (2013) se establece que la nueva clasificación de la economía nacional (GB/T) 4754-2011) es introducida al inicio de la compilación de las estadísticas anuales de 2012. La revisión basada en la clasificación de 2002 fue organizada por el Buro de Estadísticas de China, tomando en consideración los estándares internacionales de la clasificación industrial de todas las actividades económicas (ISIC/Rev.4) de las ONU. La nueva clasificación fue promulgada por el National Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine and the Standardization Administration of the People, Republic of China el 29 de abril de 2011, y se compone de 20 secciones, 93 divisiones, 432 grupos y 1094 clases.

De acuerdo con el decreto No. 415 emitido por el Consejo de Estado de la República Popular China, en el que se describen las regulaciones para realizar el Censo Económico Nacional, se identifica en el Artículo 14 del Capítulo IV (Organización y Conducción del Censo Económico) que el Consejo de Estado deberá establecer un grupo líder para el censo económico, el cual será responsable de la organización y conducción del trabajo. La oficina que encabezará dicho grupo se establecerá bajo las órdenes del Buro de Estadísticas de China.

En conclusión, tanto el SCIAN de México como la clasificación industrial de la economía nacional de China están basadas en CIIU-3 de Naciones Unidas, aspecto que se indicó en la parte introductoria del estudio titulado "Análisis del patrón de desarrollo región en México y China, 1980-2012", permitiendo con ello, que el método comparativo sea implementado con la seguridad y las acotaciones metodológicas que ello implica.

Resultados

Para explicar la comparación del patrón de desarrollo regional México-China, se revisaron dos apartados asociados al conocimiento del marco teórico sobre el desarrollo regional y al diseño del planteamiento del problema, con el propósito de identificar la situación económica y del desarrollo regional en los dos países. Las variables utilizadas fueron las siguientes: crecimiento económico, PIB per cápita, coeficiente de gini, pobreza multidimensional y calidad de vida, así como de temas relacionados con la planeación, descentralización y desigualdad regional.

En el documento se cumplió con el propósito de analizar e incluir en el marco teórico los conceptos de desarrollo, desarrollo económico, de-

sarrollo regional, el papel del gobierno en la economía, lo qué es la región, las desigualdades regionales, la región como ente único, homogéneo o heterogéneo, la existencia de un patrón de desarrollo regional y por qué es fundamental caracterizarlo, ya que la conceptualización asumida desde varias aristas, enfoques y autores coadyuvó a generar un soporte consistente a la presente investigación.

Asimismo, en el estudio, se revisó la consistencia y diseño del planteamiento del problema, en particular de cuatro de sus componentes: objetivo, hipótesis, justificación y metodología (Tabla 1), de los que se realizó el siguiente análisis.

Con base en el objetivo trazado, se cumplió con el cometido de analizar el patrón de desarrollo regional tanto de México como China, estableciendo como hallazgo general, la existencia de un comportamiento diferenciado en dicha tendencia, así como la presencia limitada de economías de aglomeración para las regiones, que conforman el sistema subnacional de cada economía, prevaleciendo en ese sentido, una fuerte concentración de las actividades económicas en el centro de México y la costa de China, producto de un proceso inacabado y distorsionado de descentralización y desconcentración de la política regional.

De igual forma, en la investigación se establecieron dos tipos de hipótesis, una general y dos secundarias (Tabla 1). Con el uso del software TAREA se validó la hipótesis general, puesto que ambos países requieren transformar los patrones de desarrollo regional, que actualmente registran, particularmente resulta necesario reformular la política económica con énfasis en una política regional sustentada en una estrategia de descentralización efectiva para la captación y distribución de mayor Inversión Extranjera Directa (IED) e inversión pública hacia el sistema subnacional y territorial tanto de México como de China.

Caber resaltar, que TAREA mide el crecimiento, ausencia y distribución económica de las actividades en el territorio; así como el uso de regionalizaciones económicas de los dos países con énfasis en los mecanismos de planeación y planificación.

Las dos hipótesis particulares planteadas también quedaron validadas en el presente estudio, por un lado se comprueba, a través de resultados estadísticos y de la aplicación de TAREA, que luego de más de tres décadas de haberse implementado el modelo de apertura externa en los dos países, persiste en el caso de México un aumento de la pobreza multidimensional, a

la par de un crecimiento sostenido a la alza del coeficiente de gini, —indicador que mide la desigualdad del ingreso entre la población—, mientras que en China, el aumento significativo del coeficiente de gini entre el periodo de 1980 y 2000 permitió explicar la presencia de un dualismo regional de dos niveles (costa-interior, urbano-rural) en el concierto de las regiones que lo conforman, quedando pendiente de comprobar la certeza que implica una supuesta reducción de la pobreza multidimensional reconocida por el propio gobierno y organismos internacionales.

Tabla 1. Planteamiento del problema: consistencia de cuatro de sus componentes. Nombre de la investigación: Análisis del patrón de desarrollo regional en México y China, 1980-2012

Componentes	Descripción de sus componentes
Objetivo	Explicar la caracterización del patrón de desarrollo regional, tanto en México como en China, para buscar explicaciones que coadyuven a comprender por qué en ambas economías aún no se registran los efectos favorables y potenciales de la estrategia de apertura implementada en los ochenta, la cual fue asociada inmediatamente a un incremento masivo de la productividad y de las exportaciones.
Hipótesis	Hipótesis general: para que México y China mejoren su rezago regional, deberán transformar el patrón de desarrollo regional que registran en la actualidad y propiciar un mayor eslabonamiento hacia las otras regiones Hipótesis secundaria: para que México y China impulsen un mayor desarrollo de sus regiones, primero deberán conocer el patrón de especialización regional que presentan, y a partir de allí, formular políticas de desarrollo regional más incluyentes, en el sentido de dar mayor alcance y cobertura a las otras regiones que los conforman” Hipótesis secundarias: Para México “el modelo de apertura externa reforzó el patrón de desarrollo regional desigual, propiciando con ello un doble aumento: de la pobreza multidimensional y del Coeficiente de Gini (CG) B) Para el caso de China “la apertura externa, generó un patrón de desarrollo regional, que ha propiciado fuertes desigualdades entre la región costera y las del interior del país, no obstante que tanto la pobreza absoluta como el CG han decrecido en los últimos años

Justificación	Puntos énfasis: Impulso del desarrollo regional en los dos países (logros, asignaturas pendientes) Continuidad en el impulso del desarrollo regional, a partir de sus políticas y estrategias particulares No hay investigación que considere el análisis de las regiones de México y China (comparación como método y técnica de análisis regional como instrumento) Generación de insumo de análisis y reflexión para los estudiosos del desarrollo regional
Metodología	Capítulo 3. Región y método: territorios diferenciados en México y China

Nota. Apéndice de tesis doctoral "Análisis del patrón de desarrollo regional en México y China, 1980-2012", identificado como Notas Aclaratorias (Orozco, 2014, p. 263-280)

La justificación o necesidad de realizar la presente investigación quedó sustentada en el siguiente hallazgo. El patrón de desarrollo regional para México indicó que está es una nación con un desarrollo subnacional distorsionado y desequilibrado, con una seria desigualdad territorial, del ingreso, del consumo, del destino de la inversión pública y de la IED, alta concentración económica, poblacional y de la toma de decisiones políticas, crecimiento caótico del espacio urbano, ausencia de planeación territorial, de clases empresariales, de financiamiento, la existencia clara de una divergencia en la formación de capital humano y del crecimiento del coeficiente de gini en los últimos 30 años.

En ese sentido, lo que aquí se requiere es una descentralización efectiva como la que apuntan Boisier (2004), o bien un federalismo regional conducente a que los territorios cumplan con el compromiso de modernizarse y estar a la altura de las circunstancias, que exige una población determinada.

Por su parte, el patrón regional que presentó China está sujeto a los efectos de las propias reformas económicas de finales de los ochentas, que favorecieron el desarrollo del este versus el oeste, con la instauración de políticas de puertas abiertas y preferenciales en la zona costera de dicho país, lo que ha generado un dualismo regional entre la costa y el interior; entre la ciudad y el campo; entre el este y el oeste; donde persiste la prosperidad por encima del desarrollo natural y seminatural de dichas latitudes. La política regional de Estado ha conllevado a que la zona costera capte más del 90% de IED y de exportaciones del país, así como la desincorporación de empresas propiedad del Estado. Los principales efectos son, entonces, una

alta disparidad del ingreso regional, desigualdad en el acceso a servicios públicos y protección social, incluso en el propio sistema aduanal.

La metodología diseñada para abordar el desarrollo regional de México y China es: descripción de región, del método comparativo y de los casos empíricos utilizados. Las variables usadas fueron las siguientes: relación transpacífica México-China, síntesis del pensamiento boiseriano, aplicación del software TAREA, características étnicas y geográficas de México y China, procesos de planificación económica en ambos países y regiones ganadoras.

El método comparativo, utilizado en esta investigación, resultó de la mayor utilidad para comprender, a partir de la aplicación de software TAREA, si las regiones crecen y cómo se concentran su producción o estancamiento de la misma. En el planteamiento del problema se retomaron algunos aspectos del desarrollo regional, tanto en México como en China, mismos que se irán reflejando con los datos derivados de la matriz secre, instrumento elaborado por Boisier en su paso por ILPES-CEPAL.

Con base a los resultados arrojados por TAREA para el caso de México (2009), los 19 sectores analizados y la regionalización propuesta (sur-sureste, centro, centro-occidente, noreste y noroeste), se observa que la industria manufactura concentró más del 50% de la actividad sectorial en cada una de las cinco regiones, y que el potencial minero lo tiene la región sur-sureste, ya que registró 46% de producción para este sector. Con los resultados anteriores se concluye que las actividades económicas permiten determinar que México no es del todo una nación con fuerza en el sector servicios.

Al revisar los resultados de la aplicación metodológica del software TAREA para nueve sectores y con datos del Buro de Estadísticas de China, 2011, se infiere como parte del patrón regional, que en dicha nación al igual que en México la producción industrial es la más dominante al concentrar 45.10% del contexto nacional, de la cual el centro representó 46.9%. La industria en China representa una especialización absoluta interregional, ya que significa, para cada una de las cuatro regiones, casi 50% de participación en términos producción.

Discusión

Esta sección consistió en validar las herramientas que sirvieron de respaldo para realizar la comparación diacrónica, considerando el uso de una fuente internacional estandarizada, la utilización del software TAREA y del levanta-

miento y difusión de estadísticas nacionales en México y China, a través de sus censos económicos.

Como se comentó previamente, en el apéndice del estudio sobre el patrón de desarrollo regional México-China se describió un apartado de “Notas Aclaratorias”, con el propósito de reflexionar si era posible utilizar una fuente de información económica estandarizada para los países que permitiera estudiar dos economías con tamaños de mercado y periodos de análisis diferentes. En ese tenor, se identificó que las clasificaciones industriales del SCIAN (México) y del Buro de Estadísticas de China están unificadas con la CIIU-3 de Naciones Unidas.

De acuerdo con la Organización Internacional del Trabajo (OIT, 2025) “La CIIU es una clasificación estándar de las actividades económicas dispuesta de forma que las entidades puedan clasificarse según la actividad que realizan. Las categorías de la CIIU en el nivel más detallado (clases) se delimitan según lo que es, en la mayoría de los países, la combinación habitual de actividades descritas en las unidades estadísticas y considera la importancia relativa de las actividades incluidas en estas clases. Cada grupo de la clasificación se designa mediante un título y un código de letra/número y se asocia a una descripción que especifica el ámbito de aplicación del grupo.

La estructura jerárquica incluye: secciones designadas por códigos de una letra; por ejemplo, A Agricultura, silvicultura y pesca; divisiones designadas por códigos de 2 dos dígitos; por ejemplo, 03 Pesca y Acuicultura; grupos escogidos por códigos de 3 dígitos; por ejemplo, 031 Pesca; clases establecidas por códigos de 4 cifras (0311) Pesca marítima.

Desde que se aprobó la versión original de la CIIU en 1948, la mayoría de los países de todo el mundo la vienen utilizando como su clasificación nacional de las actividades económicas o han elaborado categorizaciones nacionales derivadas de ella. Por consiguiente, la CIIU ha proporcionado orientación a las naciones para la elaboración de clasificaciones nacionales y se ha convertido en un instrumento importante para comparar a nivel internacional los datos estadísticos sobre las actividades económicas.

En ese ámbito de ideas, “las clasificaciones internacionales facilitan la armonización de conceptos y principios que deben regir para elaborar nuevas versiones. Se consideran básicas por servir de referencia y orientación a las clasificaciones multinacionales y nacionales” (DANE, 2003, p. 14).

Para Nohlen (2020), el enfoque comparativo se relaciona con la toma de decisiones armonizadas entre varios aspectos para lograr una relación

metodológica razonable, entre los que destacan los siguientes: el “ámbito de objeto”, que refiere a la comparación de gran extensión, infiriéndose que es el análisis del modelo económico de apertura para los dos países, lo que explica dicha variable; el “contexto” es homogéneo, ya que se estudian dos economías emergentes (México y China) y heterogéneo por sus diferencias económicas y de población.

El “tiempo” se caracterizó bajo un análisis diacrónico longitudinal al considerar un periodo determinado; el “espacio nacional”, al contemplar dos economías de la región de la Cuenca del Pacífico); la “estrategia de investigación”, se explica a través del método de concordancia y la comprobación de hipótesis basadas en la evolución de variables macroeconómicas seleccionadas; “los conceptos precisos y transparentes”, son aplicados a lo largo de la investigación e identificados en un glosario; el “alcance”, se interpreta, a través del desarrollo de sus principales sectores económicos; y la libertad para escribir, considerando el uso de la cláusula *ceteris paribus*.

El primer paso para preparar un análisis diacrónico es identificar una pregunta clara de investigación u objeto. Esta envuelve la definición de fenómenos históricos o procesos que deseas estudiar y determinar los aspectos específicos que se quieren investigar. Algunos ejemplos de preguntas de investigación que es posible dirigir, a través del análisis diacrónico incluyen ¿cómo las estructuras económicas y sociales de una región en particular cambian en el tiempo?; ¿cuáles son aquellos factores clave que contribuyen a surgir o caer de un imperio histórico? ¿cómo las tendencias intelectuales o culturales envuelven una respuesta a los mayores eventos históricos? (Lee, 2025).

Según Nohlen (2020) dependiendo del planteamiento del problema, es posible que un estudio de dos países (estudio binario) aporte resultados más provechosos que una investigación orientada al ideal de una cuantificación estadística de un gran número de casos o de una cantidad artificialmente elevada de ellos. Luego entonces, dicho señalamiento del autor, fortalece la comparación entre dos economías como México y China, al ser un estudio representativo por dos entes económicos nacionales.

Para Velázquez y Santisteban (2019), la comparación es la confrontación de objetos con el fin de poner de manifiesto los rasgos de semejanza o de diferencia entre ellos (o unos y otros a la vez). Es una premisa importante de la generalización, pues desempeña una gran función en los razonamientos por analogía. Los juicios que expresan el resultado de la comparación sirven

para descubrir el contenido de los conceptos acerca de los objetos. Lo que se estudia en la investigación es detectar el diferenciador entre los patrones de desarrollo regional de dos países, con el propósito de identificar, con la ayuda del software TAREA-CEPAL, las regiones económicas más dinámicas de México y China, resultando la zona centro para México y la costa para China.

Según Cervantes (2025), uno de los instrumentos más valiosos con los que se cuenta en México es el censo económico elaborado por INEGI. Este censo permite analizar de manera profunda y detallada los cambios en la dinámica económica a nivel sectorial y regional. Los resultados completos del censo brindan información valiosa sobre los avances y desafíos estructurales que enfrenta la economía. Entre otros aspectos, permite examinar temas como la productividad, el valor agregado y la informalidad.

De acuerdo con Milenio (2025), China publicó los resultados de su quinto censo económico nacional, los cuales muestran que la economía del país tuvo una base sólida, una fuerte resiliencia y un enorme potencial en los últimos cinco años. Los resultados del censo revelan que la estructura económica de China sigue mejorando. La industria terciaria cobró mayor importancia, representando 56.3 % del PIB en 2023, un aumento de más de dos puntos porcentuales con respecto a 2018.

El censo económico, una de las principales encuestas nacionales de China, proporciona una visión integral de las industrias secundaria y terciaria del país, ofreciendo información valiosa sobre su desarrollo social y económico. China llevó a cabo cuatro censos económicos nacionales en 2004, 2008, 2013 y 2018. El quinto censo comenzó formalmente en 2023, con un enfoque en la autenticidad y confiabilidad de los datos. Para garantizar la calidad de los datos, se diseñó un plan de censo científico y se fortaleció el control de calidad en todo el proceso.

Según Xinhua CGTN (2018), durante el censo se recabarán datos sobre la estructura de las empresas, salarios del personal, estatus financiero, capacidad de producción, consumo de energía y actividades de investigación y desarrollo. El censo abarcará a unos 30 millones de entidades y unidades de actividad industrial, así como a cerca de 60 millones de empresarios que trabajan por su cuenta.

El cuarto censo económico nacional de China es vital para proyectar las nuevas situaciones económicas, en particular el desarrollo de nuevos motores de crecimiento, dijo Ning Jizhe, subdirector de la Comisión Nacional de Desarrollo y Reforma y director del Buró Nacional de Estadísticas (BNE).

“El censo también promoverá el desarrollo de alta calidad de la economía de China y los resultados podrían ayudar a prevenir riesgos en medio del rápido desarrollo económico de China” (Xinhua, 2018).

En el estudio se utilizó y adaptó la matriz secre del software TAREA, diseñado por ILPES-CEPAL, la cual permitió agrupar los 17 sectores económicos de México (INEGI) y 9 de China (Buro de Estadísticas de China), con el objeto de medir el crecimiento de las actividades económicas en su territorios (estructura económica; dinámica y competitividad), resultando positivo su uso, ya que asintió medir más de 10 indicadores de referencia, concluyéndose que el sector industrial manufacturero concentró en promedio 50 % de la actividad sectorial en cada una de las regiones de México y China, considerando una fuerte presencia económica de la región centro para el primer país y costa para el segundo.

De acuerdo con el Centro de Estudios de Desarrollo Regional y Urbano Sustentable de la UNAM (2025). Estos sistemas computacionales (TAREA) fueron desarrollados por el ILPES en el marco de la aplicación de metodologías de análisis y planificación regional y local. Ambos sistemas han facilitado el manejo de algunas técnicas de análisis regional (TAR), lo que permite interrogarse sobre cuestiones que tienen que ver con los criterios de asignación de recursos, los efectos regionales y locales de la política económica, la distribución de las actividades en el territorio, y sobre el sistema institucional y los actores fundamentales relacionados con lo anterior.

Conclusiones

En la exploración de literatura se revisó si el estándar de clasificación industrial CIIU-3 de Naciones Unidas era de utilidad para homogeneizar estadísticas de dos instituciones (INEGI de México y Buro de Estadísticas de China) en dos periodos diferentes de levantamiento, concluyéndose que, de acuerdo con los marcos teóricos del método comparativo de tipo diacrónico, si es posible elegir dos momentos diferentes. Para nuestro caso, se utilizaron datos del Censo Económico de INEGI 2009 y el Statistical Yearbook de China para 2011.

Para afinar el método comparativo se eligió el software TAREA del ILPES-CEPAL, con el que fue posible interactuar con una matriz secre, con el propósito de configurar los 19 sectores económicos de México y 9 de China, permitiendo identificar el crecimiento económico regional y la dinámica económica en territorios ganadores de México y China, la región centro para el primero y la costa para el segundo, dejando constancia de las disparidades

que existen en ambas naciones, así como de la fuerte concentración y dependencia económica observada.

Se hace un reconocimiento o aplicación de la cláusula *ceteris paribus*, con el objeto de determinar la posibilidad de realizar comparaciones de tipo diacrónico, dejando constantes variables como el gran tamaño de mercado y población como el que tiene China con respecto a México, para luego continuar con aquellas que si eran susceptibles de comparación, así como a los ocho pasos de Nohlen (2020) para la toma de decisiones armoniosa al momento de realizar estudios comparativos, destacando las interpretaciones de los ámbitos de objeto, contexto, tiempo, espacio, estrategia, conceptos, alcance y libertad para el diseño propio de la investigación.

Se utilizaron como herramientas de estudio los censos económicos y las clasificaciones industriales de todas las actividades económicas para ambos países (dividiéndolas en principales, secundaria y auxiliares), y el CIIU-3 como fuente estadística de estandarización internacional de Naciones Unidas, con el objeto de cotejar resultados a dos dígitos, en millones de dólares, para el conjunto de 19 sectores económicos para México y 9 para China, permitiendo medir variables como el PIB, PIB per cápita e indicadores clave de crecimiento, así como la evolución y tendencias de cada uno de los sectores señalados.

Con respecto a la revisión de la consistencia de cuatro de los principales componentes de la introducción, particular de su planteamiento del problema (objetivo, hipótesis, justificación y metodología), se efectuaron dos apartados: el marco teórico y conceptual para identificar la situación económica y el desarrollo territorial en dos países, concluyéndose que para su elaboración bajo el concepto de “notas aclaratorias” (apéndice de la investigación) fue de gran utilidad para asegurar un claro abordaje del objetivo (características del patrón de desarrollo regional), con uso de variables per cápita, coeficiente de gini, pobreza y calidad de vida, observando que México y China enfrentan un patrón diferenciado con limitada presencia de economías de aglomeración, fuerte concentración de las actividades económicas la región centro (México) y costa (China), además de estudiarse conceptos como desarrollo, desarrollo económico, región y desigualdad.

Para la hipótesis general, se validó con TAREA la importancia de pensar en un proyecto de descentralización efectiva como el que sugiere Boisier (2002), con el objeto de atraer más IED y mejorar los procesos de planeación y planificación económica. Con respecto a las hipótesis particulares, fue

posible identificar el incremento de la pobreza, el coeficiente de gini y la aparición del dualismo regional.

Con la justificación o los motivos de la investigación, se observaron los logros y las asignaciones pendientes, siendo factible elaborar el estudio por la problemática regional que enfrentaba México: distorsionado, con desigualdad del ingreso, consumo, IED, pobreza y concentración económica; y las características de China: dualismo, 90 % de la IED y la exportación concentrada en la costa, servicios públicos y, protección social.

Para hacer la metodología resultó necesario estudiar el concepto de región, método comparativo, casos empíricos, relaciones transpacíficas, perspectiva boiseriana del desarrollo regional, así como la implementación de TAREA, planeación, regiones ganadoras, sectores económicos de INEGI-Buro del censo económico y clasificación industrial.

Finalmente, el cumplimiento del objetivo de la investigación llegó a un buen fin, ya que se establecieron criterios oportunos para comparar a México y a China, dejando de lado variables que eran complejas de valorar por las dimensiones económicas y poblaciones de China con respecto a México.

El efectuar las “notas aclaratorias” y argumentar con un estándar internacional de medición para validar las metodologías de levantamiento de información económica, permitió dar fuerza a los aspectos soporte de la problematización (introducción), por lo que la revisión de su consistencia coadyuvó a consolidar que los resultados arrojados en el cálculo de los indicadores regionales fueran interpretados con un criterio similar, no obstante a que los censos se implementaron en años diferentes y a que existen también un desigual número de sectores económicos.

Con respeto a las implicaciones teóricas del método comparativo para futuras investigaciones, se destaca la necesidad de continuar revisando las aportaciones vigentes sobre los temas objeto de estudio, con la posibilidad de encontrar valoraciones y métricas, que coadyuven a encontrar facilidades para comparar economías de tamaños diferentes, a través del uso de fuentes internacionales y de la selección de variables económicas estandarizadas en los escenarios macroeconómicos establecidos.

Referencias

- Boisier, S. (2004). Desarrollo territorial y descentralización, el desarrollo en el lugar y en manos de la gente. *Revista Eure*, XXX (90), pp. 27–40.
- Boisier, S. (1981). Experiencias de planificación regional en América Latina. Una teoría en busca de una práctica. ILPES-CEPAL. <https://repositorio.cepal.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/963a5410-dfa2-44f6-8d0f-8ae0ad2322e6/content>
- Bronislaw Duda, M. (1995). El método comparativo en los estudios latinoamericanos de Polonia. *Cuyo, Anuario de Filosofía Argentina y americana*, nº 12, pp. 105-110 https://bdigital.uncu.edu.ar/objetos_digitales/1652/bronislawacuyo12.pdf
- Cervantes Arenillas, D. (2025). Economía mexicana: retos y oportunidades ante el Censo Económico 2024. *El Economista* <https://www.eleconomista.com.mx/opinion/economia-mexicana-retos-oportunidades-censo-economico-20250320-751326.html>
- Departamento Administrativo Nacional para Colombia (DANE) (2003). Clasificación Industrial Internacional Uniforme de Todas las Actividades Económicas, revisión 3 adaptada para Colombia. <https://www.dane.gov.co/files/sen/nomenclatura/ciiu/CIIURev3AC.pdf>
- Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI) (2009). Censo económico 2009. <https://www.inegi.org.mx/programas/ce/2009/>
- Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI) (2013). Metodología de los censos económicos 2004-2013. INEGI. https://www.inegi.org.mx/contenidos/productos/prod_serv/contenidos/espanol/bvinegi/productos/metodologias/censo_econo/censo_eco_2004/Met_CE2004.pdf
- Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI) (2023). Sistema de Clasificación Industrial de América del Norte, México SCIAN 2023. <https://www.inegi.org.mx/scian/>
- Gómez Rodríguez, A. (2001). Las leyes del ceteris paribus y la inexactitud de la economía. *Revista Teorema*. Vol. XX(3), 2001. <https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=4250281>
- González García, J., Calderón Villareal, C., y Gómez Chiñas, C. (2015). Análisis de los vínculos económicos de México con China: ¿Es posible pasar de la larga marcha de enfrentamientos al gran salto adelante en la nueva relación? *Revista México en la Cuenca del Pacífico*. vol.4 (12) Guadalajara sep./dic. 2015 https://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S2007-53082015000300039
- Lee, S. (2025). Masterind diachronics analysis: techniques and Best practices. *A Step-by-Step Guide to Conducting Effective Diachronic Analysis in Historiography*. Number Analytics. <https://www.numberanalytics.com/blog/mastering-diachronic-analysis-techniques-best-practices>
- Lira, L. y Quiroga, B. (2009). Técnicas de Análisis Regional. Serie de Manuales. ILPES- CEPAL. <https://repositorio.cepal.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/c6aa2d07-862d-465e-b3d1-a1f8259e367a/content>
- Milenio (2025). Quinto censo económico de China: Resalta nueva vitalidad del desarrollo nacional. Milenio. <https://www.milenio.com/negocios/censo-economico-china-resalta-vitalidad-desarrollo-nacional>
- Naciones Unidas (2009). Clasificación Industrial Uniforme de Todas las Actividades Económicas (CIIU-3). NY: Departamento de Estudios Económicos y Sociales. División de Estadísticas. https://unstats.un.org/unsd/publication/seriesm/seriesm_4rev4s.pdf

- National Bureau of Statistics of China. (2013). China Statistical Yearbook 2013. National Accounts. <https://www.stats.gov.cn/sj/ndsj/2013/indexeh.htm>
- National Bureau of Statistics of China (2011-2024). Classifications. <https://www.stats.gov.cn/english/>
- Nohlen, D. (2020). El método comparativo. UNAM Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas <https://archivos.juridicas.unam.mx/www/bjv/libros/13/6180/5.pdf>
- OIT (2025). Clasificación Industrial Internacional Uniforme de Todas las Actividades Económicas (CIIU). <https://ilostat.ilo.org/es/methods/concepts-and-definitions/classification-economic-activities/>
- Orozco Plascencia, J.M. (2014). Análisis del patrón de desarrollo regional en México y China, 1980-2012". Notas Aclaratorias. [Tesis doctoral] Universidad de Colima.
- Sartori, G. y Morlino, L. (Comps.). (1999-2002). La comparación en las Ciencias Sociales, Alianza Editorial. <https://www.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/la-comparación-en-las-ciencias-sociales/docview/1424660881/se-2>
- Schteingart, M. y Sierra, A. (2024). Los estudios comparativos en el campo de la investigación urbana. Estudios demográficos y urbanos, 39(1), e2209. Epub 07 de junio de 2024. <https://doi.org/10.24201/edu.v39i1.2209>
- UNAM (2025). Software TAREA-ELITE metodologías de análisis y planificación regional y local: México. Centro de Estudios de Desarrollo Regional y Urbano Sustentable <http://www.economia.unam.mx/cedrus/paqueteria.html>
- Velázquez Ávila K. M. y Santisteban Naranjo E. (2019). El método comparativo funcional: una vía para enseñar gramática. Didáctica. Lengua y Literatura, 31 (2019), 29-45. <https://doi.org/10.5209/dida.65936>
- Xinhua (2018). China realizará censo económico nacional exhaustivo y preciso. CGTN <https://espanol.cgtn.com/news/3d3d774d6656544f32637a6333566d54/p.html>